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MAHĀBHĀṢYADĪPIKĀ
OF
BHARTṚHARI

Fascicule IV : Āhnika I

critically edited by
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BHANDARKAR ORIENTAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
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PREFACE

This so-called 'critical edition' (with translation) of the first Āhnika of Bhartṛhari's *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* is no more, and can be no more, than an attempt to make sense of an often unintelligible text, handed down in one incomplete manuscript. This being the case, it can in no way claim to be final. Other reconstructions and interpretations based on the same text can often be conceived, and it is not usually possible to ascertain which of these will be closest to Bhartṛhari's original text and meaning. Only in exceptional cases is it possible to reconstrue an original reading with some degree of certainty. Examples where this is possible are, first of all, quotations from earlier works,[1] and quotations from Bhartṛhari in later works. In almost all other cases any emendation of the text is bound to be conjectural.

It is for this reason that all serious students of the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* will want to use, besides this edition, a copy of the manuscript as well as the two other editions of the texts.[2] As, therefore, all available evidence is at the disposal of the reader, manuscript readings have not been recorded in footnotes.

My connection with Bhartṛhari's *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* has been a long one. In 1976, while studying in Poona, I approached Professor K. V. Abhyankar — one of the editors of this text — with the request to read the *Dīpikā* with me. Professor Abhyankar kindly agreed, but we had read no more than a few pages before he was cruelly murdered. I decided to continue on my own, and prepared some kind of translation of the first Āhnika in the course of 1977. I then abandoned this task until 1984 when, at the instigation of Ācārya V. P. Limaye, who most unfortunately died soon afterwards, I was involved in the new *Dīpikā* project of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. For this purpose I spent the months of July, August, and September of 1984 in Poona. During this period I was able to discuss

1. Vedic quotations in the text have all been traced by Rau (1980). For this reason not all Vedic texts in which a certain quotation occurs have been enumerated in the translation and notes.

2. Bibliographical details of these editions can be found in the Bibliography at the end of this book, under 'Bhartṛhari'. Copies of the manuscript have been made available by the Bhandarkar Institute.

part of my work with Professor Dr. S. D. Laddu. What remained to be done was completed in the following months back in Europe.

I thank Prof. Laddu for working with me on this interesting project, the authorities of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute for inviting me to participate in it, the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research (ZWO) for funding my research, and the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO) for funding my trip to India.

Leiden, 13-8-1986 J. B.

ABBREVIATIONS

AB	*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*
AL	Edition of *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* by Abhyankar and Limaye
ĀśvŚS	*Āsvalāyana Śrauta Sūtra*
CE	'Critical edition' of *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*
Dhp	Dhātupāṭha
KapS	*Kapiṣṭhala Saṃhitā*
KātyŚS	*Kātyāyana Śrauta Sūtra*
KA	*Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa*
KS	*Kāṭhaka Saṃhitā*
Mbh	*Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali, ed. by Kielhorn
MPV	*Mahābhāṣya Pradīpa Vyākhyānāni*
Ms	Manuscript of *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*
MS	*Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā*
MŚS	*Mānava Śrauta Sūtra*
Nir	*Nirukta*
NSP	Nirṇaya-sagar Press edition of Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, Bombay 1932 f.
P.	Pāṇinian sūtra
PMS	Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra
PS	*Paribhāṣā-Saṃgraha*, ed. by K. V. Abhyankar
RV	*Ṛgveda*
ŚB	*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*
ŚŚS	*Śāṅkhāyana Śrauta Sūtra*
Sw	Edition of *Mahābhāsyadīpikā* by Swaminathan
TA	*Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*
TB	*Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*
TS	*Taittirīya Saṃhitā*
UṇS	Uṇādi Sūtra
VārŚS	*Vārāha Śrauta Sūtra*
VP	*Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari

भर्तृहरिविरचितायां

महाभाष्यदीपिकायां प्रथममाह्निकम्

महाभाष्यदीपिकायां प्रथममाह्निकम्

[१.१] [प्राधान्यख्या]पनार्थं वैदिकानां पृथगुपादानम्। प्राधान्यस्यापि हि सामान्येऽप्यन्तर्भूतस्य पृथगुपदेशो दृश्यते, ब्राह्मणा आयाता वसिष्ठोऽप्यायात इति। अथ वा लौकिकानामित्येवमुक्ते लौकिकशब्दं सामान्यमपि [न?] विशेषं प्रतिपद्येत। भाषाशब्दानामेवेदमनुशासनं न वैदिकानाम्। यस्मात्ते हि नियतसंवेशाः प्रतिनियतप्रातिशाख्याः, दृष्टानुविधित्वात्तेष्विति। अत उभयोरुपादानम्—**लौकिकानां वैदिकानां चेति**।

[१.२] ननु चैवमात्मकत्वे सति नानेनानुशासनं वैदिकानामिति ये सन्ति प्रातिशाख्यलक्षणे। पुरुषाः प्रमादादशक्तेर्वा अपभाषन्ते यत इदमनुशासनम्। यथा तैत्तिरीयाः कृतणत्वमग्निशब्दमुच्चारयन्ति। किं च। ये च शब्दा अनाम्नाता अपूर्वस्याभिव्यक्तौ व्याप्रियन्ते, तद्यथा संख्याय कपालान्युद्वासयतीति संख्याशब्दप्रतिपादितैः एको द्वौ त्रय उद्वासयन् शास्त्रेणानुशिष्टैरुद्वासयति। एवं येयमग्निहोत्रे मानुषीवदिदं कुर्वित्यत्रापि विनियोगशब्दाः शास्त्रेणान्वाख्याताः प्रयोक्तव्या इति तेषु व्यापारः। ये चान्ये लब्धानुपूर्वीकाः तेष्वपि व्यापारोऽस्ति। कथमिति। शास्त्रपूर्वे प्रयोगेऽभ्युदयः। शास्त्रात् विज्ञाततत्त्वाः प्रयुज्यमाना धर्मः।

[१.३] **लौकिकास्तावत्। गौरश्वः पुरुषो हस्ती ब्राह्मण [इति]।** इतिः प्रकारार्थ एवंप्रकारादौ अधिकृतत्वाच्चान्वाख्यानस्य। लोके चानियतपौर्वापर्याणि वाक्येष्वर्थप्रधानानि पदान्येवान्वाख्यायन्त इति लौकिकाः पदभूता एव निर्दिश्यन्ते। अपौरुषेयवैदिकानां शमादयो न केवलाः प्रयुज्यन्त इति वाक्यान्येव निर्दिश्यन्ते। वाक्यस्थानामेवानुशासनं न वाक्यानामेव। एतच्च सर्वं भाष्यकारस्य प्रयोजनानि वक्तुः प्रस्तावनामात्रम्। प्राक्प्रयोजनान्वाख्यानमध्येतृप्रोत्साहनार्थमिति।

[२.१] अथ गौरित्ययवशब्दोऽयं बहुष्वर्थेषु अभिधादिषु एव। तच्च सर्वं भाष्यकारनिर्दिष्टम्। यथा संस्कारशब्दः शास्त्रान्तरे एवमनेकार्थ इति। शब्दानुशासनमिति शब्दशब्दः तस्य यदि प्रसिद्धार्थे वृत्तिः कल्प्यते अनुशासनवैयर्थ्यमेव। लौकिकानां कर्तृसिद्धत्वात् वैदिकानां च वेदे। अत्र यथैव कश्चित् अथातो निश्वास-

प्रश्वासान् व्याख्यास्यामः एवं ब्रुवन्ननर्थकं ब्रूयात् एवं शब्दानुशासनमपि । तस्मादत्र शब्दशब्दः प्रसिद्धेऽर्थे [न] संभवति । एवं केषां शब्दानामित्यत्रापि । एवं गौरश्वः पुरुष इति । एवं शब्दशब्दो यदि वार्थे वृत्तः अनेनोपात्तः तस्य चाप्यनुशासने सति प्रयोजनम् । अथास्य कश्चिदन्यः पारिभाषिकः शब्दोऽस्ति यस्यानुशासनं क्रियते स च न परिभाषां गच्छति । गौरित्यत्र कः शब्दः । अथ वा द्वौ भागौ शब्दस्य स्वरूपभागोऽर्थभागश्च । रूपभागेऽन्वाख्यानवैयर्थ्यात् द्वितीयो भाग आश्रीयते तदन्वाख्यानात् शब्देनेति । यथा धर्मं व्याख्यास्याम इति प्रस्तुत्य द्रव्याद्युपदेशस्तत्प्रतिपत्तेरेव । अथापि चात्र गौरिति शब्देन द्रव्यादयः साहचर्यादुच्यन्ते ।

[२. २] तत्र गौरित्येतस्मिन् संनिविष्टांस्तानुपन्यस्यति । **किं यत्तत् सास्नालाङ्गूलखुरककुदविषाणि अर्थरूपम्** । द्रव्यपदार्थिकस्य हि गोशब्दे केनचिद् धर्मेण असंस्पृष्टस्य निरुपाख्यस्य द्रव्यस्य विषाणादयः संसर्गिणोऽर्थभेदकाः अगोशब्दवाच्यस्य तु [न] । यथा गुडस्य माधुर्यमन्धकारे द्रव्यान्तरेभ्यो भेदकं गुडोऽयं नान्यद्रव्यमिति । अर्थरूपो गोपिण्ड इत्यर्थः । **नेत्याह । द्रव्यं नाम तदिति । नेत्याह ।** नेदं गोशब्द इत्येवं प्रसिद्धम् । किं तर्हि । धर्मान्तरेण प्रसिद्धमिति । धर्मान्तरं च दर्शयति । **द्रव्यं नाम तदिति** । यथा संख्याया एकशेषो द्वाभ्यां निर्वर्त्यते संख्याया अर्थासंप्रत्ययात् अन्यपदार्थत्वाच्च अनेकशेष इत्येवम् । किमिति द्रव्यस्य स्वां प्रसिद्धिमुत्सृज्य प्रसिद्ध्यन्तरेण च व्यपदेशः स्यात् । द्रव्यानुशासनं चेद्विवक्षितमभविष्यत् एवमेवावक्ष्यत्--द्रव्यानुशासनमिति । **यत्तर्हि तदिङ्गितं चेष्टितं निमिषितमिति** । इङ्गितं नामाभिप्रायस्य सूचकः कश्चिदेव शरीरगतो विकारः । चेष्टितं कायपरिस्पन्दः । निमिषितमक्षिगताः क्रियाः । कथमासां शब्दत्वं मन्येत । संभवित्वादासां क्रियाणाम् । संभवन्ति ह्येताः क्रियाः गवार्थे । अथ वा जातेरेव गोत्वस्य क्रियात्वम् । यथा सत्तत्यस्याः क्रियाशब्देनाभिधानमस्ति । यथैव गतं गोत्वमेवं इङ्गिताद्यप्यर्थतः महिषादिषु दृष्टम् । व्युत्पत्त्यापि कर्मण्याश्रीयमाणे गमिवत् विशेषणं दुराख्यानमुपाददीत गच्छति गर्जति गदति वा गौरिति । एवं निमेषादयोऽपि शब्दत्वेन व्यपदिश्यन्ते । अत्रापि तथैव धर्मान्तरेण प्रसिद्धिमाह – **नेत्याह । क्रिया नामेति । यत्तर्हि शुक्लो नील** इति । एषामपि संभवित्वात् विशेषेण चेङ्गितादिवदवस्थानात् । भिन्नानि गोविषयाणि शौक्ल्यादीन्यश्वविषयेभ्यः । अतश्च भिन्नानि यदश्वः कर्कः शोणो हेम इत्युच्यते, गौस्तु शुक्लो रक्तो नील इति । तथा वर्णसाधनोऽप्येवं शक्यते कल्पयितुं गम्यतेऽनेनेति । शुक्लादिभिश्च गम्यतेऽन्योऽयमस्मादर्थान्तरमिति । **नेत्याह । गुणो नाम सः** । अत्राप्यन्यया बुद्ध्या कथनमर्थान्तरादिति । नेत्याह गुणो नाम स इति न

युक्तं द्रव्यस्य निर्देशात् । नैष दोषः । उभयवचनात् । शुक्लादयो द्रव्यवत् प्रागुपन्यस्ताः । संप्रति गुणपरो निर्देश इति । यत्तर्हि भिन्नेष्वभिन्नमित्येकत्वं कथयति । छिन्नेष्वाच्छिन्नमिति नित्यत्वं जातेराह । सामान्यभूतम् इति । भूतशब्द उपमावाची । तत्र येषामर्थान्तरभूता जातिः, तेषां विशिष्टेषु गोपिण्डेषु अनुवर्तमानं गोत्वं तेषां सामान्यं नाश्वादीनां सर्वेषामिति तदपेक्ष उपमासंबन्धः । येषां तत् द्रव्याणि च तेषामपि येभ्योऽभेदो नोपपद्यते तेषां परित्यागाद्यस्माच्च शक्याभेदप्रतीतिः तस्य चोपादानात् सामान्यगुणत्वमित्युक्तम् । नेत्याह । आकृतिर्नाम सा । आकृतिरिति [न] तत् संस्थानम् । किं तर्हि ? जातिरेव । यथाकृत्यभिव्यञ्जका (?) वाजप्यायन इति । आक्रियतेऽनयेति आकृतिः । आक्रियन्ते इति भिद्यन्ते पदार्थान्तरेभ्य इत्याकृतिः (?) । आक्रियेते बुद्धिशब्दावस्या इति आकृतिः । संप्रति द्रव्यादिषु निरस्तेषु द्वयमपि स्थितं समुदायो वा कश्चित् पारिभाषिको [वा] । तत्र समुदायोऽपि द्रव्यादिवत् समुदाय इति प्रसिद्धः । अन्यश्च पारिभाषिको नास्ति । प्रसिद्धस्य चोपादाने वैयर्थ्यमित्यतः पृच्छति– कस्तर्हि शब्द इति । येनोच्चारितेनेति । अत्रानेकं दर्शनम् । केचिन्मन्यन्ते । यो वायमुच्चार्यते क्रमवान् अवरः । कश्चिदन्यः अक्रमः शब्दात्मा बुद्धिस्थो विगाहते । तस्मादर्थप्रतिपत्तिः । कुतः । यथैवार्थान्तरनिबन्धनो नार्थान्तरं प्रत्याययति एवं स्वरूपनिबन्धनो नोत्सहते प्रत्याययितुम् । अन्ये मन्यन्ते । यथा वर्णेषु वर्णतुरीया भागा वर्णजातिं व्यञ्जयन्ति एवं वर्णा वाक्यान्तरेषु ये क्रमजन्मानः अयुगपत्कालास्ते तां पदस्थां वर्णजातिमभिव्यञ्जयन्ति । वृक्षशब्दो वृक्षत्वम् । जातेरर्थस्य प्रतिपत्तिः । एतच्च अर्थस्वरूपं स्फोटोऽयमेव शब्दात्मा नित्यः । ये तु क्रमजन्मानः अयुगपत्काला, व्यक्तयो ध्वन्यात्मानस्ते इति । अन्ये मन्यन्ते । द्विशक्तिः शब्द आत्मप्रकाशनेऽर्थप्रकाशने च समर्थः । यथा प्रदीपः आत्मानं प्रकाशयन् निध्यर्थान् प्रकाशयति । यस्त्वाध्यात्मिकः इन्द्रियाख्यः प्रकाशः स आत्मानमप्रकाशयन् बाह्यमर्थं प्रकाशयतीति । अतो ग्रन्थो येनोच्चारितेनेति उभयथा वर्ण्यते । येनोच्चारितेन प्रकाशितेन, अथ वा येनोच्चारितेनेति । अथ वा प्रतीतपदार्थक इति । शब्दः इत्येतस्य प्रतीतः पदार्थः ध्वनिः । ध्वनिरस्याभिधेयः । ध्वनावयमर्थप्रकरणशब्दान्तराण्यन्तरेण स्वरूपं प्रतिलभते । एतमेवार्थं पदग्रहणेन व्याचष्टे । पदस्यायमर्थो नार्थो वाक्यगम्य इति । शब्दः । किमर्थं पुनरिदमुच्यते । निर्णयस्य व्याकरणापाकरणाभ्यां प्रकरणप्रवृत्तिदर्शनात् । तद्यथा । कति भवतः पुत्रा इत्युक्ते संख्या पूर्वं संख्यामुपादाय प्रश्ने निसृता । तस्याः निर्णयो व्याकरणेन अपाकरणेन वा । कश्चिदाह एको द्वौ बहव इति । एकोऽपि मे नास्ति [इति] अयमपाकरोत्येव प्रश्नम्, नैवायं प्रष्टव्य इति । एवमिहापि गौरित्यत्र कः शब्द इति नैवायं प्रष्टव्यः प्रसिद्धयुप-

रोधात् । य एव प्रसिद्धः शब्दस्तस्यैव शब्दशब्देन ग्रहणम् । प्रतीतपदार्थकतां च कथयति । शब्दं कुरु । मा शब्दं कार्षीः । शब्दकार्ययं माणवक इति ध्वनिं कुर्वन्नुच्यते । तत्र ध्वनिं कुर्वन् इतीदं शब्दकार्ययमित्यस्य संबन्धित्वेनोपात्तम् । पूर्वयोस्त्वन्यत् प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । अथ वा यो ध्वनिं करोति स प्रेर्यते शब्दं कुरु इति । एवं प्रवृत्तक्रियश्च प्रतिषिध्यते इति ध्वनिमारभमाण एव प्रतिषिध्यते मा शब्दं कार्षीरिति । ननु च ध्वनिः शब्दगुणः । एवं ह्युक्तम् —

स्फोटः शब्दो ध्वनिस्तस्य व्यायामादुपजायते ॥ इति ॥

उच्यते । द्रव्यादयो न भवन्ति शब्दाः, एवंपरायां चोदनायां ध्वनिशब्दयोरन्यत्वे प्रयोजनाभावात् एकत्वेन व्यपदेशः । इतरः न चेत् प्रसिद्ध्युपरोधो य एव लौकिकः शब्दोऽसावेवाश्रीयते । तस्य चेदमनुशासनं शास्त्रम् ॥

[३] शास्त्रे च या प्रवृत्तिः अध्ययनं प्रति सा सत्यर्थित्वे । अर्थित्वं च सत्सु प्रयोजनेषु । न चेदं नित्यकर्मावश्यं कर्तव्यम् । नित्ये कर्मण्यप्रवृत्तावधर्मः । अनित्येषु कामचारः । यदि च प्रयोजनानि अस्य न भविष्यन्ति [न] ततः प्रवर्तिष्यत इति पृच्छति — **कानि पुनरस्य शब्दानुशासनस्य प्रयोजनानि । रक्षोहागमलघ्वसंदेहाः प्रयोजनम् ।**

[३. १] सतोऽर्थस्यापायपरिहारो रक्षा नाम । **लोपागमवर्णविकारज्ञो हि सम्यक् वेदाननुपालयिष्यतीति ।** लोपोदाहरणम् । पीवोपवसनादीनां छन्दसि लोपः । पीवोपवसनानां पयोपवसनानामिति । आगमः । नीचाया दुक् छन्दसि नीचादुच्चा इति । तथा क्त्वो यक् । सौभाग्यमस्यै दत्त्वायाथास्तं वि परेतन । विकारः । हृग्रहोर्भः छन्दसि । तत् कन्यासु सुकन्ये किमिति मां जीर्णिमनर्थ्यं जर्भुराणं कृत्यारूपं कामयसे । तथा उद्ग्राभं च निग्राभं च ब्रह्म देवा अवीवृधन् । मघोर्गृह्णाति । क्वचित् त्वविकारः । आह । स्यादीनां व्यत्ययस्ततो बाहुलकेन कृतसाधुत्वः । यथा त्रिष्टुभौजः शुभितमुग्रवीरम् । सुहितमिति प्राप्नोति । ननु चेह लोपागमवर्णविकाराः कृत्स्नाम्नायग्रन्थस्य तथाभूतस्य पाठात् ज्ञाता एव । उच्यते । प्रयोक्त्रधीनत्वात् प्रयोगस्य । प्रयोक्ता च प्रमादात् कर्णदोषात विस्मरणाद्वान्यथोच्चारयेत् संदिह्येत वा । तज्ज्ञाश्चासंनिहिताः । सन्ति चान्यशास्त्रज्ञाः । वेदादन्यदुच्चारयन् म्लिष्टमुच्चारयेत् । अतोऽस्मिन् स्थित्यन्तरे सति नैव कश्चिदुपश्लिष्येत् । आत्मसंस्कारार्थं चाध्येयं व्याकरणम् । अतश्च सम्यग्ग्रहणम् । कृतात्मसंस्कारो हि सम्यग्वेदपरिपालने समर्थः ।

[३. २. १] ऊहः खल्वपि । प्रकृतौ समर्थानां विकारेषु सामर्थ्याभावः । प्रकृतिरुपादानार्थे प्रसक्ते शब्दलिङ्गवचनान्तरेण विक्रियते । तद्यथा । प्रकृतावग्नय इति अग्निशब्दः समर्थो दृष्टः । तत्र विकारेषु ऊहः । एकदेशापादाने निवृत्तौ अधिकृतायां मुख्यवृत्तिव्यतिक्रमेण वार्थान्तरोपादाने प्रसक्तिः । अर्थान्तरेष्वर्थान्तरवृत्तेरुपादानं क्रियते । तत्र यदि विकारस्तूष्णीमुपांशु क्रियते शब्दवती प्रकृतिः अशब्दो विकारः स्यात् । अथाप्यग्निशब्द एवोपादीयेत । मुख्या वृत्तिः सूर्यार्थं न प्रतिपादयेत् । अथाप्यस्य गुणादर्थान्तरे सूर्ये मुख्यवृत्तिव्यतिक्रमेण प्रयोग आश्रीयेत, प्रकृतिविपरीतः शब्दप्रवृत्तिधर्मः आश्रितः स्यात् । तस्मादत्र वाक्यान्तरमेतद्विभक्तिकमुपादीयते ।

[३. २. २] आश्रयलिङ्गवचनभेदेन भवत्यूहः । तद्यथा । देवीरापः शुद्धा यूयम् । देव आज्य शुद्धं त्वम् । शुद्धमित्येतत् प्रथमान्तं अव्यतिरिक्तप्रातिपदिकार्थं यदामन्त्रितान्तमिति । विभक्त्यन्तराणामप्यायुराशास्ते इति आयुराशासाते [इति] आयुराशासते इति । येषां तु प्रकृतार्थे विधिना सामर्थ्यं नास्ति तद्यथा वायवः स्थोपायवः स्थेति प्रकृतौ एव बहुवचने वत्सो विधीयते तत्रासामर्थ्यात् विकृतावूहो न भवति । तथैकस्मिन्नेव प्रकृतिपाशे पाशानिति बहुवचनान्तं श्रूयते, अदितिः पाशान् प्रमुमोक्त्वेति । तत्रापि विकृतावूहो नास्ति । वाजसनेयिनां त्वेकवचनान्तः पठ्यते, अदितिः पाशमिति । तेषामूहः प्राप्नोति यदि तत्रास्त्यदितिः । अथ वा पाशेषु नोह इति अनेन तु नैगमविभाषा । बहुवचने सति यथेष्टं प्रयोगो भवति । जूरसि धृता मनसा जुष्टा विष्णवे तस्यास्ते सत्यसवस इति एवं वेदे स्त्रीलिङ्गेन पठितः । तस्मा[द् य]दा साद्यस्क्रेषु साण्डस्त्रिवत्सः सोमक्रयणो भवति तदा स्त्र्यर्थवृत्तितामनपेक्ष्यैव पदानां पुमर्थाभिधायिनमदृष्टं वेदे पुंशब्दमूहन्ते । जूरसि धृतो मनसा जुष्टो विष्णवे तस्य ते सत्यसवस इति । तथा राजक्रयणीसंस्तवे चिदसि मनासि धीरसि दक्षिणासि यज्ञियासि क्षत्रियास्यदितिरस्युभयतःशीर्ष्णी सा नः सुप्राची सुप्रतीची भव सा देवि देवमच्छेहीति स्त्रीलिङ्गेन पठितः । साद्यस्क्रेषु पुलँलिङ्गेनोह्यते । चिदसि मनोऽसि धीरसि दक्षिणोऽसि यज्ञियोऽसि क्षत्रियोऽस्युभयतःशीर्ष्णा स नः सुप्राक् सुप्रत्यग् भव स देव देवमच्छेहीति । वाजसनेयिनस्तथैवैनमूहन्ते । तथा सोमक्रयण्यानयनमन्त्रे स्त्रीलिङ्गानि पदानि वस्व्यसि रुद्रासि अदितिरस्यादित्यासि चन्द्रासीति । एतेषां साद्यस्क्रेषूहो भवति । वसुरसि रुद्रोऽसि अदितिरसि आदित्योऽसि चन्द्रोऽसीति । तथा पशुप्रकृतौ पुलँलिङ्गेन मन्त्रः पठितः । दारु चास्मिन् प्रतिमुञ्चति । तत्र यदा मूर्धन्यस्या आलभ्यते तदा स्त्रीप्रत्ययमूहन्ते । ता अस्यै प्रतिवेद-

येति । तथा पशावेव हुतो याहि पथिभिर्देवयानैरिति, ऊहे हुता याहि पथिभिर्देवयानैरिति ।

[३. २. ३] ऊह्यमानानां चामन्त्रत्वान्मन्त्रे घसह्वरेत्येवमादि न भवतीति एके मन्यन्ते । कथं तर्ह्यघस्तामिति । तथा पठितत्वाददोषः । इन्द्राग्निभ्यां छागेनाघस्तां तं मेदस्तः प्रतिपचताग्रभीष्टामवीवृधेतां पुरोडाशेनेति । तस्मादक्षन्नित्यूहो मास्त्वमानुषत्वादित्येके मन्यन्ते । मन्त्रान्तराण्येवैतान्यूहविषयाणीत्यपरे मन्यन्ते । अघसदघसतामघसन्नग्रभीषुरक्षन्नित्यूहप्रकरणे पठ्यते । तथा आम्नाय एव । घर्मस्य तपसा तप्यध्वमिति तप्यस्व तप्येथामिति क्वचिदूहो निर्दिश्यते । शाखान्तरेषु च बहव ऊहितव्या भाव्यन्ते । एवमिदमूह्यमिदमनूह्यमिति न्यायादवस्थिते लिङ्गवचनविभक्तीनां सम्यग्विनियोगे व्याकरणस्य व्यापारः ।

[३. २. ४] अङ्गानि ज्ञातिनामान्युपमा चेन्द्रियाणि च ।
एतानि नोहं गच्छन्ति अध्रिगौ विषमं हि तत् ॥

अध्रिगोस्त्वन्यत्र । प्रशसा बाहू शला दोषणी कश्यपेवांसाच्छिद्रे श्रोणी कवषोरू स्रेकपर्णाष्ठीवन्ता । तदाव्ययमनेकस्मिन् पशौ द्विरभ्यस्यते । अङ्गानि । यत्पशुर्मायुमकृतोरो वा पद्भिराहत । अग्निर्मा तस्मादेनसो विश्वान्मुञ्चत्वंहस इति । यत् पशू मायुमकृषातामुरो वा पद्भिराहसातां यत्पशवो मायुमकृषतोरो वा पद्भिराहसतेति । ज्ञातिनामानि । अन्वेनं माता मन्यतामनु पितानु भ्राता सगर्भ्योऽनु सखा सयूथ्य इति । उपमा । कश्यपेवांसाच्छिद्रे श्रोणी कवषोरू । श्येनमस्य वक्षः कृणुतादिति । इन्द्रियाणि । सूर्यं चक्षुर्गमयताद्वातं प्राणमन्ववसृजतादन्तरिक्षमसुं दिशः श्रोत्रं पृथिवीं शरीरम् । एकधास्य त्वचमाछ्यतात् पुरा नाभ्या अपिशसो वपामुत्खिदतादन्तरेवोष्माणं वारयध्वात् इति । तत्रोहप्रकरण एवैषां माता पिता भ्राता सनाभिसंसर्गिशब्दा इत्येवमादीन्यनूह्यानीति पठ्यते । तथा अङ्गान्यपि पाणिपादं शिरोग्रीवं सप्त प्राणा इत्येवमादीनि परिगणितानि कैश्चित् । अथ अध्रिगुः । दैव्याः शमितार उत मनुष्या आरभध्वम् । उपनयत मेध्यादुरः । आशासाना मेधपतिभ्यां मेधम् । प्रास्मा अग्निं भरत । स्तृणीत बर्हिः । अन्वेनं माता मन्यताम् । अनु पितानु भ्राता सगर्भ्योऽनु सखा सयूथ्यः । उदीचीनाँ अस्य पदो निधत्तात् । सूर्यं चक्षुर्गमयतात् । वातं प्राणमन्ववसृजतात् । अन्तरिक्षमसुम् । दिशः श्रोत्रम् । पृथिवीं शरीरम् । एकधास्य त्वचमाछ्यतात् । पुरा नाभ्या अपिशसो वपामुत्खिदतात् । अन्तरेवोष्माणं वारयध्वात् । श्येनमस्य वक्षः कृणुतात् । प्रशसा बाहू । शला दोषणी । कश्यपेवांसाच्छिद्रे श्रोणी ।

कवषोरू स्रेकपर्णा अष्ठीवन्ता । षड्विंशतिरस्य वङ्क्रयस्ता अनुष्ठ्योच्च्यावयतात् । गात्रं गात्रमस्यानूनं कृणुतात् । ऊवध्यगोहं पार्थिवं खनतात् । अस्रा रक्षः संसजतात् । वनिष्ठुमस्य मा राविष्टोरूकं मन्यमानाः । नेद्वस्तोके तनये । रविता रवच्छमितारः । अध्रिगो शमीध्वम् सुशमि शमीध्वम् । शमीध्वमध्रिगो ।

अध्रिगुश्च विपापश्च देवानां शमितारौ ।
ता एनं प्रविद्वांसौ श्रपयतं यथास्य श्रपणं तथा ॥

इति ऊह्यन्ते । उरुप्रथा उरु प्रथस्वोरु ते यज्ञपतिः प्रथतामिति । पुरोडाशप्रथनपरत्वात् सप्तदशास्वपि यजमानेषु यज्ञपतयः प्रथन्तामिति ऊहो न भवति । तत्रेतिकर्तव्यतोहे गीत्यूहे च नास्ति व्याकरणस्य प्रवृत्तिः । लोकतो लक्षणान्तराच्च प्रातिशाख्यादितस्तौ व्यवतिष्ठेते । शब्दविषये तूहे यावान् व्याकरणस्य व्यापारः तत्र निदर्शनमात्रमभिहितम् । प्रकृतिविकारभावश्च प्रसिद्धो यत्र स एव विषय ऊहस्य न तु यो दुस्त्यजो दुर्मतिभिर्मतस्तदभिधानमात्रेण [स] भवत्यूहः । ततश्चोभयेषां त्वा देवमनुष्याणां प्रियं करोमीति । यदि प्रकृतिकृतौ क्वचिदाम्नातो नैवायमूहस्य विषयः । यज्ञविषये हि काश्चित प्रकृतयः काश्चिद् विकृतयः काश्चित् प्रकृतयो विकृतयश्च काश्चिन्न प्रकृतयो न विकृतयः । सर्वसोमप्रकृतिरग्निष्टोमः । दर्शपूर्णमासयोश्च सर्वेष्टिप्रकृतित्वम् ।

[३. ३] आगमः खल्वपि । पारम्पर्येणाविच्छिन्न उपदेश आगमः । श्रुतिलक्षणः स्मृतिलक्षणश्च । कः पुनरसावागमः । **ब्राह्मणेन निष्कारणो धर्मः षडङ्गो वेदोऽध्येयः** । निष्कारण इति कारणमनुद्दिश्य यथा नित्यानि कर्माणि कर्तव्यानि इत्यकरणे तेषां प्रत्यवायः । यानि त्वनित्यानि कर्माणि तद्यथा काम्यानि पुत्रकामो यजेतेति अन्नाद्यकामो यजेतेति तेषामकरणे नास्ति प्रत्यवायः । अर्थित्वे सति प्रवृत्तेः । इदं तु व्याकरणाध्ययनं नित्यं कर्मावश्यकर्तव्यमुपनयनादिवत् इत्येतत् प्रदर्श्यते ।

[३. ४] **ब्राह्मणेन शब्दा ज्ञेयाः** । अध्यापनं ब्राह्मणस्य वृत्तिः । अपशब्दज्ञश्च विश्लिष्टवाक्त्वे सति अगृहीतवाक्यत्वान्नोपगम्यत इति शब्दा ज्ञातव्याः । तेषां च ज्ञाने व्याकरणादन्यो लघुरुपायो नास्ति । उपायो नाम कार्यनिर्वृत्तिं प्रति यः कारणानां विन्यासविशेषः । तस्माद् व्याकरणं लघुरुपायः शब्दज्ञानं प्रति । अन्य उपाय एव न संभवति । तस्मादध्येयं व्याकरणम् । अथ वा अचिरकाला संप्रतिपत्तिर्लाघवम् । तस्या व्याकरणमुपायः ।

[३.५] **याज्ञिकाः पठन्ति । स्थूलपृषतीमाग्निवारुणीमनड्वाहीमालभेतेति ।** पृषती क्षुद्रपृषती स्थूलपृषती [ता] मैत्रावरुण्य इति वेदे पठ्यते । तत्र यः पृषतीसंनिधाने स्थूलशब्दः पृषतां विशेषणं न प्रतिपद्यते । पृषद्विशेषणे हि सति व्यक्तमन्यपदार्थत्वम् । स्वरभेदादर्थभेदं वैयाकरणाः प्रतिपद्यन्ते । तस्मिंश्च कर्मणि यस्याः स्थूलानि पृषन्ति लभ्यन्ते तत्र वैयाकरणैस्त्वसंदेहेन पूर्वपदप्रकृतिस्वरेण बहुव्रीहिरेवात्र निश्चित इति ॥

[४] **इमानि च भूयः शब्दानुशासनस्य प्रयोजनानि ।** भूयःशब्दः पुनरर्थः । इमानि पुनरपराणीत्यर्थः ॥

[४.१] **तेऽसुरा हेलयो हेलय इति कुर्वन्तः पराबभूवुः ।**

[४.१.१] अयमर्थवादो म्लेच्छनस्य निवृत्त्यर्थं उपादीयते । अर्थवादस्तु प्रवर्तको निवर्तको वा । तत्रायं प्रवर्तको वादः । सर्वा वा इमा दिशः पशुयाज्यभिजयति सर्वाँल्लोकान् सर्वा एवास्येमा दिशोऽभिजिता भवन्ति सर्वे लोकाः । निवर्तको — न दतो गमयेद् यद्दतो गमयेत् सर्पा एनं घातुकाः स्युः सर्पानेव शमयत्यहिंसायै । यस्मात्त एवं कुर्वन्तः पराभूतास्तस्माद् **ब्राह्मणेन न म्लेच्छितवै** न म्लेच्छितव्यम् । कृत्यार्थे तवै इति । किं पुनर्म्लेच्छनमिति । अत आह — **नापभाषितवै** । अपभाषणं म्लेच्छनम् । किं पुनरत्रासुरैरपभाषितम् । तत्र केचिदाहुः । हैहेप्रयोगे हैहयोरिति प्लुतो न कृत इति । अपरे ब्रुवते । कृतः प्लुतः किं तु स्वरसंधिः कृतो न प्रकृतिभाव इति । अपर आह । हेऽलयो हेऽलय इति द्विर्वचनं कृतमिति । अपरे लेपुर्लेकारादिरयं न भवति शिष्टाप्रयुक्तत्वात्तेषां तत्र लत्वमपलापनमिति । अथ किमर्थमेवमुपसंहरति **म्लेच्छा मा भूमेति** न पुनर्मा पराभूमेति । उच्यते । उक्तमेव अर्थवादोऽयम्, अम्लेच्छनं विधीयमानमिति ।

[४.१.२] अपरे वर्णयन्ति । यस्माद्धेतोः तेषां पराभवस्तस्य त्यागादपराभवोऽप्युक्त इति । कः पुनरसुराणां पराभवः । प्रत्यवाययोगः । यद्योगादद्यापि नोत्तिष्ठन्ति । यैरपि पुत्रपौत्रैरसुराणां न प्रयुक्तस्तेऽपि पराभूताः । तस्माद्यथा असुरा एवं वयमपि मा पराभूमेत्यध्येयं व्याकरणम् ॥

[४.२] **दुष्टः शब्दः स्वरतो वर्णतो वा ।** आद्यादित्वात्तसिः । स्वरवर्णाभ्यां दुष्टः । यश्चाभ्यां दुष्टः स उच्यते **मिथ्याप्रयुक्त** इति । स एवंभूतो **न तदर्थमाह ।** स तदर्थमनभिदधद् **वाग्वज्रो यजमानं हिनस्ति ।** वाग् वज्रो वाग्वज्रः । असावेनसो योगात् तेन चैनसा प्रयुक्तोऽमुत्र प्रत्यवायाद्धिंसितो भवति । यजमानो हीज्यायां प्रधानम् ।

अथ वा ऋत्विजो हिंसायामयमपि हिंसितः । यथेन्द्रशत्रुः । यथायमिन्द्रशत्रुर्यजमानं हिंसितवान् एवमन्योऽपि मिथ्याप्रयुक्तो मा हिंसीदित्यध्येयं व्याकरणम् । दुष्टशब्दप्रयोग इति । श्रूयते । स्वाहेन्द्रशत्रुर्वर्धस्वेति मन्त्रः कर्तव्यः । आद्युदात्तः कृतः । ततोऽस्येन्द्र एव शातयिता संवृत्त इति । अत्र चोद्यते । यद्यपि समासान्तोदात्तत्वमेवमपि नायमर्थो व्यावर्तत इति । इन्द्रः शत्रुरस्येति । यथा सोमसखो राजसख इति । इदं चात्र वक्तव्यम् । इन्द्रशत्रो वर्धस्वेति कस्मादामन्त्रिते प्रथमा न भवति । यत्तावदुक्तमन्तोदात्तत्वेऽपि न तस्यार्थस्य व्युच्छित्तिरिति । नैष दोषः । योऽयं शत्रुशब्दो मन्त्रे प्रयुक्त एष रूढिशब्दोऽपि सन्नर्थप्रकरणवशाद् युक्तनिरूढिं निमित्तमपेक्षमाणः प्रयुक्तः । तस्मान्नायमेवाश्रीयत इन्द्रस्यामित्र इन्द्रो वामित्रोऽस्येति । कथं तर्हि । क्रियामेव निमित्तत्वेनोपादाय प्रयुक्तः शातयिता शमयिता वा शत्रुरिति । तत्रेन्द्रस्य शातयिता भवेति प्रयुयुक्षित इन्द्रः शातयितास्येति प्रयुक्तम् । यच्चोक्तमामन्त्रितविभक्त्या भवितव्यमिति । योऽर्थः स्वेन धर्मेण प्रसिद्धो धर्मान्तरसंबधं प्रति अभिमुखीक्रियते तत्रामन्त्रितविभक्तिः । यथा देवदत्तं धर्मान्तरसंबन्धं प्रत्यभिमुखीकरोति देवदत्ताधीष्व भुङ्क्ष्वेति । यस्य चाधीयमान एवासौ धर्मस्तस्य कुत आमन्त्रितविभक्तिः । तद्यथा राजा भव युध्यस्व पुरुषो भवेति राजत्वमेवाधीयमानं पुरुषत्वं चेति नास्त्यामन्त्रितविभक्तिः । एवमिहापीन्द्रशत्रुत्वमेवाधीयमानमित्यदोषः । तत्र पूर्वस्मिन् वर्णदोषः प्रदर्शितो हेऽलयो हेऽलय इति । संप्रति स्वरदोषः ॥

[४. ३] **यदधीतमविज्ञातं निगदेनैव शब्द्यत** इति । अनेनैतदाख्यायते । य एवासौ वेदस्तस्यैव व्याकरणानुगतस्य यदि संशब्दनमप्येतदभ्युदयायेति । तत्र निरुक्तकारोऽविज्ञातार्थमिति वर्णयति । इह तु स्वरवर्णसंस्काराविज्ञातमविज्ञातमिति परिगृह्यते । यच्चैवंभूतं तन्निगदेनैव शब्द्यते । आचार्योपदेशेनैव केवलेनेत्यर्थः । **अनग्नाविव शुष्कैधः ।** यथा ज्वलनसमर्थमपि सत् काष्ठमग्निनानुपगृहीतं न ज्वलनसमर्थं निष्प्रयोजनमेवमधीतमपि शास्त्रं व्याकरणेनानुपगृहीतमसमर्थं फलनिष्पत्तिं प्रति । **तस्मादनर्थकं माधिगीष्महीति** निष्प्रयोजनं माधिगीष्महीत्यर्थः ॥

[४. ४] **यस्तु प्रयुङ्क्ते** इति ॥ व्याकरणात् प्रत्यवायेनायोग इष्टेन च फलेन संबन्धः इत्येतदाख्यायते । प्रयुङ्क्ते प्रेरयति । **कुशलो** विद्वान् । **विशेषे ।** स एव शब्दोऽर्थविशेषे कस्मिंश्चित्साधुः कस्मिंश्चिदसाधुरित्येतदाख्यायते । यथा गोणीशब्दः सास्नादिमत्यसाधुः । तथाश्वशब्दः केसरादिमति साधुर्न निःस्व इति । अस्व इति निर्धने साधु-

नैकशफादिलक्षणे । यदि तु गोणीशब्दोऽपि निमित्तान्तरात् सास्नादिमति प्रयुज्येत गोणीव गोणीति साधुरेव स्यात् । अश्वे वा अस्वशब्दं धनाभावद्वारकं प्रयुञ्जीत स साधुरेव । अथ वा कुशलोऽविशेषे इति । अविशेषेऽपि शास्त्रस्य तत आगत इति तेन खनतीति साधुरेव विशेष एव प्रयुज्यते न सर्वत्र । वृक्षमूलादागतः अङ्गुल्या खनतीति । अन्येषां ग्रन्थः । कुशलो विशेषैरिति । विशेषैः शास्त्रप्रतिपादितैरित्यर्थः । यथा तदधीते तद्वेदेत्यनेन । व्यवहारो वृत्तिः शिष्टव्यवहारो याज्यैव कर्मविधिः । कः ? वाग्योगविदेव । अन्यस्याश्रुतत्वादाह कः ? वाग्योगविदेवेति । एवं मन्यते । यस्मिन्नर्थे आसेव्यमाने धर्मः । तस्माद्यो विपरीतः तदासेवायां तद्विपरीतेन फलेन भवितव्यम् । यथा ब्राह्मणस्य सुखं कृत्वा धर्मः दुःखं कृत्वा अधर्मः । एवं वाग्योगविद्यस्माच्छब्दाञ्जानाति तस्माद् धर्मः । शब्दज्ञानं चापशब्दज्ञानानुषक्तमेवेत्याह यो हि शब्दान् जानाति । अर्थोपपत्तिमाश्रित्यैवं चोद्यते न शब्दव्यापारम् । भूयांसो ह्यपशब्दाः अल्पीयांसः शब्दा इति । कथं प्रकर्षप्रत्ययः ? उच्यते । परमतापेक्षया परिकल्प्यं समानगुणत्वम् । कथम् ? एवं त्वं मन्येथाः । यद्यपि वाग्योगविदुभयं जानाति तथापि बहवः शब्दास्तेषां बहुत्वात् अल्पा अपशब्दाः तदल्पत्वादल्पः प्रत्यवाय इति । एतच्चापि न । अल्पीयांसः शब्दा इति । अपभ्रंशा ये [ते] त्वप्यप्रत्यायका भवन्ति । एष एव पक्षो नैतेऽर्थं प्रत्याययन्तीति । अज्ञानं तस्य शरणम् । काममसौ धर्मेण न युज्येत प्रत्यवायेन तु तस्यायोगः । तथा तिर्यगादयः अज्ञानात् प्रवर्तमाना न प्रत्यवायेन युज्यन्ते । इदं सर्वमेवमुपन्यस्तं ज्ञाने धर्मः । प्रयोगतस्तु ज्ञानस्यैवानुमानमिति । नात्यन्तायाज्ञानं शरणं भवितुमर्हति । न ह्यज्ञानाद्विषं भक्षितं मरणाय न प्रकल्पते । तिर्यगादिष्वेवाज्ञानं शरणम् । न म्लेच्छादीनां ब्रह्महत्यादिषु प्रवर्तमानानामिति । एवं तर्हीति । एतदाचष्टे । प्रत्यासत्तेः सामर्थ्यं बलवदिति अवाग्योगविदभिसंबध्यते । तत्र वाग्योगवित् शब्दापशब्दज्ञः शब्दान् प्रयोक्ष्यते नापशब्दान् । प्रयोगाच्चाभ्युदयः प्रत्यवायो वा, न ज्ञानादिति । अयं न श्रुतावुपनिबद्धो नापि स्मृतावित्याह – क्व पुनरिदं पठितम् इति । भ्राजा नाम श्लोकाः । अस्याभिप्रायः । यो वार्थः स स्मृतावाम्नातः ततः प्रमाणं भवितुमर्हतीति । किं च भोः श्लोका अपि वै प्रमाणम् । नायमेकान्तेन श्लोकानामप्रामाण्यमाचष्टे । भवन्ति हि श्लोकाः स्मृत्युपनिबद्धाः प्रमाणम् । एवंभूतास्त्वप्रमाणम् । एवंभूतानां प्रामाण्ये सति यः कश्चित् प्रमाणं भवितुमर्हति – यदुदुम्बरवर्णानाम् इति । अयं हि श्लोकः सौत्रामण्या असामर्थ्यमाचष्टे । तस्मात् सौत्रामणीं हित्वा पानागारशालायामेव मद्यं पातव्यम् । प्रमत्तगीत एष तत्रभवतः असमाहितचेतस इत्यर्थः । कथं ज्ञायते । श्रुतिस्मृतिविप्रतिषेधात् । अयं त्वप्रमत्त-

गीतः । अस्ति हि स्मृतिः । एकः शब्दः सम्यग्ज्ञातः सुप्रयुक्तः शास्त्रान्वितः स्वर्गे लोके कामधुग्भवतीति ।

[४. ५] **अविद्वांसः प्रत्यभिवादे** इत्यनेनैतत् कथयति । व्याकरणमन्तरेण शिष्टेभ्यः पृथक्कृताः स्त्रीपक्षे भवन्ति न चाभिवादयितारं शक्नुवन्त्यनुग्रहीतुम् । प्रत्यभिवादेन ह्यसौ संस्कृतो धर्मभाग्भवति स्वयं चाभ्युदयेन युज्यते ।

[४. ६] **प्रयाजाः सविभक्तिका** इति । प्रयाजमन्त्रा इत्यर्थः । यास्तावत् प्रयाजशब्देषु प्रतिपदं विभक्तयो न ताभिः सविभक्तिका इत्युच्यन्ते, नित्यं संनिधानात्तासाम् । तस्मादाम्नातादन्यच्छब्दरूपं प्रयाजेषूपादीयते । केवलायाश्च विभक्तेरप्रयोगात् प्रातिपदिकं प्रकृतिरर्थगृहीता । तत्रापि त्वमग्ने प्रयाजानुयाजानां पुरस्तात् त्वं पश्चादिति दर्शनादर्थान्तरवृत्ति श्रुत्यन्तरं नोपादीयते । विभक्तीनामपि सर्वासां प्रयोगे प्राप्ते या द्व्यक्षरा वा सत्यश्चतुरक्षरा वा भवन्तीति वचनादग्निनाग्निनेति न प्रयुज्यते । तथा न शब्दजामि कुर्यात् । शब्दजामि हि तद् भवति यत् पञ्चम्यन्तम् । तस्मादग्नेरग्नेरित्यनेन रूपेण षष्ठ्यन्तं प्रयुज्यते । पुनराधेये प्रयाजानुयाजानां पुरस्ताद्वोपरिष्टाद् [वा] विभक्तीः कुर्यात् । नराशंसो अग्निमग्निमिति वा उभयथा दृष्टत्वात् । समिधः समिधोऽग्नेऽग्न इति संधिर्दृष्टः । इळो अग्निनाग्न इति विवृत्तिर्दृष्टेति बह्वृचसूत्रभाष्ये । आश्वलायनसूत्रे ये यजामहे समिधः समिधोऽग्नेऽग्न आज्यस्य व्यन्तु । तनूनपादग्निमग्न आज्यस्य हविषो वेतु । नराशंसो अग्निमग्न आज्यस्य हविषो वेतु । इळोऽग्निनाग्न आज्यस्य हविषो व्यन्तु । बर्हिरग्निरग्न आज्यस्य हविषो वेतु । आपस्तम्बसूत्रे अग्नाग्नेऽग्नावग्नेऽग्निनाग्नेऽग्निमग्न इति चतुर्षु प्रयाजेष्विति विभक्तय उक्ताः । अग्ना इति यथाम्नात उत्तमः प्रयाजः । तस्योपरिष्टात् [न] क्रियते विभक्तिः । विकृतावप्यविभक्तिः क्रियते तदा । तद्यथा । ये यजामहे स्वाहाग्निं स्वाहा सोमम् । अग्निहोत्रं स्वाहा अग्नीषोमौ स्वाहा देवा आज्यपा जुषाणा अग्न आज्यस्य हविषो व्यन्तु इति । एतेषु प्रयाजेषु सविभक्तिकेषु कर्तव्येषु वैयाकरणो विभक्त्यन्तान् सम्यगुच्चारयेत् । तस्मादेवमर्थमध्येयं व्याकरणम् ॥

[४. ७] **स आर्त्विजीन** इति । यश्च ऋत्विजमर्हति यश्च ऋत्विक्कर्माभावव्यार्त्विजीनौ विद्वानेव याजयतीति । [न] अविद्वांसोऽनधिकारात् । ब्राह्मणस्य व्याकरणमन्तरेण यजमानत्वं याजकत्वं वा न संभवतीति प्रोत्साह्यते ॥

[४. ८. १] **चत्वारि पदजातानि** यानि तानि अस्य शृङ्गाणीव । कर्मप्रवचनीया निपातेष्वन्तर्भूता इति चत्वार्युच्यन्ते । अन्येषां द्वे पदजाते नामाख्यातं च ।

त्रयः कालाः अभिधायाः शब्दस्य प्रयुज्यते प्रयोक्ष्यते प्रायोजीति । अभिधानस्य वा भवति भविष्यति अभूदिति । **द्वौ शब्दात्मानौ नित्यः कार्यश्चेति** । कैश्चिन्नित्योऽयमिति दृष्टः कैश्चिदनित्य इति । अथ वा जातिर्व्यक्तिश्चेति । अथ वा स्फोटो ध्वनिश्च । **सप्त विभक्तयः** स्वादयः । अथ वा सह शेषेण कारकाणि सप्त विभक्तयो न तु कारकः शेषोऽप्यष्टमः संभवति ।

[४. ८. २] **न इङ्गयन्तीति** । न दुर्यन्ति । **न निमिषन्ति न चेष्टन्त** इति । सायुज्यादिदमभेदेनोपादानम् । **मनीषिणो** ये तैः सह साम्यं गच्छेमेति । तेऽपि हि शास्त्रादेवेमां काष्ठां प्राप्ताः ॥

[४. ९] **पश्यन्नपि न पश्यति । शृण्वन्नपि न शृणोति** । व्याकरणाध्यायिनो वाच ईशते प्रभुत्वं येषां वाचि भवतीति ॥

[४. १०] **सक्तुमिव तितउना** । साध्यं यद् द्रव्यं दुःशोध्यं तस्योपलक्षणं सक्तवः । एवमपशब्दाः शक्त्या व्याकरणेन शोध्यन्ते इति । **अत्रा सखायः** । ऋचि तुनुघमक्ष्विति दीर्घः । **अत्र सखायः सख्यानि** समानख्यातयः समानप्रज्ञानाः ।

[४. ११] **आहिताग्निरपशब्दं प्रयुज्येति** । एतत् प्रतिपादयति । यथाग्निमादधदवश्यं जायामानयति तामन्तरेणाग्न्याधानस्याप्रवृत्तेः, एवमनेनाग्निमादधतावश्यं व्याकरणमध्येयम् इति नित्यकर्मतामेव समर्थयते ॥

[४. १२] **दशम्यां पुत्रस्य नाम विदध्यात्** इति । एतदुक्तं भवति । नामकरणसंस्कारादारभ्य व्याकरणमुपयुज्यत इति ॥

[४. १३] **सुदेवो असि वरुण** । बार्हस्पत्ये सूक्ते प्रगाथे वरुणोपस्तुतिरियम् । वरुणस्य चेयं स्तुतिः त्वं सत्यदेव इत्येषा यस्माद् व्याकरणज्ञानादतः पठितव्यमिति ॥

[५] **किं पुनरिदमिति** । नात्र शिष्याचार्याचार्यदेशीयाः प्रतिपत्तव्याः । ग्रन्थकार एवेमं ग्रन्थं विभजते **न पुनरन्यदपि किंचित्** । सति हि प्रयोजनाख्याने एवं प्रतिपद्येत प्रोत्साह्योऽहमनेन प्रकारेण । नैतानि सन्ति प्रयोजनानि । अथ वा व्याख्यायते किमिति निष्प्रयोजनं श्रमकरमध्येष्ये इति नैवाधीयीत । **ओमित्युक्त्वा** । [न] ओंकारमुच्चार्येत्येवगन्तव्यम् । किं तर्हि ? एवमित्यभ्युपगम्य अनपेक्षितप्रयोजना एवेत्यर्थः । **वृत्तान्तत** इति । वृत्तान्ताः प्रपाठका उच्यन्ते । तत्राद्यादित्वात्तसिः । वृत्तान्तैः वृत्तान्तैः प्रपाठकैः पठन्ति । अन्येषां वृत्तान्तश इति पाठः । त एवं पठन्ति । वृत्तान्तं वृत्तान्तं

पठन्तीति वृत्तान्तशः पठन्तीति । **पुराकल्प एतदासीत्** । एतदाचष्टे । यस्यामवस्थायामसौ व्याकरणमध्याप्यते तस्यामसौ परिप्रश्नासमर्थ एव भवति । कुतः प्रयोजनानि प्रवक्ष्यति । **तत्र स्थानकरणानुप्रदानज्ञेभ्य** इति । पुराकल्पे स्थानकरणादीन् व्याकरणादेव प्रतिपद्यते । ततो **वैदिकाः शब्दा उपदिश्यन्ते** । तत्र वेदाध्ययने प्रयोजनप्रश्नः स्यात् । तस्यापि प्रयोजनमाख्यायते, वेदाङ्गमपि व्याकरणमवश्यमध्येतव्यमिति । **तदद्यत्वे न तथा** । अद्यत्व इति निपातोऽस्मिन् काल इत्यनेन समानार्थः । अद्यत्वे हि बाला एवानधिगतव्याकरणा वेदमध्याप्यन्ते । वेदो अविज्ञातस्थानकरणानुप्रदान एव । **वेदमधीत्य त्वरिता वक्तारो भवन्ति** । **त्वरिता** इति । धनोपादाने वा तुरिता भवन्ति भोगोपभोगे वा । अथ वा पुनरध्यायान्तरे पारतन्त्र्यकरणो नियोगो मा भूदिति त्वरिता इदमाहुर्वेदाध्ययनसमकालमेवेति ॥

[६. १] **उक्तः शब्दः** । स्वभावोऽप्यस्य व्याख्यातः ध्वनिः शब्द इति । रक्षादीन्यपि **प्रयोजनान्युक्तानि । शब्दानुशासनमिदानीं कर्तव्यम्** आख्यातव्यं प्रस्तोतव्यमित्यर्थः । **तत् कथं कर्तव्यम्** इत्याख्यातव्यं निदर्शयति । य आचष्टे तेन कथं कर्तव्यमिति । किं शब्दोपदेशोऽपशब्दोपदेश उभयशब्दोपदेश इति । स्वलक्षणेन परलक्षणाभावेन यदाख्यायते तद्विस्पष्टतरं भवतीत्युभयोपदेशकरणस्योपादानम् । यद्यपि विस्पष्टतरं भवति अतिगौरवं तु शास्त्रस्येति स्वलक्षणेनैवानुशासनं परिगृह्णाति । अन्यतरोपादानेन कृती शब्दापशब्दयोरित्यर्थः । यदि ह्युभयोपदेशोऽपि परिगृहीतः स्यात् तममेव कुर्यात् अन्यतमोपदेशेनेति । **तद्यथा । भक्ष्यनियमेनाभक्ष्यप्रतिषेधो गम्यते** । भक्ष्याभक्ष्यप्रकरणे इदं श्रूयते पञ्च पञ्चनखा भक्ष्या इति । प्रकरणादन्यस्य पञ्चनखस्य निवृत्तिः । अथ वार्थित्वाद् बुभुक्षाप्रयुक्तं भक्षणं सर्वविषयमशब्दकं प्रवृत्तम् । तत्रेदं वचनं पञ्च पञ्चनखा भक्ष्या इति । तद्यद्यनेन पञ्च पञ्चनखा भक्ष्या इत्येतत् प्रतिपाद्येत यदहरेव न भक्षयति तदहरेवायं विहिताकरणात् प्रत्यवेयात् । ये च शल्यकादिभ्योऽन्ये पञ्चनखास्तेषां च भक्षणं ह्यनिमित्तप्रयुक्तमव्यावृत्तमेव स्यात् । तदेव भक्षणं पौरस्त्यमर्थित्वे सति प्रवृत्तं तदेव पञ्चसु पञ्चनखेषूपदिश्यते । क्षुत्प्रतीघात एतैरेव कर्तव्यो नान्यैरिति । इयति शब्दव्यापारे पञ्चनखान्तराणां निवृत्तिः । असौ न शब्दवती । किं तर्हि ? सामर्थ्यलक्षणा । एवं च सति व्रत इत्येतस्मिन् सूत्रे अश्राद्धभोजीत्यत्र यदुच्यते यदि योऽश्राद्धं भुङ्क्तेऽसावश्राद्धभोजी यदहरेवासावश्राद्धं न भुङ्क्ते तदास्य व्रतलोप इति अत्रापि श्राद्धभोजनमर्थात् प्रसक्तम् । तत इदमुच्यते श्राद्धं न भोक्तव्यमिति । पौरस्त्यस्यैव श्राद्धभोजनस्यार्थात् प्रसक्तस्य निवृत्तिः क्रियते । भुञ्जानः श्राद्धं मा भुङ्क्ष्वेति । पौरस्त्यस्यैव

श्राद्धभोजनस्य विधानसामर्थ्यात् विनिवर्तमानं श्राद्धभोजनमिति कुतो व्रतलोपः । एवमर्थप्रत्यायनं प्रति शब्दापशब्दयोः प्रवृत्तौ सत्यां शब्दोपदेशेनापशब्दनिवृत्तिरिति व्यक्तम् । **अभक्ष्यप्रतिषेधेन वा भक्ष्यनियमः । अभक्ष्यो ग्राम्यकुक्कुटः** इत्यर्थमुख्यः प्रतिषेध इति । न ह्यत्र प्राप्त्यनुमानबाधा । किं तर्हि ? बाधैवेयम् । एवमिहाप्यपशब्दोपदेशेन गाव्यादिभ्यश्चान्यः शब्दो गौरिति प्रतिपद्यते । **किं पुनरत्र ज्यायः ।** उभयोपदेशात गुरोर्लघुत्वात् प्रशस्यत्वमनुभूय मिथःस्पर्धायां प्रकर्षप्रत्ययेन संबध्यते । **इष्टान्वाख्यानं खल्वपि भवति ।** कथं शब्दोपदेश इष्टान्वाख्यानम् । उच्यते । यथाम्नाये शब्दानां स धर्म एवमेषामपि धर्मार्थत्वादिदमुच्यत इष्टान्वाख्यानमिति । अथ वापशब्देषूपदिश्यमानेषु आनुमानिकी प्रतिपत्तिरयं शब्दस्ते इत्यानुमानिक्यां च प्रतिपत्तौ परिकल्पस्यानन्त्यात् किं गौरित्येष गाव्यादिभ्योऽन्यः शब्दः आहोस्विदन्य इत्येतत् दुर्ज्ञानमेव भवतीति नैवेदमन्वाख्यानं स्यादिति ।

[६. २] **अथैतस्मिन् शब्दोपदेशे सति ।** अस्मिन् काले प्रतिपदपाठमेव सुकरं मन्यन्ते । न ह्यत्र किंचित् स्मर्तव्यं लक्षणम् । केवलं शब्दा एवोच्चारयितव्याः । प्रकृत्याद्युपदेशे हि सति चिरकालसंप्रतिपत्तिरिति । **प्रतिपदपाठ** इति । स्वरूपेण यदुच्चारणं स प्रतिपदपाठः । येनार्थः परिच्छिद्यते तत् पदम् । **अनभ्युपाय** इति । उपायशब्दपर्यायवाच्येवायमभ्युपायशब्दः । **एवं हि श्रूयते । बृहस्पतिरिन्द्रायेति ।** अर्थवादोऽयं प्रतिपदपाठस्य निवृत्तये उपादीयते । ईदृशो वक्ता ईदृशः श्रोता इयता कालेन नान्तं गतः । **किं पुनरद्यत्व** इति । **शब्दानां शब्दपारायणमिति ।** रूढिशब्दोऽयं कस्यचित् ग्रन्थस्य वाचकः । यथा शिरोरोगः कुक्षिं बाधते इति । शिरोरोगशब्दः कुक्षिरोगस्य व्याधिविशेषस्य रूढिः । स शिरः कृत्स्नं च कुक्षिं बाधत इति । एवं शब्दपारायणं नाम ग्रन्थः । **शब्दानां प्रोवाचेति । चतुर्भिश्च प्रकारैर्विद्योपयुक्तोपयुक्ता भवति ।** अर्धोपयुक्तापि सत्यनुपयुक्ता भवति निष्फलत्वात् । अथ वा लोके एकदेशोपयोगादप्युपयुक्तमिति गम्यते । तद्यथोपयुक्तं घृतमिति । एवमिदं नैकदेशोपयोगादुपयुक्तमिति । किं तर्हि ? समुदायोपयोगादुपयुक्तमित्येव कथयति । **आगमकालो** ग्रहणकालः । **स्वाध्यायकालः** कालोऽभ्यासस्य । **प्रवचनकालः** शिष्येभ्यः संप्रदातव्यः । **व्यवहारकालो** याज्ञे कर्मणि विनियोगः शिष्टमध्ये वा यो विनिश्चयः । **किंचित् सामान्यविशेषवत् लक्षणं प्रवर्त्यम् ।** सामान्यविशेषौ यस्मिंस्तत् सामान्यविशेषवत् । यथा **कर्मण्यणि**ति । धातोरित्येतत् सामान्यमस्मिन् लक्षणेऽस्ति । **आतोऽनुपसर्गे क** इत्यस्मिंश्चात इति विशेषोऽस्ति । अनेन **चाल्पेन**

यत्नेन महतो महतः शब्दौघान् प्रतिपद्यते । कुम्भकारः काण्डलाव इत्येवमादि । एवं पार्ष्णित्रो गोद इत्येवमादीन् । एवं सर्वत्र योज्यम् । स्थान्यादेशभावे विधिप्रतिषेधे च ।

[७] **किं पुनराकृतिः पदार्थ आहोस्वित् द्रव्यम्** । आचार्याणां विप्रतिपत्तेः संदेहः । वाजप्यायनस्याकृतिः । व्याडेस्तु द्रव्यम् । अत्र केचिद्वर्णयन्ति । यद्यपीदमविशेषेणोक्तमेवमपि संभविषु शब्देषु इदं पृच्छयते येषूभयं संभवति द्रव्यमाकृतिश्च । गौरश्व इत्येवमादिषु न पुनर्डित्थ इत्येवमादिषु । अपरे पुनराहुः । आकृतिशब्देन यावत् परविशेषणं सत्त्ववदुच्यते । आक्रियते येन परिच्छिद्यते येनेति भिन्नक्रिया परिच्छिद्यते । अन्ये आहुः । सर्वत्रैवाकृतिः संभवति । जातिः साभिधीयत इति । तत्र वाजप्यायनस्य शब्द आकृतिमेव चोदयति न द्रव्यादीन् । तद्यथा । नीलशब्दोऽर्थान्तरनिरपेक्षो गुणसामान्यस्तद्रूपं प्रतिलभते । तत्र प्रतिलब्धस्वरूपस्तदधिष्ठानो यदा गुणवचनो नीलस्य साहचर्यात् नीलत्वेन व्यावेशं तद्धर्मतामनुभवति एकयोगक्षेमतामापद्यते विभागाभावादाकृत्यभिभूत एव सन् गुणप्रत्ययमादधाति । यथोपाश्रयवशात् स्फटिकं तद्गुणमुपलभ्यते, एवं द्रव्यमप्ययमभिदधन्नीलशब्दः स्वाभिधेयस्य नीलत्वस्य य आश्रयो गुणस्तस्याधारो द्रव्यमिति समवेतसमवायाद् व्यवहितोऽपि गुणेन तदधिष्ठान एव द्रव्ये प्रत्ययमादधाति । तथा द्रव्यान्तरेणापि रक्ते वस्त्रे । संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायादेव पारम्पर्येण याव- [द्] द्वयो रक्तयोर्वस्त्रयोर्मध्ये शुक्लं वस्त्रं तद्गुणमुपलभ्यते इति । एवं गौरित्यप्ययं शब्दो गोत्वे प्रतिलभ्य स्वरूपं तदधिष्ठान एव द्रव्ये प्रवर्तते । एवं पचतिशब्दे या अधिश्रयणादिक्रियास्तासां यानि प्रत्यर्थनियतानि सामान्यान्यधिश्रयणादीनि तैः सहैकार्थसमवायि यत् सर्वविषयं सामान्यमभिव्यज्यते तत् पचतिशब्दवाच्यम् । यथा भ्रमणत्वमनेककर्मविषयं भ्रमणमित्युच्यते । एवं डित्थेऽपि यदुत्पत्तिप्रभृत्या विनाशात् एव तद् भवत्ययं डित्थोऽयं डित्थ इति । बाल्यकौमारयौवनस्थाविरेष्वभिन्नः स एवायमिति संप्रत्ययः सा आकृतिः शब्दवाच्या । मुग्धेऽपि च संप्रत्ययो भवति डित्थोऽयं लिख्यत इति । तस्मात् सामान्यमत्राप्यस्ति । यो वा संनिवेशविशेषः संयोगविशेषणं च हस्त्यादिष्विव साकृतिरेव । अस्य तु द्रव्याभिधानं गुणकल्पनया जातित्वमापादितस्य तच्छब्देनाभिधानात् । द्रव्यपदार्थिकस्य तु द्रव्यमुच्यते । जात्यादयस्तु भेदका द्रव्यस्य सत्त्वं वक्तुम् । उपाधिभूतास्ते शब्दस्येति । तत्रैकेषां माधुर्यादयोऽत्यन्तमनभिधीयमाना गुडादिभिः शब्दैः तानर्थान् [सजन्ते] इति । एवं गोत्वादयोऽपि । अस्यापि जात्यभिधानं गौणम् । द्रव्यतामापादिता जातिस्तच्छब्देनाभिधीयते । तत्र वाजप्यायनदर्शनम् । पाणिनेः सर्वत्राकृतेर्भावात् सकृद्गतौ विप्रतिषेधबाधनं शब्दान्तरप्राप्तिश्च नोपपद्यते । अथ द्रव्यमेव

पदार्थः, एवमपि सर्वासां व्यक्तीनां सर्वाभिश्चोदनाभिरङ्गीकरणादुत्सर्गापवादा न प्रकल्पन्ते। व्यवस्थितविभाषाश्च न प्रकल्पन्ते। **उभयमित्याह**। व्यक्तिराकृतिश्च पदार्थ-परैर्लौकिकैः प्रयुज्येते। ये च शास्त्रे उपदेशशब्दास्तेषु कश्चिज्जातिमभिदधाति कश्चिद् द्रव्यम्। एवं च सति न कश्चिद् गौणः पदार्थोऽस्य। यो जातिशब्दस्तस्य जातिरेवार्थो यो द्रव्यशब्दस्तस्य द्रव्यमेवार्थ इति। उपदेशशब्देष्वपि लक्ष्यवशादिच्छातः पदार्था-श्रयणे सर्वे शास्त्रे प्रक्रियाभेदा दर्शनभेदाश्चोपपद्यन्ते। **उभयथा आचार्येण** इति। अत्र चोद्यते। ननु उभयपदार्थिकस्य द्रव्ये पदार्थे बहुषु बहुवचनं सिद्धम्। एकेनानेकाभिधानं जातौ पदार्थे। सत्यमेवं मतम्। यदा तु कस्याश्चित् क्रियाया उपदेशे वा प्रतिषेधे वा जातिरेव प्रकरणे वा जातेः शब्द उपादीयते तदा तस्या एकत्वादप्राप्तं बहुषु बहुवचन-मारभ्यते। एवं यदा द्रव्यविवक्षा भवति तस्य च प्रकरणं तदा वाक्य इव सरूपाणां प्लक्षन्यग्रोधधवखदिरपलाशा इत्यनेकशब्दत्वे प्रसक्ते वृक्षवृक्षवृक्ष इत्येकशब्दत्वाय यत्नः क्रियते। अपरः प्रकारोऽत्र वक्ष्यते। इह शुक्लवासाः क्रियतामित्यत्र शुक्लवासस्त्वमेव क्रिय-माणं द्रव्यम् [अक्रियमाणम्। शुक्लवाससमानयेत्यत्र क्रियमाणं द्रव्यम्] अक्रियमाणस्तु तदा संबन्धः। इह तु शुक्लवासः शुक्लवाससमानयेत्युपलक्षणमपि क्रियायामन्तर्भवति। परिगृहीतोपलक्षणो हि व्याप्रियते तद्वत्त्वात्। इह तु यः शुक्लवासा दृष्टः स आनीय-तामिति तद्वतः केवलं भेदके वाससी न तु तयोस्तत्र क्रियायामन्तर्भावः। एवमिहापि गौरित्यनेन शब्देन गोत्वमेवाभिधीयते न द्रव्यमिति वाजप्यायनदर्शनम्। तथा द्रव्यमपि अभिधीयते उपलक्षणं गोत्वादय इति व्याडिमतम्। अयं तु भगवान् पाणिनिरुभय-मुच्यते शब्देनेति प्रतिपन्न इत्येतत् कथ्यते इदम्। इदं च संबन्धमुपनीयते **उभयथा ह्याचार्येणेति**। इह कः सिंहोऽयं श्वेत्युक्ते यदा शौर्यमुपादीयते तदा श्वा सिंहत्वेन विपरिणम्यते। धात्वर्थविवक्षायां सिंहः श्वत्वेन परिणम्यते। एवं व्रीहिः इत्युभयाश्रयणे यदा द्रव्यत्वमापाद्यते जातिस्तदा सिद्धं बहुवचनम्। जातितां चापादिते द्रव्ये सिद्ध-मेकशब्दत्वम्। विपरीतार्थक्रियायां तु एकवचनमनेकशब्दत्वं मा प्रापदिति योगद्वयं पठति। एवमुपदेशशब्देष्वपि योज्यम्। अत एव तदुक्तं किंचित् प्रधानभूतं किंचिद् गुणभूतमिति॥

[८. १] **किं पुनर्नित्यः शब्द आहोस्वित् कार्य** इति। अत्रापि विप्रति-पत्तिः। वेदविदां नित्योऽन्येषामनित्यः। अथ वायमर्थः। नित्या एव ते शब्दा गौरित्येव-मादयः। येषां तु आकृतिर्लक्षणमुत्पाद्यवस्त्वेवेदम्। समयोऽयं वाचिकैर्वृतः। केचिदेवं मन्यन्ते। य एवैते प्राकृताः शब्दाः त एवैते नित्याः। प्रकृतौ भवाः प्राकृताः। अन्ये

मन्यन्ते । इयं दैवी वाक् । सा तु पुरुषाशक्तेरालस्याद्वा प्रकीर्णा । यथा स्वस्तीति शिक्षमाणो बालो अन्यथोच्चारयतीति । अथ वा यथैवेह वस्तु द्वेधावस्थितं द्रव्याकृतिभेदेनैवं शब्दोऽपि । य एते शब्दाः किं ते शब्दाकृतय आहोस्वित् शब्दव्यक्तय इति । तत्र यदायं वृक्ष [इति] वृक्षादयः शब्दाः क्रमजन्मानः अयुगपत्कालाः वृक्षशब्दत्वाकृतेरक्रमाया अभिव्यक्तिहेतवो भवन्ति यथा सास्नादयो गोत्वस्येति तदा वृक्षशब्दत्वादर्थप्रतिपत्तिः । सा च नित्या । अभ्यासाच्च साकृतिः केनचित् पुरुषेण कतिभिश्चिदेव वर्णव्यक्तिभिरवगृह्यते । येषां रेखामात्रेणैव चित्रे प्रतिपद्यते पुरुषोऽयं लिख्यते हस्ती नेति एतस्मिन् दर्शने नित्यः शब्दः । तत्र चैतत् उक्तमुभयतः स्फोटमात्रं प्रतिनिर्दिश्यते रश्रुतेर्लश्रुतिरिति । यस्यापि शब्दव्यक्तिः तस्यापि नित्यः शब्दः । स तु नादाभिव्यङ्ग्यः । पदनियतो नादः । यथा चक्षुरादयो नियताः अभिव्यञ्जकाः अभिव्यङ्ग्येषु रूपादिषु रूपवृद्धिह्रासानुविधायिनश्च । यद्वादर्शमण्डलादिषु प्रतिबिम्बानि दीर्घाणि परिमण्डलानि महान्ति अन्यानि च दृश्यन्ते । एवं शब्दा अपि नादभेदेन भिद्यन्ते । यथा सलिले तरङ्गभेदेन एकश्चन्द्रोऽनेक उपलभ्यते । प्रदीपभेदाच्च छाया भिद्यते । आदर्शभेदाच्च प्रतिबिम्बभेदः । तस्मान्नियतनादाभिव्यङ्ग्या नादवृद्धिह्रासानुविधायिनो व्यक्तिशब्दा अपि नित्याः ।

स च नादः श्रोत्रस्यानुग्रहे वर्तते । तदनुगृहीतं श्रोत्रं शब्दोपलब्धौ समर्थं भवति । यथाक्ष्णोरञ्जनमित्येके । अपरे शब्दस्यैव । यथा प्रोक्षणं पृथिव्या एव न घ्राणस्य । उभयोरित्यपरे । यथा वश्येन्द्रियस्य प्रथमतश्चक्षू रश्मीन् घटं चानुगृह्णाति । एवं च सति वर्णाः पदं वाक्यं च सर्वं नित्यम् । वेदवाक्येषु त्वेष विशेषः । न तत्र विपर्यासेन शब्दस्यार्थे प्रयोगोऽस्ति । लोके त्वस्ति प्रयोगः । आहर पात्रं पात्रमाहर । त्वं पचसि पचसि त्वम् । इषे त्वोर्जे त्वा इत्येवंभूतः प्रयोगोऽस्ति । [न] त्वा इषे त्वा ऊर्जे इति । लौकिकवैदिकयोरेवं विशेषः । प्रयोगनित्यत्वं वैदिकानामनित्यता लौकिकानामिति ।

नित्यता चापि द्विविधा । व्यवहाराश्रया परमार्थाश्रया च । परमार्थाश्रया च वैशेषिकदर्शने परमाणवः आकाशादीनि च । व्यवहाराश्रया नागरातिविषामुस्तक्वाथः स्यादामपाचन इति न चरकवचनादेषामामपाचनत्वम् । किं तर्हि ? स्वभावात् । एवमिहापि पाणिनिनान्येन वा शब्दाः [स्मृता] एव स्वतोऽर्थप्रत्यायका इति व्यवहारनित्यतैवेहोपकारिणी । संग्रह एतत् प्राधान्येन परीक्षितं नित्यो वा स्यात् कार्यो वेति । चतुर्दश सहस्राणि वस्तूनि अस्मिन् संग्रहग्रन्थे । शास्त्रपूर्वात् प्रयोगादभ्युदय इति उभयथापि लक्षणं प्रवर्त्यमित्येव संग्रहे निर्णयः । कथं पुनरिदं भगवतः कार्यो वा

नित्यो वा । अयं त्वाचार्यः किं दर्शनं प्रमाणीकृत्य प्रवृत्तः । किं वेदविदामुतान्येषामिति । एतत् पृच्छति । अथ वा कथं पुनरिदमिति । यद्यपि पाणिनेरभिरुचिता नित्यतानित्यता वा इदं तु शास्त्रं कथं प्रस्तुतम् । किं तावदवगच्छामः अहमेव शब्दार्थसंबन्धानां स्रष्टा यथा ब्राह्मणोऽभिमानतः प्रजोत्पादनं प्रति । अथापीदं दर्शनम् । अवस्थिता एव अमी शब्दार्थसंबन्धाः । अहं तु वृत्तज्ञत्वात् बहुश्रुतत्वाद्वा [स्मर्ता] स्वां तेषामिति ॥

[८.२] **सिद्धे शब्दार्थसंबन्धे** । परमार्थनित्यता व्यवहारनित्यता वा शब्दस्य नित्यशब्दवृत्तिः अनित्यशब्दवृत्तिः कल्पनेति । करणसंनिपातोत्पन्नः प्रतिनियतो वर्णादिविषयो ध्वनिरभिव्यञ्जक इति आकृतौ व्यक्तौ वा संस्कारः क्रियते । आकृतिर्व्यक्तिर्वार्थस्य प्रत्यायिका । आकृतिसंस्कारस्त्वालम्भनादिवत् व्यक्तिद्वारकः । तत्र नित्यशब्दवादिन इतरेतराश्रयत्वं सुपरिहारं भवति । प्रतिदेशत्वे शब्दानां नियमः सिद्धः । यथा हम्मतिः सुराष्ट्रेषु इति । तथा अविशेषेणोपदिष्टस्य डित्थ इत्यादेरर्थविशेष एवावस्थानम् । एवं ह्येते प्रयुक्ताः । केवलं पाणिनिः स्मर्तेति । अर्थोऽपि । येषामाकृतिरभिधेया सा नित्या । द्रव्येऽपि पदार्थे व्यवहारनित्यता । यदा यदा घटादयस्तदा तदैवैते एवंसंनिवेशा एवेति संबन्धोऽपि योग्यता यथा रूपोपलब्धौ योग्यं चक्षुर्न श्रोत्रमित्येव गृह्यते । अथ वा अर्थः शब्दप्रयुक्त इति शब्दार्थयोः कार्यकारणलक्षणः संबन्धः । तत्रार्थस्य नित्यत्वादनिर्दिश्यमाना अप्यर्था वीप्साकृत्वोर्थादयः उपसिक्तादयश्च सप्तपर्णस्त्रिदशा इति दध्योदन इति चाङ्गीभवन्ति । तथा चोक्तम् । स्वभावतोऽर्थेषु वर्तमानानां निमित्तत्वेनान्वाख्यानम् । तद्यथा । कूपे हस्तदक्षिण इति । संबन्धोऽपि नित्य उक्तं सरूपसूत्रे । तस्माद् वक्तव्यं व्यर्थो बह्वर्थश्चेति । उच्येत न तु गम्येत । यो हि गामश्व इति ब्रूयात् न जातुचित् संप्रत्ययः स्यात् इति ।

[८.३] **अथ सिद्धशब्दस्य कः पदार्थः** । नावयवार्थः पृच्छयते । कस्तर्हि । समुदायार्थो लौकिकः । सामर्थ्यात् रूढिशब्दः । **नित्यपर्यायवाची सिद्धशब्दो** नित्यस्यार्थस्य पर्यायेण वाचकः । कदाचिद्धि नित्यशब्दस्तमर्थमाह कदाचित् सिद्धशब्दः । यदा स्वरूपमाश्रीयते नित्य इत्यस्य स्वरूपस्य नित्यशब्दस्य यः पर्यायस्तद्वाची सिद्धशब्दः नित्यशब्दस्य च पर्यायः सिद्धशब्दः तं चाह सिद्धशब्द इति । तत्र यथैव विभवादात्मनि सर्वगतस्यात्मेति व्यपदेशः प्रवर्तते प्राप्तिसामान्यान्निष्क्रियेऽपि एवमेव साध्यमानानां यत्स्था परिनिष्पत्तिः तत्सामान्यादसाध्येषु सिद्धशब्दस्य प्रवृत्तिः । **कथं ज्ञायते** । अभिप्रायः । पर्यायशब्दः शब्दान्तरनिरपेक्षस्तमर्थं ब्रवीति । यथेन्द्रः शक्रः पुरंदर इति । न च

शक्रादयः इन्द्रार्थादर्थान्तरेषु वर्तन्ते। अयं तु सिद्धशब्दः शब्दान्तरोपसंहितोऽनित्यार्थमाह। कार्येषु च घटादिषु दृष्टः। यत् कूटस्थेष्वविचालिषु भावेषु वर्तते। कूटस्थशब्दः। शब्दोऽयं न व्ययीक्रियते [यत्र] तत्र प्रवर्तते। तद्यथा। कूटस्थं राशिं कुरु नास्माद् व्ययः कर्तव्यः इति। अविचालिष्विति देशान्तराप्राप्तिं [अ]विपरिणामं चाह। यस्य हि मात्रापनीयते विपरिणम्यते वा तन्नित्यं न भवतीति अस्याभिप्रायः। पर्यायवाचिनोऽपि सामान्यविशेषभावे सामानाधिकरण्यं दृश्यते। वराहशब्दः पर्वते वर्तते सूकरे च वर्तते। प्रसिद्धतरस्तु सूकरे। पर्वतेन तु सामानाधिकरण्यमनुभवति। वराहो हिमवान् वराहः पारियात्र इति। तत्र यथैव वराहशब्दः पर्यायः सन् शब्दान्तरोपसंहितः प्रयुज्यते विशेषप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमेवं नित्यविशेषप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं पृथिव्यादीनामुपादानमिति न विरुध्यते पर्यायशब्दत्वम्। शुक्लशब्दस्तु पर्यायो भूत्वा प्रवर्तते शुक्लवस्त्रमिति। **सिद्धा द्यौः सिद्धा पृथिवी सिद्धमाकाशमिति**। आर्हतानां मीमांसकानां च नैवास्ति विनाशः एषाम्। सति वा विनाशे प्रयोक्तृणां शब्दव्यवहारमतिक्रान्ता एते इति नित्या इत्युच्यन्ते। न हि प्रयोक्तृभेदेन उत्पद्यमाना विनश्यन्तो वा दृष्टा इति। **ननु च भोः कार्येष्वपि दृश्यते।** अभ्युपगच्छामो वयं विशेषप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमुपादानं सत्यपि पर्यायशब्द इति। तत्र किं वा तन्निष्पत्तिरूपमाश्रित्य सिद्धशब्दो नित्येषु उपसंह्रियते। यदि निष्पत्तिरूपमाश्रीयते कार्येष्वपि निष्पत्तिरूपमस्तीति नास्ति सिद्धशब्दात् निर्णयः। प्रथमतो मन्यसे सत्यपि निष्पत्तिरूपे तदाश्रीयते। किं तर्हि? रूढिरेव। तद्यथा गङ्गा हि रूपेणाश्रिता तन्नामिकाणमुत्पादयति गाङ्ग इति। देवतादिरूपेणाश्रीयमाणा ढकं गाङ्गेय इति। एवं वासुदेव इति। यदापत्यत्वेनोच्यते वसुदेवस्यापत्यमिति तदा क्षत्रियाख्या। यदा तु वसन्त्यस्मिन् देवा इति वासुदेवः तदा संज्ञैषा तत्रभगवत इति। दुर्योधन इति कृच्छ्रेण योध्यत इति तदा कौरवत्वे नाख्या [दौर्योधनिरिति]। कौरव इति दौर्योधन इति। अनुकारी यथैव नित्येषु रूढ एवमपि कार्येष्वपीति। यदि निमित्तापेक्षो यदि रूढिशब्दः सर्वथा नास्ति **नित्यपर्यायवाचिन** इति निर्णयः। **संग्रहे कार्यप्रतिद्वन्द्विभावात्**। इह सामान्यस्य स्वविषयस्मृतिहेतुरनेकः साहचर्यादिः। यथा शिलाशब्दस्य सामान्यं सहचरितैर्भिद्यते। लोहदण्डमानय शिलां चेत्युक्ते व्यायामाप्रतिपत्तिः शिलाङ्गत्वाच्चेति पेषाङ्गे। तथा रामलक्ष्मणाविति दाशरथौ। रामकेशवाविति बलदेवे। विरोधेनापि किंचित् साहचर्यं यथा रामार्जुनाविति जामदग्न्ये कार्तवीर्ये च प्रतिपत्तिः। एवं संग्रहे एतत् प्रस्तुतं किं कार्यः शब्दः अथ सिद्ध इति। कार्यशब्दसंनिधाने प्रयोगात् सिद्धशब्दो नित्यस्यार्थवृत्तिः। तथा न। किं तर्हि? कार्यो न कार्यः सिद्ध इति। कार्यत्वप्रतिषेधात् सिद्धत्वाप्रतिषेधाच्च निश्चितं संग्रहे **नित्यपर्यायवाचिनः**

(ॅनुम्)। इहापि तदेव। कुतः। संग्रहोऽप्यस्यैव शास्त्रस्यैकदेशः तत्रैकतन्त्रत्वाद् व्याडेश्च प्रामाण्यादिहापि तथैव सिद्धशब्द उपात्तः।

[८.४] अथ वा सन्त्येकपदान्यप्यवधारणानि। अनपेक्ष्य ग्रन्थान्तरं संप्रत्युच्यते। इह किंचिद् द्विपदमेवावधारणं भवति यत्रैवकारः श्रूयते। अप एव भक्षयति। वायुमेव भक्षयतीति। अवधार्यमाणस्यार्थस्य शब्दान्तरेणोपात्तस्यानवद्योतितमवधारणमवद्योत्यत एवशब्देन। यदा त्वर्थप्रकरणादेः सोऽर्थोऽभिव्यज्यते तदैवशब्दो न श्रूयते इत्यवधारणमेकपदमित्युच्यते। तत्र न कश्चिदपो भक्षयतीति [अब्भक्षः]। अब्भक्षश्रुतिः सामर्थ्यादन्यनिवृत्तिपरा। अप एव यो भक्षयति स आनीयतामिति। तथा यः संप्रत्यब्भक्षः संपन्न इति प्रागपि तस्याप्सु प्रवृत्तेरवधार्यन्ते आपोऽन्यनिवृत्त्यर्थम्। यथा पुनरत्र सामर्थ्यमिह सिद्धशब्दे। किं सामर्थ्यम्? उच्यते। सिद्धशब्दोपादानात्तावन्नायमुभयार्थो गम्यते। एतावदेव वस्तु नित्यमनित्यं वा। न किंचिदन्यन्नित्यानित्यमस्ति। तत्र यथैवाभिरूपाय कन्या दातव्येत्यभिरूपस्य प्रकर्षे प्रवृत्तिर्नाभिरूपमात्रे एवं केवलसिद्धशब्दो य एवाव्यभिचारिणा सिद्धत्वेनानुगतस्तमेवोपादत्ते। ध्रुवाणां चाव्यभिचारिणां सिद्धत्वं कार्याणां व्यभिचारि इति कार्येषु पदान्तरोपसंहितः प्रवर्तते। तत्रापि च प्रवर्तमानो नित्यविषयमेकदेशमाश्रित्य प्रवर्तते इत्यत इदमुच्यते – सिद्ध एव यो न साध्य इति। एतच्च निष्पत्तिरूपाश्रितायां शब्दप्रवृत्तौ युज्यते न रूढ्याश्रितायाम्। एवं च सति अब्भक्षो वायुभक्ष इति युज्यते। यदा तु व्रतनामधेयम् अब्भक्षो वायुभक्ष इति च रूढिः तदापि जातिवचनः। तदात्यन्तं रूढौ क्रियायां प्रवृत्तेरवधारणाभावः।

[८.५] अथ वा पूर्वोत्तरपदलोपोऽत्र द्रष्टव्यः। कः पुनरयं पूर्वोत्तरपदलोपोपायः। न ह्यनुच्चारितस्य देवदत्तशब्दस्य पाणिनिरन्यो वा कश्चित् समर्थो लोपं कर्तुम्। तत्रैके मन्यन्ते। एकपदोपलब्धौ समुदायस्मृतिः। तत एवार्थप्रतिपत्तिरिति। एतदसम्यक्। न हि प्रतीयमानादर्थप्रत्यायनं न चानुमानिकस्य संस्कारः। नित्यत्वं च व्याकरणे उक्तम्। यस्मात् इदं दर्शनम्। नामकरणकाले अनुनिष्पादितो नान्तरीयकत्वाद्वाजिनवत् सह निष्पद्यते। तद्यथामिक्षार्थिनः क्षीरमुपाददानस्य एकसाधनसाध्यमामिक्षयैककालं वाजिनमपि निष्पद्यते। एवं सत्यभामाशब्देन सह सत्यशब्दो भामाशब्दश्च निष्पाद्यते। तच्च पाणिनिर्लोपद्वारेणैवंभूतानाममनुनिष्पादिनां साधुत्वमाचष्टे। न तु ज्येष्ठा इत्येवमादीनां ज्ये इत्युच्यते। विशाखा च खा इति। एवमिह सिद्धशब्दोऽत्यन्तसिद्धशब्दानुनिष्पादी यः स निर्दिष्टः। यथा पुनस्तत्रार्थप्रकरणादिति। विप्रतिपत्तिस्तु तस्यासंभवे।

दत्तं दायमाह्वयति अर्थो वा स तादृशो यो देवदत्तेन कर्तव्य इति दत्तशब्देन देवदत्तः प्रतिपद्येत । एवमिहापि । कथम् । उच्यते । इहापि यदि निष्पत्तिरूपाश्रयणं क्रियेत निष्पद्यमानताया यच्च निष्पन्नं तस्येदमन्वाख्यानमित्यभूयोविषयत्वं स्याल्लक्षणस्य । तस्माद्यश्च निष्पन्नो यश्च निष्पद्यते यश्च निष्पत्स्यमानः सर्व एते सिद्धाः । एवं च आकाशे निष्पद्यमानता निष्पत्स्यमानता निष्पन्नता चास्ति । अत्यन्तसिद्धा एते इत्येतत्सामर्थ्यादत्यन्तसिद्धानुनिष्पादी अयमिति व्यपदिश्यते ।

[८. ६] **अथ वा व्याख्यानतो विशेषप्रतिपत्तिरिति** । एतत् प्रतिपादयति न यस्मात् संदेहस्तस्मादलक्षणम् । न हि वक्त्रादयः पाण्यादयो वा संदिह्यमाने वस्तुनि स्थाणोः पुरुषस्य....लक्षणं न भवति । तस्माद्यथैव वृद्धिरादैजित्येवमादयोऽनुवृत्ता इदं व्याख्यानादवसीयते एवमिह सिद्धशब्दं नित्यपर्यायवाचिनं तद्वचनात् प्रतिपद्यते।

[८. ७] **मङ्गलार्थम्** । निरुपकृष्टाभिमतार्थसिद्धिर्मङ्गलम् । तदर्थं च यदुपादीयते तदपि तदर्थत्वात् मङ्गलमित्याख्यायते । तत्र मङ्गलार्थमभिप्रेतार्थसिद्धयर्थम् । **माङ्गलिक इति** । मङ्गलं प्रयुङ्क्ते । तथैवाभिप्रेतार्थसिद्धयामङ्गतया प्रयुङ्क्त ऐन्द्रमह्निक इति यथा । **महतः शास्त्रौघस्येति** दुस्तरत्वं ख्याप्यते । **प्रथन्ते** । प्रथनं चानभिभवः । अपरो न विच्छेदाद्यध्ययनस्येति इदमाह । **वीरपुरुषाण्यायुष्मत्पुरुषाणि चेति** । **अध्येतारश्च सिद्धार्थाः** । कार्यसिद्धिस्तेषां शास्त्रस्याप्रतिबन्धेन परिसमाप्तिर्वाभ्युदयो वा तत्पूर्वकः । नित्यशब्दोपादानेऽप्येष एव वृत्तान्तो यः सिद्धशब्द इत्येतत् कथयति - **आभीक्ष्ण्ये इति** । स्यादेतत् क्रियाशब्दप्रयोगादाभीक्ष्ण्यं युज्यत इति । एवमपि नित्ये शब्दार्थसंबन्ध इत्युच्यमाने अभीक्ष्णं यः शब्दः प्रयुज्यते आगोपालादिभ्यस्तेषामिदमन्वाख्यानमन्येषां नेति गम्यते । किं च आश्चर्यमनित्य इत्यत्राभीक्ष्णं यन्न भवति तदनित्यमित्युच्यते इत्यस्ति क्रियापदमन्तरेणाभीक्ष्ण्यवचनत्वमिति ॥

[९. १] **कं पुनः पदार्थं मत्वैष विग्रहः क्रियते सिद्धे शब्दे अर्थे संबन्धे चेति** । शब्देऽभिधेयोऽर्थस्तं प्रत्येव प्रश्नः । किं शब्दस्याभिधेयं मत्वैष विग्रहः क्रियते इत्यर्थः । **आकृतिमित्याह** । शब्दो ह्यनपेक्षितार्थान्तरसंबन्धो जातावेव स्वरूपं प्रतिलभते जातिगुणक्रियायदृच्छाशब्देषु । द्रव्यादीनां तु ताद्रूप्यापादनेनाभिधानम् । यथा गोशब्देन वाहीकस्य । संज्ञाशब्देन च द्रव्यस्य । तत्र क्रियां प्रतिपद्यमानं द्रव्यं गामानयेति पररूपेणाभिधीयते । एवं शुक्लो गौरिति शुक्लत्वेनैकार्थसमवेतसमवायेन गोत्वमुपलक्ष्यते । एको ब्राह्मण इत्येकत्वेन ब्राह्मणत्वमिति सर्वः शब्द आकृतिमाह । तस्याश्च तत्त्वान्यत्वप्रख्य-

योर्युगपत् कार्यत्वमेकस्मिन्नर्थे न संभवति । यथा स एव यज्ञदत्तो योऽन्यो यज्ञदत्तादिति । इह तु मधुरायां बालं दुर्बलं कपिलं दृष्ट्वा पाटलिपुत्रे नीलं स्थूलमुपलभ्य स एवायमर्थो नीलत्वादिगुणयुक्तो यो मया बालत्वादियुक्तो दृष्ट इति प्रत्यभिज्ञानादस्तित्वमवसीयते । न चादृष्टे प्रत्यभिज्ञानमस्ति । नूनं दृष्टः प्रागर्थो यतः प्रत्यभिज्ञायत इति । सर्वेषामेव व्यतिरिक्ता जातिरित्येवंवादिनां नित्यत्वं प्रत्यविप्रतिपत्तिरिति इदमुच्यते – **आकृतिर्हि नित्येति** । सा त्वनित्यैर्द्रव्यादिभिर्व्यज्यत इति इयान् व्यापारो द्रव्यादीनाम् ।

[९. २] **अथ द्रव्ये पदार्थे विग्रहः कर्तव्यः** । द्रव्यमेवाभिधीयते । गोत्वादयस्त्वनभिधीयमानाः शब्दस्योपाधिभूताः प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् । यथा स्वस्तिकादयो देवदत्तगृहस्यावाचकाः सन्त उपलक्षणं गृहस्य भवन्ति । द्रव्यस्य च विनाशदर्शनात् । अथ वा तत्रैवं विग्रहः कर्तव्यः । **सिद्धे शब्दे अर्थसंबन्धे चेति** । अर्थेन संबन्धः अर्थसंबन्धः । तस्मिन्नित्य इत्यर्थस्य न स्वार्थमुपादानं वाक्ये । किं तर्हि? संबधोपलक्षणत्वेन । यथा नुम्ग्रहणमनुस्वारोपलक्षणार्थम् । एवं ह्युच्यमाने सिद्धे शब्दे संबन्धे चेति इदमपि गम्येत । शब्दस्य यः स्वयाकृत्या संबन्धस्तस्मिन् नित्य इति । अर्थग्रहणे तु सति अभिधेयस्य प्रतिपत्तिरिति । अथ कथमनित्येऽर्थे संबन्धो नित्यः स्यात् । उच्यते । समवायवत् । यथा समवायो नित्यविषयो नित्यानित्यविषयः अनित्यविषयश्च नित्यः एवमयमपि स्यात् । अथ वा घटशब्दस्य या सर्वकालमर्थेनाशून्यता सर्वकालमाविष्टमेवार्थरूपेण शब्दरूपमित्येवंविषयां योग्यतामपेक्ष्य शब्दधर्मेणाह – **नित्यो ह्यर्थवतामर्थैरभिसंबन्ध इति** । एतदेव च दर्शनमन्ते वक्ष्यति । **अथ वा किं न एतेन इदं नित्यमिदमनित्यमिति । द्रव्य एव पदार्थ एष विग्रहो न्याय्यः । द्रव्यं हि नित्यम्** । नित्यः पृथिवीधातुः । पृथिवीधातौ किं सत्यम् । विकल्पः । विकल्पे किं सत्यम् । ज्ञानम् । ज्ञाने किं सत्यम् । ॐ । अथ तद् ब्रह्म । तदेतदुक्तं भवति । अतः परं शब्दार्थव्यवहारो निवर्तते । व्यवहारातीतोऽयमर्थ इति । तत्र यावन्तो निर्देशा अनित्य इति वा नित्य इति वा सर्व एवैतेऽवस्थापेक्षाः ताश्चानन्यास्तस्मादिति । यथैव च स्वप्नोऽन्यद्वा ज्ञानं त्रैलोक्यमिति वा गृहमिति वानाकारं पर्वतादिभेदैरविभक्तं पर्वतादिप्रदेशेष्वेवमसावर्थः । स पुरुषादिः सर्वान् शब्दव्यवहारानतिक्रान्तो नित्यः परिकल्प्यते । तस्य च नित्यत्वे उपपन्नो विग्रहः ।

[९. ३] **आकृतावपि पदार्थे एष विग्रहो न्याय्यः** । अपिशब्दो द्रव्येऽप्येवंभूत उपपन्न इति प्रदर्शनार्थः । **न क्वचित् उपरतेति कृत्वातः सर्वत्रोपरता भवति** । यदुच्यते आकृतिरन्योत्पद्यते इति तदसत् । कस्याश्चित् तिरोभावात् कस्या-

श्चित् चाविर्भावात्। पौरस्त्ये हि दर्शने सति भावाभावौ न स्तो जातेः। किं तर्हि? आविर्भावतिरोभावौ। तौ चानुपलभ्य सर्तुर्भगवतोऽस्य पाणिनेरुभयं पदार्थ इत्येष सिद्धान्तः। तत्रोभयस्मिन् अपि पदार्थे अर्थस्य नित्यता न व्यावर्तत इति न शक्यतेऽस्या भावाभावौ कल्पयितुम्। एवं प्रधानात्मन्यवस्थितमसंवेद्यं नास्तित्वात् प्रच्यवते। द्रव्यान्तरस्थोपलभ्यते। द्रव्यान्तरस्थाभिव्यज्यते। तत्र तत्त्वान्यत्वप्रत्यययोरविकल्पयोरेकस्मिन् आश्रये विरोधादाकृतेरेकत्वमविनाशोऽस्ति इत्यवकल्पन्ते। अथापि यथोपन्यस्तं दर्शनम्। अत्राप्यनन्यत्वात् याकृतिरिति तदेव द्रव्यमुच्यते भवता। नैवम्। यदि द्रव्यं नित्यं आकृतिरपि नित्या। अथ वेदमपि दर्शनम्। एकमपि तावद्द्विरूपं सर्वम्। शक्तीनां समुदाये काचित्तु शक्तिः कदाचित् तिरोभवति कदाचित् आविर्भवतीति। तथा शब्दः प्रवर्तते।

[९.४] अथ वा नेदमेव नित्यलक्षणं ध्रुवं कूटस्थमविचालीति। अनेन ग्रन्थेन त्रिविधामनित्यतामाह। त्रिविधा ह्यनित्यता। संसर्गानित्यता विपरिणामानित्यता वस्तुविनाशानित्यता च। अतो विपर्ययेण नित्यता। संसर्गानित्यता यथा स्फटिकस्योपाश्रयविशेषैः संसर्गिभिर्द्रव्यान्तरैः प्रच्छादितं स्वरूपं नोपलभ्यते स्वतः सच्च तदपि। तथा विपरिणामानित्यता यथा बदरस्य श्यामतातिरोभावे रक्तताप्रादुर्भावेन। वस्तुविनाशानित्यता यः सर्वेण सर्वप्रध्वंसो निरुपाख्ये। तदा नैतत् प्रतिपत्तव्यं यदेवैते धर्मा न सन्ति। तन्नित्यमिति। एवं हि परिकल्प्यमाने सांख्यस्यैव आत्माविकारित्वनित्यः स्यात्। प्रधानं तु विकारधर्मि इत्यनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः। तस्मादिदमपि नित्यलक्षणं यस्मिंस्तत्त्वं न विहन्यते तन्नित्यमिति। स एवायमिति तुल्यबुद्धिहेतुत्वम्। स एवायमात्मा। वस्तुना अविनष्टं चात्मत्रस्तु घटत्वादि। अथ वा स एवायं स तयावस्थयोच्यते। अथ वा किं न एतेन। न हीदं शास्त्रं कस्यचिदेकस्य सहायभूतं सर्वसाधारणम्। यथैव सांख्यादीनां द्रव्यादेव प्रतिपत्तिः रूपादिसमवायो घटोऽर्थान्तरभूतो वेति यस्य यो घटस्तस्मिन् घटशब्दं प्रयुङ्क्ते। एवं यस्य यादृशी नित्यताभिप्रेता तां नित्यतामाश्रित्यार्थस्यायं विग्रहः क्रियते। तत्र क्षणिकवादिनामविच्छेदेन प्रवृत्तिर्या सा नित्यता। इतरेषां प्रधानव्यवस्थानदर्शनेन नित्यता। अथ वेदं प्रतिपादयति तत्र किं न एतेनेदं नित्यमिदमनित्यमिति। किमस्माकं वस्तुगतेन विचारेण। यदस्माकं नित्यं तं पदार्थं मत्वैष विग्रहः क्रियते। अर्थश्चास्माकं यः शब्देनाभिधीयते। तत्र वस्तु यदि नित्यं यद्यनित्यं शब्दस्तु न कदाचिदभिधेयश्चानित्य इति शब्दो नार्थाप्रवृत्तपूर्वः। तत्र नित्यकालं स्वरूपेण व्यावेशाद्यश्च

घटशब्दो यश्च शशविषाणशब्दो सर्व एते सर्वकालमर्थैरशून्या व्याविष्टा एवार्थरूपेणेत्येवंभूते पदार्थे युक्त एवैष विग्रहः। सिद्धे शब्दे अर्थे संबन्धे चेति ॥

[१०. १] **कथं पुनः** प्रस्तूयते। उपपत्तिं पृच्छति। **लोकतः**। लोकाद्धि प्रसिद्धमिदं नित्यमिदमनित्यमिति। यादृशी लोकप्रवृत्तिः कार्येषु भावेषु तादृशी न शब्देषु। ये लौकिकाः अर्थाः शिक्षापूर्वकाः ते न शिक्षामन्तरेण निर्वर्तयितुं शक्यन्ते। तद्यथा। घटेनार्थी न च शिक्षितः घटकरणे तु कुशलं कर्तारमुपैति कुम्भकारं **कुरु घटं कार्यमनेन करिष्यामि** इति एवम्। यदि शब्दाः गौरित्येवमादयः पाणिनिप्रभृतिभिरेव शारक्रीडावत् व्यवहारार्थमुत्पादिताः स्युः तत्राशिक्षितः पुरुषः कुशलान् प्रयोज्यत्वे वैयाकरणानुपेयात्। न चोपैति। **तावत्येवार्थमर्थमुपादाय शब्दान् प्रयुङ्क्ते**। बुद्धौ समीक्ष्यार्थं प्रयुङ्क्त एव। तस्मादेतदवसेयम्। अवस्थिता एव अमी शब्दार्थसंबन्धा इति।

अन्ये वर्णयन्ति। सौमसौरक्रीडावदुत्पादिताः। यथा शब्दान् पृच्छति एवमर्थान् पृच्छति। अस्य शब्दस्य कोऽर्थः। एवं संबन्धमपि करोति। न हि शब्दमवस्थाप्यार्थं च तावुभावुपश्लेषयति। तस्मादेतदवसेयम्। व्यवस्थिता एवामी शब्दार्थसंबन्धाः। यत एकस्मिन्नेव काले बुद्ध्या निरूप्यन्त इति।

अन्ये वर्णयन्ति। यत्तदुक्तं दर्शनस्य परार्थत्वात् विप्रप्रवृत्तत्वादिति तदेवानेन भाष्येणोक्तमिति। कार्याणामेव विनियोगादप्यन्यद्दर्शनमस्ति उत्पत्तिं प्रति। अस्य तु यद्दर्शनं योपलब्धिः या निष्पत्तिः सा परार्थरूपा एव। न हि अपरार्थताशून्यः कालः क्वचिदस्ति। तस्मादेतत् प्रतिपत्तव्यम्। अवस्थित एवासौ प्रयोक्तृकरणादिसंनिपातेन अभिव्यज्यत इति। अस्यां कल्पनायां द्वयं न संबध्यते। **यदि तर्हि लोकः शब्देषु प्रमाणमिति। लोकतोऽर्थप्रयुक्ते शब्दप्रयोगे शास्त्रेण धर्मनियमः**। लोकात् लोकतः। अर्थेन प्रेरिते अर्थप्रयुक्ते। यस्माल्लोकादयं शिक्षते स लोकः सापराधः। साधूनसाधूंश्च शिक्षयति। यश्चात्मप्रत्यायनेऽर्थः प्रेरयिता सः। यथैव गौरित्येतं प्रेरयत्येवं गाव्यादीनपि। अतः शास्त्रप्रवृत्तिः एवमर्था कथमसाधवो निवर्तेरन्निति। अथ शब्दप्रयोग इति प्रयोगग्रहणं किमर्थम्। एतावद्वक्तव्यं लोकतोऽर्थप्रयुक्त शब्द इति। उच्यते। अर्थप्रत्यायनं बोधः। तत्र प्रत्याय्योऽर्थः। प्रत्यायनं फलम्। शब्दः करणम्। शब्दार्थयोः कर्मकरणयोः असति क्रियार्थे संबन्धाभावात् क्रियाभ्युपगन्तव्या। यथा च धान्यानां व्रीहीणामवहनने मुशलोद्यमननिपातनाभ्यां व्यवहितेन संबन्धो भवति ततश्च कणमोक्षतुषविप्रमोक्षः फलं निर्वर्तते। एवमिहापि शब्दो द्रव्यभूतः करणम्। अर्थः कर्म प्रत्याय्यते। तदवबोधः

फलम् । तत् फलं क्रियायाः । का पुनः सा क्रिया । उच्यते । प्रणिधिः प्रयोक्तुः शब्दान् प्रेरयतस्तद्विषयः । प्रणिधिश्चेतसो वृत्तिरयं योग्य एतमर्थं प्रत्याययितुमिति । सा क्रिया । एवं ह्युक्तम् । आत्मा बुद्ध्या समर्थ्यार्थान् मनो युङ्क्ते विवक्षयेति । यथा सत्येव चक्षुषि सति च रूपे न चक्षुरप्रणिहितमनधिष्ठितं मनसा विषयालोचने समर्थं भवत्येवं शब्दो व्यवस्थितोऽर्थेऽपि प्रयोक्तुः प्रणिधानमन्तरेण प्रत्यायने असमर्थः इत्येतत् प्रयोगग्रहणेनाचष्टे । अन्येषां दर्शनम् । शब्दस्यानेको धर्मः । यथेण् गताविल्ययं यदान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामर्थवानिति समधिगम्यते तदार्थवत्त्वाद् धातुत्वं प्रतिपद्यते । अयमेव तु यदार्थपरित्यागे एकाचो द्वे इति वर्णत्वेनाश्रीयते तदा तस्यार्थपदार्थकस्यायमेकः अजिति व्यतिरेके अस्येति संबन्धमुपनीयते । तथा ब्राह्मणशब्दा अभ्यासकालेऽनर्थकाः परप्रतिपादने स्वरूपपदार्थकाः एवं पठैवं पठेति । विनियोगकालेऽर्थवन्तः । तत्र यासौ विनियोगकाले परिगृहीतार्थवतोऽर्थेषु प्रपत्तिः स संबन्धः । यच्चोपलक्ष्यते पारतन्त्र्यं स शब्दस्यात्मीयो धर्मः । नित्यः शब्दात्मा । स प्रयोगशब्देनोपसंगृह्यते । एवंभूतः शब्दोऽर्थेन प्रेर्यते न सर्व इति ।

अन्ये वर्णयन्ति । प्रयुज्यत इति प्रयोगः । शब्दश्चासौ प्रयोगश्च शब्दप्रयोगः । न शब्दमात्रे धर्मनियमः । किं तर्हि ? प्रयोगार्थे शब्द इति ।

अन्ये वर्णयन्ति । कश्चिच्छब्दः प्रयुज्यते कश्चिन्न प्रयुज्यते । **गुहा त्रीणि निहिता नेङ्गयन्ति । न** चेष्टन्ते इत्येते न प्रयुज्यन्ते । **तुरीयं वाचो मनुष्या वदन्ती**ति तुरीयो भागः प्रयुज्यते । ये प्रयुज्यन्ते तेषां नियमः । तस्मात् य उत्कृष्टो धर्मः तस्मात् तेषां त्रयाणां ज्ञानमिति । **धर्माय नियमो धर्मनियमः** । धर्मनियमो नाम रूढः कश्चित् । तस्य तु नियतं तादर्थ्यमिति चतुर्थ्या विग्रहे दर्श्यते । षष्ठ्या समासो ह्ययं यथाश्वघासो नाम कश्चित् इषीकादयस्तेषामेव रूढः । नियतत्वात्तादर्थ्यस्य चतुर्थ्या विगृह्यते अश्वेभ्यो घास इति । षष्ठीसमास एवायम् । तथा चोक्तम् । अश्वघासादयः षष्ठीसमासा भवन्तीति । **धर्मार्थो वा नियमो धर्मनियम** इति शाकपार्थिवादित्वादुत्तरपदलोपः । धर्मार्थत्वादयमेव नियमो धर्म इत्यासन्नं कारणं धर्मं प्रति व्यपदिश्यते । **धर्मप्रयोजनो वा** इति मीमांसकदर्शनम् । अवस्थित एव धर्मः । स त्वग्निहोत्रादिभिरभिव्यज्यते । तत्प्रेरितस्तु फलदो भवति । यथा स्वामी भृत्यैः सेवायां प्रेर्यते फलं प्रत्येवमयं नियमो धर्मस्य फलनिर्वृत्तिं प्रति प्रयोजक इति ॥

[१०. २] **यथा लौकिकवैदिकेषु । प्रियतद्धिता दाक्षिणात्याः ।** अथ किं प्रियतद्धितत्वादपशब्दोऽयमिति प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । नेत्याह । अत्र हि ये तेऽवयवा लोके भवा

वेदे वा शक्यास्ते तद्धितमन्तरेणोपसंग्रहीतुं समुदायशब्देन लोक इति वा वेद इति वा। अयं त्वाचार्यश्चानवयवभूतान् पृथक्कृत्य लोकवेदयोश्चाधारत्वं निर्दिशति । तत्र किमन्यत् प्रियतद्धितत्वात्। यथा कश्चिद् वनस्पतय इति भेदेन ब्रवीति कश्चित् समूहरूपेण वानस्पत्यमिति । **अथ वा युक्तः एवात्र तद्धितार्थः** । नात्रावयवावयविभावः। किं तर्हि ? वाक्य एवानेकदेशभूतोऽर्थोऽभिप्रेतो लोकवेदाभ्याम्। कः पुनरसौ। कृतान्तः सिद्धान्तः समयग्रन्थसंदर्भः। एतदुक्तं भवति । यथैवान्ये ग्रन्थसंदर्भा धर्मनियमार्था एवमयमपि कस्मात् गृह्यते धर्मनियमार्थ इति ।

लोके तावदभक्ष्यो ग्राम्यकुक्कुट इति नैष साधर्म्येण दृष्टान्तः । किं तर्हि ? पक्षे । पक्षे न यो भक्ष्य इति धर्मनियम इति । अस्मात् सामान्यादिह उपात्तमर्थित्वाद् भक्षणं प्रसक्तम् एवमैतन्नोपदेशात्। तत्र नियमः क्रियते एतेन क्षुत् प्रतिहन्तव्या नान्येनेति । अत्र केषांचिद्दर्शनम्। यदि तद्वचनमभक्ष्यो ग्राम्यः कुक्कुट इत्यस्यानुपादानात् धर्म इति। अन्ये मन्यन्ते। यथैव विषभक्षणात् ध्रुवो मृत्युरिति विषं न भक्ष्यत एवमुपपातकमिति स्वभावात् तस्मात्तत्परित्यागात् धर्म इति। एवमर्थावबोधं प्रति सर्वोऽर्थः शब्दमपशब्दं च प्रयुङ्क्ते । तत्र शब्देनासौ प्रत्याय्यो नेतरेणेति नियमः क्रियते ।

ननु च क्षुद्द्वितीयस्याकरणात् कृत्यः क्षुधि कर्मण्युत्पन्नः तत्रैवं भवितव्यं शक्या चानेनेति। नैष दोषः। सामान्येनोपक्रमो विशेषेणाभिधानम्। इह शकेः कृत्यः सामान्यद्रव्यविषये कर्मार्थे प्रवृत्तः । स प्राप्तलिङ्ग एवाजहल्लिङ्गताविशेषेण भिद्यते । तत्र विशेषे यः कर्मभावः स उपयुक्तः कृत्येनेति प्रथमा। यथोक्तं मुखनासिका वचनमस्य। नोच्यते मुखनासिका वचनी यस्येति। **तथा खेदात्** । खेदो नाम यदिन्द्रियस्यात्मविषये प्रवर्तमानस्य निग्रहं प्रत्यसामर्थ्यम्। अथ वा खेदयतीति खेदः राग एवोच्यते । रागात् खलु स्त्रीषु प्रवृत्तिरिति। अथ वा दैन्यं खेदः। एवं तावत् पौरुषेयाभिमतं स्मृतिशास्त्रं स्मृत्वोपनिबद्धं वेदे तदपि प्रदर्शयति – **वेदे खल्वपि पयोव्रतो ब्राह्मण** इति । अथ किं पयोव्रतत्वं क्रत्वर्थम्। नेत्याह। यदि क्रत्वर्थं स्यात् यथान्येषु अवदानप्राशनादिष्ववश्यं प्रवृत्तिरेवमत्रापि स्यात्। न चावश्यं दीक्षितः पयो व्रतयति। अर्थित्वे हि सति। यथा कृष्णविषाणया कण्डूयतीति प्रकृतमेव कण्डूयनमुपजातायां कण्डूवां कृष्णविषाणया क्रियते । यदि च क्रत्वर्थमभ्युपगम्यते। यत् प्रकृतभोजनं प्रतिषिद्धमन्यस्मिन् काले स चास्मिन् अर्थित्वे प्रवर्तते। यथाज्यमवेक्षत इति क्रत्वर्थमवेक्षणमिति न द्रव्यान्तराणामवेक्षणं प्रतिषिध्यते । **बैल्वः खादिरो यूपः स्याद्** इति। पशोरस्वतन्त्रीकरणार्थं यूप उपादीयते ।

तत्र ह्यस्वतन्त्रीकरणं यद् दृष्टं फलं निष्पद्यते यदि शिष्टे कृतचषालेऽष्टाश्रौ काष्ठे पश्वनुबन्धः क्रियते। यथाग्नौ कपालानि इत्यत्रापि पुरोडाशानां पाको दृष्टं फलम्। न चानेन मन्त्रेण कंचित् पाकविशेषमुपलभामहे। ततश्चादृष्टमत्रास्ति फलमिति एतदनेन प्रतिपादयति।

यद्यप्येष पक्षः स्यात् साधुवदपशब्दा अपि वाचकाः इत्येवमपि दृष्टं फलं तुल्यमर्थावबोधः। इह तु अदृष्टं फलमस्त्यभ्युदय इति। अत आह – **एवमिहापि समानायामर्थावगतौ शब्देन च** इति। **अभ्युदयकारि च भवति** इति च ब्रुवता इदमभ्युपगतं भवति अविहितपरित्यागादधर्मो नश्यत इति। अन्ये मन्यन्ते। तत्परित्यागात् अधर्मः केवलं न भवति। अयमेव चाभ्युदयो यदत्र एनसा न युज्यत इति।

[११. १] **अस्त्यप्रयुक्तः**। एतत् प्रतिगृहीतं प्रयुज्यमानानां व्याख्यानमिति। एते चोषादयो न प्रयुक्ता लोके व्याकरणाय ग्रन्थेषु च लिखिता न वा। सा कतरग्रन्थे नीतिरुपपद्यते। पूर्वपक्षद्वारेणैतत् प्रतिपादयितुकामो यदेतदप्रयुक्तत्वं शब्दानां नैतद्यस्य कस्यचित् वचनादेव तिष्ठते। य एव बहुश्रुताः शिष्टाः संमताः शब्दव्यवहारेषूपरताः स्वतन्त्रास्तेषामेव वचनादिति।

इदं विप्रतिषिद्धम्। अयमभिप्रायः। येऽर्था अर्थक्रियामन्तरेण प्रसिद्धास्तेष्वियं वाचोयुक्तिरुपपद्यते। यथा घटोऽन्तरेण स्वामर्थक्रियामबाद्याहरणादिकां प्रसिद्धः सिद्धः। शब्दः त्वयं स्वामर्थक्रियामन्तरेण न जातु प्रसिद्धः सिद्धः। प्रयोगादेव ह्ययमस्तिरूपं प्रतिपद्यते। तत्र यथैव कश्चिद् ब्रूयादप्रयोगादिति तथाजातीयकमिदम्। **प्रयुञ्जान एव खल्वपि भवान्** इति अनुपरतकरणव्यापार एवाहाप्रयुक्त इति। अचिरनिर्वृत्तं प्रयोगमाचष्टे। संप्रत्येव ह्ययं प्रयुक्त इति। यथा कश्चिद् ब्रूयाद् यावज्जीवं मे मौनमतो न ब्रवीमीति तथैवेदं भवता। तत्र यदि अप्रयोगोऽनुमन्यते त्वयाप्रयुक्त इति प्रयोगान्मन्येत। अथ मन्यसे अहं प्रयुञ्जे न त्वन्ये इति अन्येनाप्रयोगादसत्त्वमेषामिति। एतदप्यसत्। शब्दा ह्येतेऽन्यैर्नोच्चार्येरन् न चैतावतैव न स्युः। बह्वो हि शब्दाः स्त्रीभिर्नोच्चार्यन्ते। अथैषा भवतो बुद्धिः किं ममोच्चारयतः अनाप्तोऽहमितीदमाह प्रोत्साहनार्थम्। मा अवमंस्था आत्मानमाप्तो भवानिति। **कश्चेदानीमन्यो भवज्जातीयकः**। कोऽन्यो भवतो विद्वत्तर इति।

नैतद् विप्रतिषिद्धम् इति। एतदाह। द्विधा सत्ता प्रत्यक्षानुमानिकी चेति। तत्र प्रत्यक्षा दाधर्ति दर्धर्तीति। आनुमानिकी प्रकृतिप्रत्ययोपदेशेन कर्तव्या। तत्रोषेत्येव-

मादीनां प्रकृतीनां प्रत्ययानां चोपदेशात्। घृङः श्लुः शपश्चैषां नियतविषयत्वान्नोक्तम्। ग्रन्थेषु च लिखितत्वादिदमवसितं सन्त्येत इति। अथ लोके न प्रयुज्यन्त इति इदं ब्रूमो ऽप्रयुक्त इति। ब्रुवाणश्चाहं कथं ब्रूयामप्रयुक्त इत्याह – **न ब्रूमोऽस्माभिरप्रयुक्ता इति। अभ्यन्तरोऽहं लोके न त्वहं लोक** इति एतदुक्तं भवति। यथा लोकः शब्दान् प्रयुङ्क्ते नैवमहमेतानूषादीन् प्रयुञ्जे इति ॥

[११.२] **नार्थे शब्दप्रयोगात्।** अर्था हि कालपुरुषादयः सन्ति। शब्दस्य चार्थान्तरेषु गुणभावात् प्रधानसंनिहितेन शब्देन भवितव्यम्। अथ वार्थोपलब्धिः शब्दास्तित्वानुमानम्। न हि कश्चिदर्थोऽशब्दोऽस्ति। तत्र यथैत्र स्वर्गापूर्वदेवताशब्दा उपलभ्यमाना अत्यन्तापरिदृष्टानामर्थानामस्तित्वानुमानमेवं किं न गृह्यतेऽर्थ उपलभ्यमानः शब्दास्तित्वस्यानुमानमिति।

[११.३] **अप्रयोगः प्रयोगान्यत्वात्।** योऽयं शब्दास्तित्वे हेतुरुपदिष्टः अशब्दकस्यार्थस्य रूपादिति। अत्र ब्रूमो यद्येषामर्थानां वाचका न स्युः प्रतिपद्येमह्येषामस्तित्वम्। यतस्तु सन्ति तस्मादहेतुरयम्। ननु चोषेत्यस्य उषिता इति समानार्थो न भवति पुरुषस्य परोक्षतायाश्चाभिधानात्। नैष दोषः। वाक्यं तथाभूतं प्रयोक्तव्यं यतः सर्वार्थाभिव्यक्तिर्भवति।

[११.४] **अप्रयुक्ते दीर्घसत्त्रवत्।** आद्येन समयेन प्रतिपादयत्यस्तित्वम्। यथा पूर्वकालं प्रयुक्तानि दीर्घसत्राणि इदानीमप्रयुज्यमानान्यपि दधिमध्वादयो धर्म इति कर्मतादिविषयः सिध्यत एवमन्यैः प्रयुक्तानां सर्वकालमिदानीमप्रयुज्यमानानामप्यनुविधानं युक्तम्। ये तु दधिमध्वादयो धर्म इति तेषां व्याकरणेऽयमर्थो न संभवति। न हि इह शब्दोच्चारणाद् धर्म इति।

[११.५] **सर्वे देशान्तरे।** अथ याज्ञिकाश्चिरं जीवन्तोऽद्यत्वेऽप्याहुः हरिः अरिरिति। एवमपि ब्रूमः सर्वे एते देशान्तरे प्रयुक्ता इति। **वाकोवाक्यम्।** उक्तिप्रत्युक्तिग्रन्थः किंस्विदावपनं महदित्येवमादिः। इतिहासः। पूर्वचरितसंकीर्तनम्। एतेषु कश्चिदेव शब्दः कस्मिंश्चित् प्रयुज्यते। यथा पुरुषीशब्दः स्त्रीलिङ्गः क्वचिदप्रयुक्तो मैत्रावरुणीयानां कल्पे प्रयुज्यते। तस्यामनड्वाहीं पुरुषीं च धेनुके दक्षिणे दत्त्वा कारपचवं प्रति यमुनामवभृतमभ्युपेयुरिति। **शवतिर्गतिकर्मा** सर्वविभक्त्यन्तः **कम्बोजेष्वेव भाषितो विकार एनमार्या भाषन्ते शव इति।** जीवतः प्रकृतेर्मृतो विकारः। मृतो नाशं गत इत्यर्थः। अथ वा गतेर्विकारः गत्युपरमः। उपरतक्रिये भाषन्ते शव इति। निरुक्ते त्वेवं

पठ्यते—विकारमस्यार्येषु भाषन्त इति। तत्रायमर्थः। शवतेरच्प्रत्ययान्तस्य यो विकार एकदेशस्तमेव भाषन्ते न शवतिं सर्वप्रत्ययान्तां प्रकृतिमिति।

[१२. १] **किं पुनः शब्दस्य ज्ञाने धर्मः आहोस्वित् प्रयोग** इति। एतावदुच्यते **शास्त्रेण धर्मनियम** इति। स धर्मनियमः किं ज्ञानादथ प्रयोगादिति। अभिज्ञ एव पृच्छति कात्र स्मृतिरिति। अथ वा स्मृतिज्ञ एव पृच्छति। सा तु स्मृतिः क्वचित् श्रुत्या विरुध्यते। यथाष्टाचत्वारिंशद् वर्षाणि वेदब्रह्मचर्यं चरितव्यमिति। इयं श्रुतिविरोधिनी स्मृतिः। श्रुतौ ह्युक्तं कृष्णकेशः पिता पुत्रं याजयेदिति। तत्रानुमानपक्षे स्मृतिः नित्यप्रमाणं भवति। किं चादृष्टार्था स्मृतिरप्रमाणम्। यथा हंसः कैश्चिद् भक्ष्य इत्यभ्युपगतम्। कैश्चिन्मातृयोनिबद्धानामुद्वाहः। तत्र लौल्यात् रागाद्वेदं प्रवर्तितम्। तत्र पूर्वं धर्मं मत्वा शिष्टा आचरन्ति अद्यत्वे। स्मृतिरेकः शब्दः सम्यक् ज्ञातः शास्त्रान्वितः सुप्रयुक्तः स्वर्गे लोके कामधुग् भवतीति। किं चेदम्। प्रयुक्त एवासौ सम्यक् ज्ञातो भवति। यदि सम्यक् प्रयुज्यते ज्ञानादेव तु धर्मः। अथैवं प्रयुक्तः सम्यक् ज्ञातो भवतीति। सम्यक् प्रयोगस्तु सम्यग्ज्ञाते सति भवतीति। तत्र पृच्छामः। का उपपत्तियुक्ता स्मृतिः। कस्याः श्रुतेः अनुवादिनीति।

[१२. २] **ज्ञाने धर्म इति चेत्तद्वदधर्मः**। पृथक् कृत्वेदमुच्यते। यदि शब्दज्ञाने धर्म एवं सति अपशब्दज्ञानादधर्मः। एतस्मिन्नर्थे एतत् संभवेद् ब्राह्मणवधादधर्मो जीवनात्तु धर्म इति। न त्वेतच्छक्यते वक्तुं ब्राह्मणवधादधर्म इति शूद्रवधाद् धर्म इति। अत्र हीदं युज्येत शब्दज्ञानाद्यदि धर्मः शब्दस्यैवाज्ञानादधर्मः प्राप्नोतीति। उच्यते। दृष्टार्थया स्मृत्या तुल्यत्वमस्याः स्मृतेराह। दृष्टार्थायां हि स्मृतौ वैद्यके यत् श्लेष्मणः प्रकोपनं तद्विपरीतं रूक्षं वायोः। एवं शब्दज्ञानान्न धर्मो नाप्यधर्मः अपशब्दज्ञानात्त्वधर्म इति अन्ये मन्यन्ते। शब्दज्ञानाद् धर्मो न त्वपशब्दज्ञानादधर्म इति। यथोत्तरत्र वक्ष्यति शब्दप्रमाणका वयमिति। केचिन्मन्यन्ते। शब्दापशब्दज्ञानाभ्यां धर्माधर्मौ प्रवर्तेते। अधर्मस्य तु धर्मेणाभिभवः। यथा कूपखानकमुपादास्यते। तत्रापशब्दज्ञानादधर्म इत्येतत् प्रदर्शयति। व्याकरणाध्ययनादनर्थ आगतः। तस्मान्न किंचिदेतत् न चान्तरेण व्याकरणं शब्दाः शक्या ज्ञातुमिति।

अथैतत् स्यात्। भूयान् धर्मोऽल्पीयानधर्म इति। एतच्चासत्। भूयस्त्वादपशब्दानां फलेनापि भूयसा भवितव्यमित्यधर्म **एव भूयान् प्राप्नोति**।

[१२. ३] **आचारे नियमः** । एवं तावदुक्तविरुद्धेयं स्मृतिः । श्रुतिश्चैनां नानुवदति । अतोऽप्यप्रमाणम् । आचारे प्रयोगे ऋषिर्मन्त्रः तेऽसुरा इति प्रदर्शयत्येतदयं त्वाचारः । तस्मान्न म्लेच्छितवै नापभाषितवै इति च । इयं स्मृतिरेवमाह म्लेच्छनमपभाषणं न कर्तव्यमिति । न पुनरेवमाह म्लेच्छनमपभाषणं न ज्ञातव्यमिति ।

ननु चात्रैतावदुच्यते अयमपशब्दो न प्रयोक्तव्य इति एवं तु नैवास्ति शब्दस्य प्रयोगाद् धर्म इति । नैष दोषः । अपभाषणे प्रतिषिद्धे किं तूष्णींभूतेनासितव्यम् । तत्रानुगृहीतोऽपि व्याहारः स साधकः कर्तव्यः इत्येतद्विज्ञायते ॥

[१२. ४] **प्रयोगे सर्वलोकस्य** । शास्त्रस्योपादानमनर्थकमित्यभिप्रायः । अन्तरेणापि व्याकरणं प्रयोगदर्शनात् ।

अत्र चोद्यते । यद्यप्यन्तरेण शास्त्रमपि प्रयोगः तथापि न यत्नानर्थक्यम् । यथा सत्यपि स्वभावारोगत्वे केषांचित् वैद्योपदेशं प्रत्याख्याय प्रवृत्ता इति अपि न वैद्यकं प्रणीयन्ते । केचिद् व्याधितास्तेन चिकित्स्यन्त एव । तथा व्याकरणमपि प्रवर्तयितव्यमध्येतव्यं च । यस्माच्छब्दान् प्रयोक्तुमिच्छन् अध्याप्यते तदर्थं च प्रणेतव्यमिति ।

उच्यते । सत्यमेवम् । तेषां तु तत्रैवोक्तम् ।

दीप्ताग्नयः खराहाराः कर्मनिष्ठा महोदराः ।
ये नराः प्रति तांश्चिन्त्यं नावश्यं गुरुलाघवम् ॥

इति । इह तु न किंचिदेवंभूतमस्ति । एतावदुच्यते न चान्तरेण व्याकरणं शब्दाः शक्या ज्ञातुमिति ॥

[१२. ५] **शास्त्रपूर्वे प्रयोगेऽभ्युदयः** । शास्त्रहेतुके ज्ञाने सति यः प्रयोगः तस्मात् अभ्युदयः । **यः शास्त्रपूर्वकं** ज्ञात्वा **शब्दान् प्रयुङ्क्ते सोऽभ्युदयेन युज्यते** । तस्मादसौ स्मृतिरेकः शब्दः सम्यक् ज्ञात इति । **तत्तुल्यं वेदशब्देन** । वेदशब्दितो योऽर्थस्तेन तुल्यम् । वेदशब्देन **योऽग्निष्टोमेन यजते य उ चैनमेवं वेद** । स वेदशब्द एतदर्थमभिदधाति । योऽग्निष्टोमं विद्वांस्तु प्रयुङ्क्ते सोऽभ्युदयेन युज्यते विदुषः कर्मण्यधिकारात् । अपर आह । संप्रति वेदवाक्यान्येवोदाहरणानि । यथा तानि ब्रह्मचर्यादिभिर्नियमैरधीतानि धर्मसाधनमेवं प्रयोगस्य धर्मसाधनत्वे शास्त्रपूर्वकं ज्ञानमिति विशिष्टात् प्रयोगादभ्युदय इति व्यवस्थितम् । **अथ वा पुनरस्तु ज्ञान एव** । नेयं स्मृतिर्दृष्टार्थया तुल्या । तत्र पारम्पर्येणाविच्छिन्नमिदं स्मर्यते ज्ञानाद् धर्म इति । तत्रागमप्रामाण्याद्

यद्विहितं प्रतिषिद्धं वा तदेव क्रियते वर्ज्यते वा । नन्विदं वचनमपशब्दज्ञानादधर्म इति वा धर्मो वा न भवत्यपशब्दज्ञानादिति । यत्र न विहितं न च प्रतिषिद्धं न तत्र करणे वर्जने वा गुणदोषाविति । अथ **वाभ्युपाय एवापशब्दज्ञानं शब्दज्ञानस्य** । यश्च यस्याभ्युपायः तमन्तरेण तस्याप्रवृत्तिरेव इति तदपि तस्याङ्गमेव भवति । यथा कश्चित् मन्येत क्षितिगतं शौक्ल्यं तस्य दर्शनाद् धर्म इति । असौ कृष्णा । स पश्यन् न तत्र शक्नोति शुक्लं द्रष्टुम् । अत उपाय एवासौ शुक्लदर्शनस्य । यथाश्वमेधादिष्वभ्युपाय एव हिंसा धर्मस्य । एवमिदमपशब्दज्ञानानुषक्तमेव शब्दज्ञानमिति । नास्याधर्मेण संबन्धः । एवं स्मृतिः समर्थिता भवति । एवमानर्थक्यं न भवति स्मृतेः ।

अथ वा कूपखानकवद् इति । इयमुपपत्तिः । यद्यप्यपशब्दज्ञानादधर्मः स्यात्तथाप्यल्पीयान् । शब्दज्ञानादेव तूत्कृष्टो धर्मो भूयांश्चेति प्रवर्तत एवाध्ययने विद्यमानेऽपि दोषे । तत्तु स्मृतिप्रणयनसामर्थ्यादेवावगम्यते शब्दज्ञानात् प्रकृष्टो धर्म इति । तस्योदाहरणं कूपखानकः । यथासौ भूयसाभ्युदयेन योगं मन्यमानो दोषवत्यपि कर्मणि कूपखनने प्रवर्तते शक्ष्याम्येनमपि दोषमपनेतुमिति । अनेन च शब्दज्ञानस्योपस्तुतिः क्रियते । यथोक्तं नावाक्शिराः श्येनचितिं चिन्वीत प्रमायुकोऽस्य यजमानो भवतीति । नेयमवाक्शिरसो निन्दा । किं तर्हि ? अनेन द्वारेणोच्चशिरसः स्तुतिः क्रियते । विद्धि के मृताः स्त्रिय इति । एवं च कृत्वेदं वचनं याज्ञवल्क्यस्यैवं वक्ष्यत इमौ पलितौ बाहू क्वस्विद् ब्राह्मणस्य वचो बभूवेति । यदि ह्यवाक्शिरा यजमानं घातयेदहमेव ज्ञात्वा नाभविष्यमिति । तस्मादिदमपि कर्म दृष्टमिति । अन्येषां दर्शनम् । निन्दैवैषावाक्शिरस इति ।

याज्ञे कर्मणि नियमः । एतदुक्तं भवति । न सामान्यानुवादिनी सा श्रुतिः । किं तर्हि ? प्रकरणानुवादिनी । प्रकरणार्थश्चान्येषामेवंभूतोऽपि भवति । अगम्यागमनं गोसवे । सुरापानं सौत्रामण्याम् । सर्वमेधे ब्राह्मणवधः । यथा च कूर्माभावे प्रतिनिधिर्नियतविषय एव । यदि कूर्मं न विन्देत् [कर्कं कच्छपमुपदध्यात् ...]...[अवभृथेष्ट्यन्ते] पिङ्गलस्य खलतेर्विक्लिधस्यात्रेयस्य उदके मग्नस्य जुम्बकाय स्वाहेति मूर्धन्याहुतिं जुहु इति । तस्मात् याज्ञे कर्मणि स नियमो नान्यत्रेत्येवमर्थं प्रतिपादयति । **एवं हि श्रूयते** इति । पुराकल्पे । ये **प्रत्यक्षधर्माणः** लोकधर्मा ये परोक्षा लोकस्य ते प्रत्यक्षास्तेषाम् । **परापरज्ञाः** । युक्तायुक्तज्ञाः । स्युश्च तावदागमात् प्रत्यक्षधर्माणो न तु युक्तायुक्तज्ञाः । **विदितवेदितव्याः** । यज्ञार्हा याज्ञात् कर्मणोऽन्यत्रापभाषमाणा अपि न पराभूता इति ।

[१३.१] **अथ व्याकरणमित्यस्य शब्दस्य कः पदार्थ** इति । किमनेनाभिधीयते कार्थरूढ इति पदार्थग्रहणेनैतत् पृच्छति । शब्दो हि कश्चित्तुल्यरूपः प्रवर्त-

मानो भिन्नार्थो भिन्ननिमित्तः परस्परमपेक्षमाणः प्रवर्तते । यथाश्वशब्दः सुबन्तस्तिङन्तश्च । कश्चित्तु निमित्तस्य तुल्यत्वात् प्रवर्तते । यथा अप्शब्दः समुद्रे बिन्दौ च जातिनिमित्तः । कश्चिज्जातिभेदेऽपि रूढिविषयः क्रिया तुल्येति प्रवर्तते । यथा सर्वः अश्नोतेरक्षः पद्यतेः पादः मिमीतेर्माष इति । तत्र क्रियासामान्यात् सिद्धमिति । कश्चित् तद्भावापादनेन वाध्यारोपेण वा यथा वाहीके गोशब्दो रज्जुद्रव्ये च सर्पशब्दः । तत्रायं व्याकरणशब्दः किंभूत आश्रीयते इति । अनेन द्वारेण शब्दप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तमाचिख्यासन्नुपन्यासं करोति । इदं पुनः पुनरुक्तं न चान्तरेण व्याकरणं तत्रावैयाकरण इति तत्रास्य पदार्थमाचष्टां भवानिति । सूत्रम् । सूत्रसमुदायोऽष्टाध्याय्याम् अस्यार्थः इति । षष्ठ्यर्थोऽनुपपन्नः । ननु च सूत्रशब्दप्रयोगोऽप्यनुपपन्नः । उच्यते । सामान्योपक्रमेऽभिधाने सूत्रम् । किं सूत्रमिति व्याकरणमिति विशेषो युक्तः । वृक्षः शिंशपेति यथा । शब्दार्थस्तु भेदाभावादप्रयुक्तः । यदा तु व्याकरणशब्दः समुदायवृत्तिः सूत्रशब्दः कस्मिंश्चिदवयवे वृत्त उपादीयते वृद्धिरादैजित्येवमादौ तदा षष्ठ्यर्थोऽप्युपपन्नः । यदा तु द्वावपि समुदायशब्दौ तदा षष्ठ्यर्थाभाव इति चोद्यते ।

[१३. २] शब्दाप्रतिपत्तिः । न हि वृद्धिरादैजित्येतस्माच्छब्दान् प्रतिपद्यामहे । किं तर्हि ? व्याख्यानतः । उदाहरणाद् वयं समानजातीयान् शब्दान् प्रतिपद्यामहे । ननु च तदेव सूत्रं विगृहीतं व्याख्यानं भवति । सूत्रार्थस्याभिव्यक्त्युपायो व्याख्यानम् । यथा वटवृक्षस्थितो दंष्ट्रीत्यस्यार्थस्याभिव्यक्तिः क्रियते वटे वृक्षे स्थितो दंष्ट्री । न केवलानि चर्चापदानि । यथा वटे वृक्ष इति चर्चापदेभ्यः प्रतिपाद्यतेऽर्थो नैवं सूत्राद्विगृहीतात् ।

[१३. ३] शब्दे ल्युडर्थः । भेदे सति षष्ठ्यर्थप्रतिपत्तिरस्ति । शब्दस्य ह्यन्वाख्यापकत्वेन सूत्रं संबन्धि भवति । ल्युडर्थस्तु नोपपद्यते । संस्क्रियमाणो हि शब्दोऽपरार्थत्वात् प्रधानम् । न च प्रधानस्य करणभावो युक्तः । यथा पुरोडाशस्योत्पत्तिसंस्कारप्रतिपत्तिषूत्पाद्यत्वात् संस्कार्यत्वात् प्रतिपाद्यत्वात् प्राधान्यमेव । गुणभावः शब्दप्रतिपत्तौ ।

[१३. ४] भवे च । ननु चान्वाख्यापकत्वात् तस्मिन् भवाः स्युः । एवं च सति यावान् योगः सर्वः वैयाकरणः प्राप्नोति । तस्मादवयवावयविभावोऽत्राभिप्रेतः ।

[१३. ५] प्रोक्तादयोऽपि नोपपद्यन्ते । न हि शब्दाः प्रोक्ताः । पुरस्तादिदम् इति । भाष्यसूत्रेषु गुरुलाघवस्यानाश्रितत्वात् लक्षणप्रपञ्चयोश्च मूलसूत्रेष्वाश्रयणा-

दिहापि लक्षणप्रपञ्चाभ्यां प्रवृत्तिः । **तद्यथा प्रस्कन्दनं प्रपतनमिति** । ननु च भीमादिष्वेते पठ्यन्ते । उच्यते । एतदेवाह कृत्यल्युटो बहुलमिति तस्य भीमादिः प्रपञ्च इति ।

अथ वा शब्दैरपि शब्दा व्याक्रियन्ते । शब्दो ह्युच्चारस्य स्वरूपं प्रति चोदयति विपरीतव्यावृत्तत्वमभिव्यनक्ति । समानजातीयानां शब्दान्तराणां प्रतिपादको भवति । भिन्नजातीयकस्य साधोरपि निवृत्तिः सर्वथा भवति । तत्रैकदेशे भाष्ये कथ्यते **नाश्वो न गर्दभ** इति ।

[१३. ६] **एवं तर्हि लक्ष्यलक्षणे व्याकरणम्** । नैतत् प्रतिपत्तव्यं यथान्यो बिल्वशरदो वनस्पतिमाहान्य एव फलम् इति । नाप्यपूशरदवत् एकशब्दत्वम् एकनिमित्तत्वात् । नाप्यक्षवत् क्रियासामान्यात् । नाप्येकशेषाश्रयणम् । एवं हि कल्प्यमाने सर्वः शब्द एव भाष्यमनु घटते । यद्वक्ष्यमाणमन्यश्चेल्लक्ष्यमाह अन्यो लक्षणमन्यः समुदायं किमुच्यते **समुदायेषु च शब्दः प्रवृत्त** इति । तस्मात् यथैव संघमण्डलसेनावनमित्येते शब्दाः समुदायाभिधायिनो नावयवाभिधायिनः एवं व्याकरणशब्दोऽपि समुदायाभिधायी नावयवाभिधायीति । **एवमप्ययं दोषः** । यथैवैते वनादयो नावयवे वर्तन्ते एवमयमप्यवयवे न वर्तते ।

पूर्वे पञ्चाला इति । समुदायत्वमापादितः समुदायशब्देनापदिश्यते । यथा गोत्वमापादितो बाहीको गोशब्देनेति । न हि शब्दस्येदं संभवति समुदायं त्यक्त्वावयवमुपसंक्रान्तुमिति । अतः समुदायो यदावयवे कृत्स्नमात्मानं संनिरोपयति तदा प्रवर्तते समुदायशब्दः । एवं व्याकरणशब्देऽपि समुदायवृत्तिर्यदैकदेशे सूत्रे आत्मानं संनिवेशयति तदा तच्छब्दप्रवृत्तिः केन कर्तव्या ।

तैलं भुक्तं घृतं भुक्तम् इति । कस्मिन्नुपघातकेऽनुग्राहके वा घृते तैले शब्दं परिकल्प्य समुदायोऽवयववृत्तिः । एवं शुक्लादिष्ववयवस्यैव कस्यचित् शुक्लीकरणात् समुदाय एवायं पटाख्योऽन्यरूपः कृत इत्येकदेशे समुदायशब्दो वर्तते । यथा न च तावत् कार्त्स्न्येन घटमुपलभते भवति चास्य केषुचिदेवावयवेषु घटबुद्धिः एवमेव सूत्रमात्रात् समुदायं प्रतिपद्यमान एव व्याकरणमिति तावत्येव शब्दं प्रयुङ्क्ते । यथा तादर्थ्याद्दधिश्रयणमात्रं दृष्ट्वा पचत्ययमिति प्रयुञ्जानं प्रति वचनमुच्यते नायं पचत्यधिश्रयति किं तु उदकं संपादयतीति ।

[१३. ७] **व्यपदेशिवद्भावेन भविष्यति** । व्यपदेशिवद्भावश्च क्वचित कथंचित् । इह एकाचो द्वे प्रथमस्य इत्यस्त्येवान्वयव्यतिरेकसमधिगम्यमानार्थवत्तया

धातुरूपतास्ति वर्णरूपता । तत्रैकेन रूपेणाश्रितस्य रूपान्तरेण युक्तो व्यपदेशः । अथ वा समुदायावयवकल्पनायां योऽसौ समुदायः प्रयोगसमवायी स शब्दभेदाय एति इतः अयनमिति तस्यामेकदेश एतिरिति । यथा शिलापुत्रकोऽयमनेकक्रियाविषयो दृष्टस्तस्येदं शरीरमिति । इह तु स्थूलशिरा राहुरित्यसत्यपि समुदायावयवभावे शब्दव्यापारमात्रादेवासति भेदे व्यपदेशः । शब्दो हि वस्तुज्ञानसद्भावासद्भावानपेक्षः कंचिदेवार्थभागं निश्चित्य प्रवर्तते । तद्यथा विद्यमानामपि पर्वतामङ्गुलेरङ्गुलिशब्दो [न] ब्रवीत्येवं विद्यमानामपि शिरोमात्रतां राहो राहुशब्दो न ब्रवीति । यावानेव हि राहुशब्दवाच्योऽर्थस्तावानेवोच्यते । तस्य शिरसा युक्तो व्यपदेशः । यथा सत्यप्येकत्वे वस्तुनोऽवस्थाया अभिधानाद् भवति प्रकर्षप्रत्ययः परुद् भवान् पटुरासीत् पटुतरश्चैषम इति । एवमिहाप्यस्त्येव व्याकरणस्य ग्रन्थसंदर्भरूपतास्त्येवावयवरूपता । तत्रावस्थाभेदादुपपन्नो व्यपदेशः । सामान्यविशेषभावाद्वा । इह सूत्रमिति सामान्याभिधात् ज्ञायते । कस्येति विशेषभावे चानन्यत्ववादिनोऽपि उपादीयते व्याकरणमिति । यदा समुदायवृत्तौ व्याकरणशब्दः कचिदेव च सूत्रे सूत्रशब्दस्तदा मुख्यवदभेदः । तत्र विशेष एव सामान्यमेव वा ।

तत् नास्ति व्यपदेशिवद्भावः । चन्दनस्य चन्दनं रूपादयो रूपादीनामिति । सामान्यविशेषभावे त्वनन्यत्ववादिनोऽपि भवति व्यपदेशः चन्दनस्य गन्ध इति । **अविजानत एतदेवं भवति** । एवदुक्तं भवति । कश्चिद् व्याख्यानतोऽपि न प्रतिपद्यते । किं तर्हि ? अक्षिनिकोचादिभिः । तत्र किं शक्यते वक्तुम् । अभिनयात् शब्दप्रतिपत्तिरिति । तत्रैवं प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । प्रतिपदं नोपाया एते । सूत्रात्त्वभिव्यक्तिः । सूत्रादेव त्वभिव्यक्तार्थाच्छब्दप्रवृत्तिरिति । यदेतदुदाहरणादीनामुपादानमेतन्नानुतन्त्राणां भाष्यस्य वा ब्रूयात् शब्दान्तरं प्रतिपद्येतेति । किं तर्हि ? अनभिव्यक्तं सूत्रे अभिव्यञ्जयेदिति । एतमेव चार्थं समर्थयते ।

यो ह्युत्सूत्रं कथयेन्नादो गृह्यते । न तत् गृह्यते । किमर्थं पुनरुत्सूत्रं न गृह्यते । उच्यते । स्मृतिशास्त्रमिदम् । तत्र यदा कश्चिदेवमेव ब्रूयात् अयं शब्द इति सोऽवश्यं पृच्छ्येत कथमस्माभिः प्रत्येतव्यमिति । यदि स्मृतिसूत्रमाह संधीयतेऽथाप्रलापस्तस्य गृह्यते । यथा पाणिनीयसूत्रमिदं नास्ति न्यङ्कोः प्रतिषेध इति । तत्रैवं विप्रतिपत्तिः । नैयङ्कवमिति भवितव्यमिति । यस्त्वेवं प्रयुञ्जीत न्याङ्कवमिति न वयमपशब्द इति प्रतिपन्नाः । यदि त्वसौ स्मृत्यन्तरं प्रदर्शयति तस्य हि प्रतिषेधः स्मृत्यन्तरे । यथेह न्यग्रोधस्य च केवलस्येति मुक्तसंशयं प्रतिपद्यामहे शब्दोऽयमिति । तस्मादिदमेव प्रतिपत्तव्यं सूत्रादेवोदाहरणादीनि ज्ञातार्थात् शब्दप्रवृत्तिरिति ।

[१४. १] **किमर्थो वर्णानामुपदेशः** । अर्थप्रयुक्ते शब्दप्रयोगे धर्मनियमः । न तत्रैतेऽर्थवन्तः । तत्रैषामुपदेशोऽनर्थकः । समुदायार्थोऽप्युपदेशो न संभवति । धातुप्रातिपदिकप्रत्ययानामुपदेशे तत्स्थानां वर्णानामप्युपदेश इति । **वृत्तिसमवायार्थ उपदेशः** । न ह्येषां स्वरूपावधारणार्थ उपदेशः । किं तर्हि ? आनुपूर्व्यार्थः । अनेनानुपूर्व्येण शास्त्रे किंचित् कार्यं कुर्युरिति । यद्वा शास्त्राङ्गोपसंहारार्थमेतदित्येवमर्थमाचष्टे । **वृत्तये समवायो वृत्तिसमवाय इति** । षष्ठीसमासोऽयम् । भेदस्तादर्थ्येन प्रदर्श्यतेऽश्वघासवत् । **वृत्त्यर्थो वा समवाय इति** । वृत्त्यर्थसमवायस्य वृत्तिं प्रति निमित्तभावः आख्यायते । यथासंख्यं हि संनिवेशमात्रादेव प्रवर्तते । प्रवृत्त्यर्थश्चासौ समवायश्चेति प्रवृत्तिसमवाय इति । यथा शाकपार्थिव इति । **वृत्तिप्रयोजनो वा इति** । पारस्पर्येण निमित्तभावो निर्दिश्यते । पारम्पर्येण शास्त्रप्रवृत्तिः समवायस्य प्रयोजिका । यैषानुबन्धोपलक्षिता शास्त्रप्रवृत्तिरकः सवर्ण इत्यस्याः पारम्पर्येण समवायो निमित्तमिति । एतच्च भाष्येऽपि द्रक्ष्यत एव । **का पुनर्वृत्तिः । शास्त्रप्रवृत्तिः** । कुत एवम् । वृत्तिरिति क्रिया । क्रिया च साधनाकाङ्क्षिणी । तत्र प्राकरणिकं शब्दानुशासनशास्त्रं साधनत्वेन प्रतीयते । शास्त्रप्रवृत्तौ यः समवायस्तदर्थो वर्णानामुपदेशः । किमुपदिश्यतेऽनेनेत्युपदेशः । न । न ह्येतैः किंचिदुपदिश्यते । इतरो भावसाधनत्वमाचष्टे । **उच्चारणम् । कुत एतत् । दिशिरुच्चारणक्रियः । उच्चार्य हि वर्णानाहोपदिष्टा मया वर्णा इति** । इह यस्मिन् व्यापारे निवृत्तेऽनन्तरो यः शब्दः प्रयुज्यते तस्य तादर्थ्यं विज्ञायते । यथा भुक्तवत्सु प्रविष्टेषु ब्राह्मणेषु भुक्तं ब्राह्मणैः प्रविष्टा ब्राह्मणा इति । गम्यते एतन्नूनमयं भुजेः प्रविशेश्चार्थ इति । एवमिहापि वर्णेषूच्चारितेष्वनन्तरं पृच्छति किमर्थ उपदेश इति । ते प्रतिपद्यामहे दिशिरुच्चारणक्रिय इति ।

[१४. २] **अनुबन्धकरणार्थश्च** । अनुबन्धकरणं शास्त्रस्य प्रवृत्त्यङ्गमवश्यं कर्तव्यम् । तच्चोपदेशमन्तरेण न भवति । तत्रानुबन्धा हल एव । अयं त्वेकः अजनुबन्धः लण् इति लकारे अकारः । उरण् रपर इत्यत्र च ऋकारलृकारयो रलपरत्वार्थः । **प्रत्याहारार्थम्** । प्रत्याहारो नाम विस्तीर्णस्य यः संक्षेपः । तत्रादिरन्त्येन सहेत्ययं प्रत्याहारो न संनिवेशमनुबन्धांश्चान्तरेणास्तीति इदमुच्यते । **समवायश्चानुबन्धकरणं च प्रत्याहारार्थम्** । **प्रत्याहारो वृत्त्यर्थः** । अकः सवर्णे दीर्घ एचोऽयवायाव इति ।

[१४. ३] **इष्टबुद्ध्यर्थश्च वर्णानामुपदेशः** । उपदेशे हि सति यथाभूता उच्चारितास्तथाभूताः साधवो विपरीतास्त्वसाधव इति साधुत्वप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमपि कर्तव्य उपदेश इति । **उदात्तादीनामप्युपदेशः कर्तव्यः** । एते हि वर्णा एकश्रुत्या पठिता अच्-

मातृका । तदत्रोदात्तादिभिन्नानां भिन्नकालानां च साधुत्वं प्राप्तमतः सर्व उपदेष्टव्याः । ननु च सर्व एवैते शास्त्रेणान्वाख्याता उदात्तादयः । उच्यते । अनुपदिश्यमानानां किंभूता उदात्तादयः प्रतिपत्तव्या इति स्वरूपेणानुपदेशात् अशक्या तेषु प्रतिपत्तिरिति ।

[१४. ४] **आकृत्युपदेशात् सिद्धम्** । आकृत्युपदेशे नान्तरीयको विशेषः । स त्वनाश्रितस्तस्मिन् काले इति कालगुणभिन्नेष्वाकृतिरस्तीति प्रतिपत्स्यन्ते अयमेवासौ वर्णो योऽक्षरसमाम्नाये उपदिष्टः । यथा एकाकृत्युपदेशे भिन्नेष्वपि च य आकृतिविशेषेषु स एवायमिति प्रतिपद्यते । तत्र यथैवाकृतिसद्भावात् कालगुणभिन्नानां साधुत्वमेवं गुणस्वरभिन्नानामप्याकृतिसद्भावात् प्रसक्तं साधुत्वम् । अतस्तन्निवृत्त्यर्थं यत्नः कर्तव्य इत्याह । **संवृतादीनां प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यः** । संवृतो नाम यो बाह्यः प्रयत्नः । आभ्यन्तरो हि प्रयत्नोऽकारस्य निष्पादकः । नैवं कलः । ध्मातो यः श्वासभूयिष्ठः । एणीकृतोऽव्यक्तः । **एताः स्वरदोषभावनाः** । एतानि स्वरदोषगोत्राणि । अवगतो हि वक्तृणां[६] प्रमादाशक्तिजः स्वरदोष इति । **गर्गादिबिदादिपाठात् संवृतादीनां निवृत्तिर्भविष्यति** । एवं मन्यते । नैव क्वचिद् वर्णा उच्चार्यन्ते । किं तर्हि ? शब्दसमुदाया एव पठ्यन्ते । वर्णात्मकश्च समुदायः । समुदायश्च निवृत्तकलादिकः पठ्यते । अत्र सिद्धा संवृतादीनां निवृत्तिरिति । **अस्त्यन्यद् गर्गादिबिदादिपाठे प्रयोजनम्** । एतदुक्तं भवति । एवमर्थो गर्गादिबिदादिपाठः । कथम् । अनेन संनिवेशेन साधुत्वं स्यादन्येन मा भूत् । गर्ग इति । किं वा कर्तव्यम् । पाठस्थितानां कलादिनिवृत्तिः कृता स्यात् । यानि तु न पठ्यन्ते शब्दरूपाणि एतेष्वनिवृत्ताः कलादय इति । एवं तर्हि अष्टादशधा भिन्ना शास्त्रान्ते प्रत्यापत्तिर्या तां निदर्शनप्रकारेण करिष्यामीति । किमर्थं पुनर्निवृत्तकलादिकामित्युच्येत । न निवृत्तसंवृतादिकामिति । संवृतत्वात् । कार्यार्थं कलादयोऽभ्युपगम्यन्ते । शीङ्मासि च कलं ध्मातं वाध्येष्ये । ङकारमकारं च नोऽध्येष्ये । एवं च वक्ष्यमि । कलाद् ध्मातादात्मनेपदं भवति । अत्र त्विदमशक्यं प्रतिपत्तुम् इको यणचीति । अनुबन्धेऽसति इत्संज्ञाशास्त्रं च नास्तीदम् आदिरन्त्येन सहेतेति । तत्र यावन्ति प्रत्याहारोपलक्षितानि कार्याणि तेषु सर्वे निर्देष्टव्याः ॥

[१४. ५] **एवं तर्ह्युभयमनेन क्रियते** । समवायश्च साधुत्वेन प्रतिपाद्यते । यथाकारादयस्ते चैवंभूता एव निर्दिष्टाः । कलादिकाः सर्वत्रासाधव इति । **कथं पुनरेकेन यत्नेनोभयं लभ्यम्** । इह संध्यक्षरेषु समुदायपर उपदेश इति नावयवौ वर्णकार्यं प्रतिपद्येते । यथा वर्णानामुपदेशोऽवयवविनिर्ज्ञानार्थं इत्यक्षरसमाम्नायेऽवयवा एवाश्रीयन्ते

न समुदायः । एवं गर्गादिबिदादिपाठेऽवयवा एव विनिर्जिज्ञासिताः स्युस्तदनुरोधात्तु समुदायोपादानम् । अथ वा समुदाया एव । यदि समुदायास्तत्रावयवानामेवंविषयाणां कलाद्यभावः स्यात् । अन्यत्र निवर्तेत एव । अथावयवपरम् । एवं सति समुदायस्य साधुत्वप्रतिपत्तिरशक्या । ततश्च गर्गादयो न निवर्तिता इव । लभ्यमित्याह । **कथम्? द्विगता अपि हेतवो भवन्ति** । द्वावर्थौ गताः द्विगताः । हेतवः कार्यनिर्वृत्तौ समर्थाः । इह लोके एक एव हेतुर्द्वयोरर्थयोः प्रसाधको दृष्टः । एकमुदकम् । तद्विषया क्रिया त्यागलक्षणा आम्रमूले कृता पितृतर्पणे द्रुसेके च सम एको हेतुः । अन्यत्र तदेवोदकं न द्विगतं भवति यदा देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तौ तर्पयितव्यौ भवतः । आम्रा अपि विप्रकृष्टदेशात् सेक्तव्या भवन्ति । तत्र यथैवोदकदानं दृष्टमदृष्टार्थं साधयितुं समर्थमित्येवंबुद्ध्या प्रक्रम्य प्रवर्तमानमुभयं निष्पादयत्येवं गर्गादिबिदादिपाठः समर्थ उभयं कर्तुमवयवान् समुदायं च कार्ये प्रवर्तमान इति । अथ वा प्रसङ्गलक्षणार्थसिद्धिः । यद्यर्थाप्रयोजकोऽन्यद्वारेणार्थं प्रतिपद्यते स प्रसङ्ग इत्युच्यते । यथा भोजनेनार्थी यः प्रयोजकोऽधिश्रयणस्य च विघसाशिवदप्रयोजकः । यो हि निष्ठितेऽप्यन्ने पुनः पाचयेत् स एवंभूतः यदा तदर्थं बह्वन्नं प्रसाधितम् । संवृतादिषु प्रतिषेधश्चोद्यते । तत्र यद्यवयवाः समुदायोपदेशपरशब्देन स्वरूपं सर्वत्रैव विशिष्टं प्रतिपाद्येरन् को दोषः स्यात् । एवमाम्राः पृथक् सेकस्य प्रयोजकाः पितरोऽप्रयोजकाः । तत्र प्रयुक्तमुदकदानं प्रसङ्गेनानुभवन्तीति ॥

[१४. ६] **तथा द्विष्ठान्यपि वाक्यानि दृश्यन्ते** । एतत् कथयति । न केवलमर्थधर्म एवायम् । किं तर्हि? शब्दधर्मोऽपि । इह कश्चिदेक एव शब्दः शक्तिप्रचितः । तस्य केवलं शक्यवच्छेदमात्रं क्रियते । यथैक एव पुराशब्द आराच्छब्दश्च पुराणसहवचनः संनिकृष्टविप्रकृष्टवचनश्च । एवं श्वेतशब्दोऽनेकशक्तिप्रचितः । तस्य केवलं शक्त्यवच्छेदमात्रं क्रियते । श्वेतो गौरिति । श्वा स इत इति प्रयोक्ता प्रयुङ्क्ते । प्रतिपत्तारः यथाशक्त्यवच्छेदेनार्थं प्रतिपद्यन्ते । अर्थान्तरेण द्वावेतौ शब्दावुच्चारितौ । यथा प्रदीपस्तन्त्रेण प्रवर्तमानोऽर्थिनां यथाभिप्रेतमर्थं निर्वर्तयति । एकस्यैव वा विद्यादिका दिदृक्षोश्च तन्त्रेण निर्वर्तयति । एवं शब्देषु तादृशीं क्रियामापादितकरणपरिस्पन्दां यथा तन्त्रेण द्वावेव शब्दावुच्चार्येते । उपायद्वयं च लोके शब्दप्रयोगो वा यौगपद्यं वा । कदाचित् क्रमवतः शब्दान् प्रयुङ्क्ते । स कथम् । अक्षो भज्यतामक्षो दीव्यतामिति । कदाचिदुपसंहृत्य क्रमं यौगपद्येनोच्चारयति । अक्षा भज्यन्तां दीव्यन्तामिति ।

द्वावभ्युपायौ शब्दानां प्रयोगे समवस्थितौ ।
क्रमो वा यौगपद्यं वा यौ लोको नातिवर्तते ॥ इति ।

तस्मादिहापि गर्गादिबिदादिपाठस्तन्त्राभ्युपायः समुदायावयवयोः प्रतिपादक इति।

[१४. ७] अथ वेदं तावदयं प्रष्टव्य इति । अयमभिप्रायः । सर्वेष्वेवामी समुदायस्था उपदिष्टाः । तत्र सिद्धैव कलादिनिवृत्तिरिति । धातवोऽपि शुद्धाः पठ्यन्ते । चुलुम्पादयोऽपि भाष्य एवोच्चार्यन्त इत्यभिप्रायः । यानि तर्ह्यग्रहणानि डित्थादीनि एतेषामप्यवश्यं स्वरवर्णानुपूर्वीज्ञानार्थमुपदेशः कर्तव्यः । अथ वा गर्गादिबिदादीनां च स्वरवर्णानुपूर्व्यर्थे उपदेशः कर्तव्यः । एवं स्मर्यते । इह यदेषामुच्चारणं तत् प्रत्ययविध्यर्थमिति । अथ वा अनेनैवं ब्रुवता एतदाश्रितं व्युत्पाद्यन्ते एते सर्व इति । ये न व्युत्पाद्यन्ते तेषां को वृत्तान्तः । उच्यते । एतमर्थं प्रतिपादयति । येऽप्येते गर्गादयः पठिताः एतेऽपि न पाणिनिनोत्पादिताः । किं तर्हि ? एवंभूता इति ते स्मर्यन्ते । यथैव त एवंभूता एव स्मर्यन्ते एवमन्येऽपि शब्दाः सामान्येन प्रतिपादिता उणादयो बहुलमित्यनेन । प्रत्ययतः प्रकृतेश्च तदूह्यमिति । शिष्टप्रयोगमभिसमीक्ष्य प्रकृतिरूहितव्या प्रत्ययश्च । अवश्यं चैतदेवं प्रतिपत्तव्यमिति । तथा हि । सत्यप्युदात्ताद्युपदेशे कलादिनिवृत्तौ कृतायां डित्थ इत्ययं साधुर्न तु डुत्थ इति । सैषा शिष्टप्रतिपत्तिरवलम्बितव्या । तस्मान्न शिष्टप्रयोगमन्तरेणैतत् भवति सर्वत्र कलादिनिवृत्तिरुपपन्ना इति ॥

॥ इति भर्तृहरिटीकायां प्रथमाध्यायस्य प्रथममाह्निकम् ॥

TRANSLATION

[1]

[1. 1] The separate mention of Vedic [forms] (in the sentence 'of [the forms] known to the people and of those occurring in the Veda'; *laukikānāṃ vaidikānāṃ ca* Mbh I p. 1 l. 3) [is made] with the idea of [pointing out their prominent status]. For a separate mention of even a prominent[1] [constituent] though [obviously] included in the general [body] is observed as [for example] in the case of (*iti*) "The Brahmins have arrived, and [the brahmin called] Vasiṣṭha too has arrived".[2]

Alternatively, since "of [forms] known among the people" has been uttered first (in the passage of the Bhāṣya under consideration), one might understand the expression "[forms] known among the people", though general, as specific, on the following line of argument (*iti*):

"This exposition relates only to the forms from common speech [and] not to those from the Veda, inasmuch as those [Vedic forms] have fixed placements and specific Prātiśākhya texts have been allotted to them; for in the case of those [Vedic forms the governing principle is that] rules are to be framed [only] on the basis of those [forms] as are found (in the sacred texts)."[3]

It is for this reason that both [these kinds of the word-forms] have been mentioned [by Patañjali], as follows: "Of [forms] found among the people and of those found in the Veda" (*laukikānāṃ vaidikānāṃ ca*: Mbh I p. 1 l. 3).

[1. 2] [Objections:] But [it may be pointed out that] if such is the nature of Vedic [forms, there should be] no exposition of them by this [grammar] since they are [dealt with] in the Prātiśākhya rules. [Reply:] (1) People, on account of carelessness or debility, speak faultily, and for this reason this exposition [of words becomes necessary]. The followers of the Taittirīya school, for example, pronounce the word *agni* with [*n*] made into *ṇ*.[4]

(2) Moreover, [grammar] is applied to words which, though not handed down in sacred texts, are used to bring about *apūrva*. As for example: (i) [When it is said] "Counting the potsherds he (i. e. the priest) disjoins them' (*saṃkhyāya kapālāny udvāsayati*),[5] he disjoins them with [the words] *eko dvau trayaḥ* ('one, two, three') understood by the word *saṃkhyā* and taught by the science [of grammar]. (ii) This [statement] concerning the Agnihotra, viz. *mānuṣīvad idaṃ kuru* 'do this like a woman',[6] is similar; here too applicational words as explained by the science [of grammar] must be used.

(3) [Grammar] is also employed in the case of the other [words] that have a fixed order. How? 'There is benefit in the use [of words] that is preceded by the study of grammar' (vt. 9). [Words] that are used while their essence is known from grammar constitute dharma.

[1.3] "Words known in the world: 'ox', 'horse', 'man', 'elephant', 'bird', 'deer', 'brahmin'" (*laukikās tāvat / gaur aśvaḥ puruṣo hastī brāhmṇa iti*; cf. Mbh I p. 1 l. 3-4).[7] *Iti* means 'of this kind', because explanation with regard to this kind [of words] and the like has begun. With respect to the world, only words which have no fixed order in sentences and in which the meaning is most important are explained; and therefore only single words from worldly usage are pointed out. In the case of Vedic [words], they being not of human origin, *śam* etc. are not used in isolation, and therefore only sentences are referred to. The exposition relates only to [Vedic words] in sentences, not to the sentences themselves.

And all this is merely by way of introduction from [Patañjali, the author of the *Mahā-*]*bhāṣya* who is about to expound the purposes [of studying grammar]; [for] a statement made [even] before [the one on] purposes has the benefit of encouraging students.

[2]

[2.1] Now about the word *go* 'ox'. This is a composite word[1] which occurs in many meanings, i. e. in a primary meaning and so on. All that has been pointed out by the author of the [*Mahā-*]*bhāṣya*. Just as the word *saṃskāra* in another science (i. e. in Vaiśeṣika), in the same way [this word *go* too] has many meanings.

[We now proceed to discuss the meaning of *śabda* 'word'.] (1) If the word *śabda* 'word' in *śabdānuśāsana* 'exposition of words' is assumed to be used in its well-known meaning,[2] an exposition [of them] would be

pointless. Because [words] of worldly usage are known from the user and Vedic [words are known] in the Veda. Just as someone saying 'And now we shall explain breathing out and breathing in '[3] would be speaking pointlessly, so also would the exposition of words [be pointless].[4] Therefore the word 'word' is here not possible in its well-known meaning, nor in [the subsequent phrases in the Bhāṣya, viz.] 'Of which words?' (*keṣām śabdānām*) and 'ox, horse, man, ···' (*gaur aśvaḥ puruṣaḥ* ···). Even so, if the word 'word' is taken by him (Patañjali ?) as being in its [well-known] meaning it will be purposeful when it is expounded.

(2) Or [the word] 'word' (*śabda*) is for him (i. e., Patañjali) a technical term different [from 'word' in its well-known meaning], that is expounded [in grammar]; but it is not [only] a technical term. [That is why he asks :] "What is the word in 'ox'?" (*gaur ity atra kaḥ śabdaḥ*; Mbh I p. 1 l. 6).

(3) Or there are two aspects to the word : the aspect which is the own form and the aspect which is the meaning. Since explanation concerning the aspect which is the form is pointless, the second aspect is taken up [for explanation); because that is explained by the word. Just as, having begun "we shall explain dharma" (Vaiśeṣika sūtra 1. 1. 1), substance etc. are enumerated precisely because they (i. e. substance etc.) are understood [by the word 'dharma'], so also here. By the word 'ox' substance etc. are referred to because these are closely associated [with the word 'ox'].

[2. 2] He introduces the [things] that are inherent in [the concept of] an ox : "Is it an object which is possessed of dewlap, tail, hoofs, hump and horns ?" (*kiṃ yat tat sāsnālāṅgūlakhurakakudaviṣāṇi artharūpam*; Mbh I p. 1, l. 6). For according to him who advocates that substances are referred to by words, in the case of the word 'ox' the substance which is indescribable and not touched by any characteristic has horns etc. which are connected [with it] and differentiate the object [from other things]; but [a substance] not denoted by the word 'ox' does not have [these]. For example, in the case of a lump of molasses sweetness differentiates it [even] in darkness from other substances, [so that one knows :] "This is a lump of molasses, no other substance."[5] [Patañjali's remark therefore] means : "The lump of flesh which is the ox and constitutes the object."[6]

"No, he says. That is called 'substance". (*nety āha / dravyaṃ nāma tat*; Mbh I p. 1 l. 7). No, he says. Not is this well-known as "the word 'ox'". What then ? It is well-known by another characteristic. And he shows the other characteristic : "That is called 'substance'." Just as *ekaśeṣa* of the numeral ['one'] is brought about [by the numeral] 'two',

in view of [the vārttika] " There is no *ekaśeṣa* of a numeral, because it does not bring to mind [the idea of] an object and because it refers to the object denoted by another word " (P. 1. 2. 64 vt. 25); why should substance be indicated by another name, rejecting its own name ?[7] If the exposition of substance had been intended, he would have said ' exposition of substance ' (*dravyānuśāsanam*).

" Then movement expressive of emotion, stirring the body, motion of the eyes " (*yat tarhi tad iṅgitaṃ ceṣṭitaṃ nimiṣitam*; Mbh I p. 1. 1. 7). Some movement of the body indicative of an intention is called *iṅgita*. *Ceṣṭita* means ' stirring the body '. Activities of the eyes are *nimiṣita*. How could one think that these are words? Because these activities could be [words], since these activities are possible in the object ' ox '. Or the genus ' ox-ness ' itself is activity; like being, which is designated by a word indicating activity. [But] just like ' going ', which is [supposedly identical with] ox-ness, so are movements expressive of emotion etc. too seen in [other animals than oxen, viz.] buffalos etc. (So the identification of ox-ness with an activity is not satisfactory.) Also when an activity is resorted to [that is obtainable] by derivation, [saying for example] " an ox (*go*) goes (*gacchati*), bellows (*garjati*) or speaks (*gadati*) "[9] one would take a characteristic, like ' going ', which is difficult to explain (?). In this way also ' motion of the eyes ' etc. are designated ' words '. Here too, in the same way as before, he says that this is well-known by another characteristic: " No, he says. That is called ' activity '. " (*nety āha / kriyā nāma sā*; Mbh I p. 1. 1. 8).

" Then what is white, black " (*yat tarhi śuklo nīlaḥ*; Mbh I p. 1. 1. 8). Because these too could be [words] and, in particular, they reside [in oxen], like movements expressive of emotion etc. Whiteness etc. found in oxen are different from those found in horses; therefore different because a horse is called a *karka* (' white '), *śoṇa* (' red '), *hema* (' black ') but an ox *śukla* (' white '), *rakta* (' red '), *nīla* (' black ').[10] In this way [an object] can also be imagined to be known by means of its colour, because by this means it is understood. That is to say, by [the colours] white etc. this [object] is understood to be different from that.

" No, he says. That is called ' quality '. " *nety āha / guṇo nāma saḥ /* Mbh I p. 1. 1. 9). Here too one can tell [something to be different] from other things by a different idea. [Objection :] The sentence " No, he says; that is called ' quality ' " is not right, since [these words] refer to substances. [Reply :] Nothing wrong here; because they express both. ' White ' etc. as substance have been introduced before. Now they are referred to as expressive of quality.

"Then what remains unbroken when [the objects] are broken " (*yat tarhi bhinneṣv abhinnam* ; Mbh I p. 1. 1. 9) voices the oneness, "uncut when [the objects] are cut " (*chinneṣv acchinnam*; Mbh I p. 1. 1. 9) expresses the eternality of the genus (*jāti*). The word *bhūta* in *sāmānyabhūtam* (Mbh I p. 1. 1. 9–10) is expressive of similarity. There [the idea is :] Those things which have a genus (*jāti*) — which is a thing different [from those things] — they have a universal (*sāmānya*), [say] oxness, that is present in the distinct individual oxen. Not all [animals,] horses etc., [have oxness as universal]. With regard to that [universal], thus explained (*iti*), there is a relation of similarity [with the genus (*jāti*)]. The things which have that [universal (*sāmānya*)] as well as substances, also have the universal (*sāmānya*) as a quality, as a result of rejecting the things identity with which is not suitable and accepting that the idea of identity with which is possible. Thus it has been said.[11]

" No, he says. That is called ' form '. " (*nety āha / ākṛtir nāma sā* ; Mbh I p. 1. 1. 10.) ' Form ' (*ākṛti*) does not mean ' configuration ' (*saṃsthāna*). What then ? Genus (*jāti*). As [it has been said :] " [Words] manifest the form (*ākṛti*) according to Vājapyāyana. "[12] Form is that by which is formed ; [things] are formed, i. e. differentiated from other things, that is form. Idea and word are formed from it, that is form.

[2. 3] Since now substance etc. have been rejected, two [possibilities] remain : [the word-form] is a collection [of sounds], or it is something technical. Among these, also a collection [of sounds] is like substance etc. in that it is well-known by the term ' collection '. (So why say ' word ' when ' collection ' is meant ?) And something different and technical does not exist. Since moreover it is pointless to accept something well-known [as ' word '], he asks : " What then is a word ? " (*kas tarhi śabdaḥ*; Mbh I p. 1. 1. 10).

" By which, when uttered ... " (*yenoccāritena* ... ; Mbh I p. 1. 1. 10)., Here there are several points of view.

(1) Some think : This word which is uttered and has sequence is inferior. There is something different, without sequence, the essence of the word, which resides in the mind.[13] From that [proceeds] the understanding of meaning. Why ? Just as [a word] which is connected with one object does not denote another object, so it cannot denote [any object] when connected with its own form.

(2) Others think : Just as among sounds the fourth state of sounds[14] manifests the genus (*jāti*) of the sounds, so sounds which arise in sequence

and are not simultaneous in sentences manifest that genus of sound which resides in words. The word *vṛkṣa* manifests the genus of [the sounds] *v-ṛ-k-ṣ-a*. From the genus [arises] understanding of meaning. And this own form of meaning, this indeed is *sphoṭa*, the essence of the word which is eternal. But those [sounds] which arise in sequence and are not simultaneous are individual entities made up of sound.

(3) Others think: The word has two powers. It is capable of illuminating itself and its meaning; like a lamp which, while illuminating itself, illuminates the wealth in a treasury. But the inner light called 'the senses' (*indriya*) illuminates the outer object without illuminating itself.[15] Therefore the reading *yenoccāritena* is explained in both ways: (i) by that which is caused to be expressed (*uccārita*), i. e. illuminated, (viz. the meaning,) or (ii) by that which is expressed (*uccārita*) (viz. the sounds).

"Or of which the meaning is well-known" (*atha vā pratītapadārthakaḥ*; Mbh I p. 1. 1. 11–12). The well-known meaning of 'word-form' is 'sound'. Sound is denoted by the word 'word-form'. In sound this [word] obtains its own form, without [the help of] meaning-context,[16] and synonyms. He explains this same matter by using 'term' (*pada*): "This is the meaning of the [single] term, not the meaning understood from a sentence."

"Word-form" (*śabdaḥ*; Mbh I p. 1. 1. 12). Why is this repeated? Because in the course of a discussion a determined position is seen [to be reached] by explanation and rejection. For example, when it is said "how many sons do you have?", the numeral is expressed in the question, taking the numeral first. It is determined by explanation or rejection. Someone says: "Out of 'one', 'two', or 'many', I have no son at all." He rejects the very question; it should not have been asked [at all].[17] So here too, this [question] "Of what nature is the word-form in 'ox'?" should not be asked, because it is in conflict with its well-known meaning. By the word 'word-form' (*śabda*) that word-form alone which is well-known is understood.

He brings out the nature of 'having its well-known meaning': "Make sound" (*śabdaṃ kuru*; Mbh I p. 1. 1. 12), "don't make sound" *mā śabdaṃ kārṣīḥ*; id.), "'this boy is making sound', thus someone is talked about who makes noise" (*śabdakāry ayaṃ māṇavaka iti dhvaniṃ kurvann ucyate*; Mbh I p. 1. 1. 13). Here "who makes noise" is taken as being connected with "this ... is making sound". But regarding the earlier two [expressions] something else must be understood. Or someone who [already] makes noise is urged on [with the words] "make sound" (*śab-*

daṃ kuru). In the same way, when he has started his activity he is forbidden [to go on]; while producing noise he is forbidden [to go on with the words] " don't make sound " (*mā śabdaṃ kārṣīḥ*).

[Objection :] Sound (*dhvani*) is a subordinate element of the word, for it has been said :

> " The word is the *sphoṭa*, its sound arises [merely] through physical effort. "[18]

And therefore it is said that substance etc. are not words. [Reply :] Concerning this objection, sound and word-form are presented as one because no purpose is served in distinguishing [them]. If there is no other conflict with the well-known meaning, [the meaning of] ' word ' that is known among the people is accepted. This exposition of that [well-known] word is the science [of grammar].[19]

[3]

[3] With regard to the science [of grammar], one proceeds to study it provided there is interest. And one gets interested provided there are stimuli. This is not an obligatory activity (*nityakarman*) that must necessarily be carried out.[1] Sin is incurred in not carrying out an obligatory activity. One may do as one likes with regard to non-obligatory activities (*anityakarman*). And if there are no stimuli for him he will not proceed. With this in mind he asks : " This exposition of word-forms, what stimuli does it provide ? " (*kāni punar asya śabdānuśāsanasya prayojanāni* ; Mbh I p. 1. 1. 14).

" Preservation, modification, tradition, economy, absence of doubt, these are the stimuli " (*rakṣohāgamalaghvasaṃdehāḥ prayojanam* ; Mbh I p. 1, 1. 14).

[3. 1] Preventing an existing thing from being harmed is called ' preservation ' (*rakṣā*). " For someone who knows elision, augments and changes of sounds will preserve the Vedas well " (*lopāgamavarṇavikārajño hi samyak vedān anupālayiṣyati*; Mbh I p. 1, 1. 15–16). An example of elision is : " Of *pīvopavasana* etc. there is elision in the Veda ; e. g. *pīvopavasanānāṃ payopavasanānāṃ*. "[2] Augment : " After *nīcā, duk* in the Veda : *nīcād uccā*. "[3] Similarly " after *ktvā, yak* " (*ktvo yak*; P. 7. 1. 47) [illustrated in] *saubhāgyam asyai dattvāyāthāstaṃ vi paretana* (RV 10. 85. 33). Change of sounds : " Of *hṛ* and *grah*, [*h* becomes] *bh* in the Veda " (P. 8. 2. 32 vt. 1). [For example :] *tat kanyāsu sukanye kim iti māṃ jīrṇim anarthyaṃ jarbhurāṇam kṛtyārūpaṃ kāmayase*.[4] Similarly, *udgrābhaṃ ca*

nigrābhaṃ ca brahma devā avīvṛdhan (TS 1. 1. 13).[5] But sometimes there is no change [of *h* to *bh*, as in] *madhor gṛhṇāti.*[6]

He says :[7] There is interchange (*vyatyaya*) of *sya* etc.[8]; elsewhere it is justified by diversity.[9] For example : *triṣṭubhaujaḥ śubhitam ugravīram* (MS 3. 16. 4); [here] *suhitam* obtains.[10] [Objection :] Elision, augments and changes of sounds are well-known in this world on the basis of the recitation of the entire Vedic literature which is of that nature.

Reply : Because use depends on the user. And the user may, through carelessness, defects of his ears, or forgetting, pronounce [a word] differently, or he may doubt. And knowledgeable [people] are not at hand, [even if] there are specialists in other sciences. If one pronounces something different from the Veda, one pronounces wrongly. Therefore, if this change of situation were to occur, no one would approach [as a student].[11] And grammar must be studied for the sake of one's refinement. And therefore the word ' well ' (*samyak*) has been used [in the *Mahābhāṣya*]. For one who has refined himself is able to preserve the Vedas well (*samyak*).

[3. 2. 1] " And also modification " (*ūhaḥ khalv api*; Mbh I p. 1, 1. 16). [Phrases] fit to be used in original rites are not fit to be used in derived rites. When one is faced with the prospect of taking up [a derived rite] the original rite is modified by means of a different word-form, gender or number. For example, in the original rite the word-form *agni* in the shape *agnaye* is found to fit. In this [case] there is modification in derived rites.[12]

[Two alternatives to this kind of modification are suggested (1–2) and subsequently rejected (1' -2') by showing their unacceptable outcome]. There is a possibility of accepting a different entity (1) if non-utterance is resorted to since part of it is dropped, or (2) by bypassing the main significatory function [of the word]. [In the latter case] another signifactory function [of the word] is resorted to [which relates it] to other objects (such as the sun etc.). In this connection [it may be pointed out that] (1') if the derived rite is performed in silence, without speaking aloud, the original rite would be with words and the derived rite without words. (2') Moreover, if the same word *agni* were accepted [in the derived rite], its main function would not convey the sense ' sun '. If again one resorted to using this [word *agni*] as referring to a different thing, viz. the sun, metaphorically, thus bypassing its main signifactory function, then a mode (*dharma*) of using words would be resorted to opposite to [the one used in] the original rite. For these reasons a different sentence with the same case-endings is here accepted.

[3. 2. 2] There is modification due to difference of substrata, gender or number. For example, *devīr āpaḥ śuddhā yūyam* (MS 1. 1. 11 etc.) [becomes] *deva ājya śuddhaṃ tvam*.[13] The nominative *śuddham* has the same referent (*prātipadikārtha*) as the vocative [*ājya*].[14]

There is also modification of other endings as in *āyur āśāste* (MS 2. 6. 9. 7 etc.) [which becomes] *āyur āśāsāte* and *āyur āśāsate*.[15] [No modification in the following two cases (i-ii) :]

(i) But in the cases where there is no correlation with the injunction regarding the object in the original rite, as when [one] calf is prescribed in the original rite even though [the mantra] *vāyavaḥ sthopāyavaḥ stha* (TS 1. 1. 1) is plural, there is no modification in the derived rite because there is no correlation [anyway].

(ii) In the same way, the plural *pāśān* is heard [recited] in *aditiḥ pāśān pramumoktu* (MS 1. 2. 15; KS 30. 8) even though there is but one noose (*pāśa*) in the original rite.[16] Here too there is no modification in the derived rite. But among the Vājasaneyins [the mantra] is read in the singular, *aditiḥ pāśam* (TS 3. 1. 4. 4). For them modification applies if [the word] *aditi* (sg.) is [recited] in the context. Or the statement that there is no modification in the case of nooses (pl. !) expresses a Vedic option : where there is a plural number [of *pāśa*] one uses the word as one wishes (i. e. either in the plural or adjusted to the situation).

[Several examples of modification follow :]

In the Veda the following is read thus with feminine gender : *jūr asi dhṛtā manasā juṣṭā viṣṇave tasyās te satyasavasaḥ* (MS 1. 2. 4 etc.). Therefore, when at the sacrifices to be performed on the day the soma is bought a three year old castrated [bull] is the price to be paid for the soma, then, completely disregarding that female objects are denoted by the words, they modify [each feminine word] into a masculine word expressive of a male object, unseen in the Veda, as follows : *jūr asi dhṛto manasā juṣṭo viṣṇave tasya te satyasavasaḥ* [17].

In the same way, in the eulogy of the cow which serves as the price of king [soma] the following is read with feminine gender : *cid asi manāsi dhīr asi dakṣiṇāsi yajñiyāsi kṣatriyāsy aditir asy ubhayataḥśīrṣṇī sā naḥ suprācī bhava sā devi devam acchehi* (MS 1. 2. 4 etc.). In *sādyaskra* rites modification [is brought about] by means of the masculine gender : *cid asi mano'si dhīr asi dakṣiṇo'si yajñiyo'si kṣatriyo'sy ubhayataḥśīrṣā sa naḥ suprāk supratyag bhava sa deva devam acchehi*. The Vājasaneyins modify this in the same way.

There are feminine words in the mantra connected with bringing the cow that is the price for soma, like this: *vasvy asi rudrāsi aditir asy ādityāsi candrāsi* (MS 1. 2. 4 etc.). There is modification of these words in the case of *sādyaskra* rites: *vasur asi rudro'si aditir asi ādityo'si candro'si.*

In an original animal sacrifice the mantra (see below) is read with masculine gender. [The accompanying brāhmaṇa passage reads:] *dāru vāsmin pratimuñcati* " he releases the stick onto him ".[18] When in this [sacrifice the animal] is immolated [with a stroke] on her head they modify [the masculine ending] into a feminine ending: *tā asyai pratिvedaya.*[19] Similarly concerning the animal itself, *huto yāhi pathibhir devayānaiḥ* (MS 2. 5. 10 etc.) [becomes] in case of modification: *hutā yāhi pathibhir devayānaiḥ.*

[3. 2. 3] [Two views concerning the status of modified mantras are presented (1–2) :]

(1) Some think that since modified [mantras] are not accorded the status of mantras rules like *mantre ghasahvara...* (P. 2. 4. 80) do not apply. How then is the form *aghastām* [to be explained] ?[20] There is nothing wrong here, because it is read like that [in the sacred texts] : *indrāgnibhyāṃ chāgenāghastāṃ taṃ medastaḥ pratipacatāgrabhīṣṭām avīvṛdhetāṃ puroḍāśena* (MS 4. 13. 9 etc.).[21] [But] the modification *akṣan* should for that reason not take place because it is [a form which is] not of human [origin] (i. e. ' mantric').

(2) Others think that modified [mantras] are other mantras themselves. In the section on modification [of the *Mānava Śrauta Sūtra* (5. 2. 9. 6) the forms *aghasat, aghastām, aghasan, agrabhīṣuḥ* and *akṣan* are enumerated, and in that way (i. e. with these forms substituted) [the modified mantras constitute] sacred tradition (*āmnāya*). Somewhere the modification of *gharmasya tapasā tapyadhvaṃ* (MS 1. 1. 8=Mbh I p. 8 l. 19) is shown to be *tapyasva, tapyethām.*[22] Also in other branches [of the Veda] many [mantras] are considered liable to modification. So there is scope for grammar in assigning properly endings in accordance with gender and number when this has been ordained on the basis of the rule ' this must be modified, this must not be modified '.[23]

[3. 2. 4] " Limbs of the body, names of relatives, comparison and organs of sense, these do not undergo modification; it is irregular in the case of *adhrigu.* "[24]

But excepting *adhrigu,*[25] [e. g. in] *praśasā bāhū śalā doṣaṇī kaśyapevāṃ sācchidre śroṇī kavaṣorū srekaparṇāṣṭhīvantā* (MS 4. 13. 4) [where

modification does take place].[26] Then, in case there is more than one animal, the indeclinable [that follows, viz. *ṣaḍviṃśatiḥ*] is repeated.[27]

'Limbs of the body': *yat paśur māyum akṛtoro vā padbhir āhata / agnir mā tasmād enaso viśvān muñcatv aṃhasaḥ /* (MŚS 1. 8. 3. 34).[28] [This becomes:] *yat paśū māyum akṛṣātām uro vā padbhir āhasātām* and *yat paśavo māyum akṛṣatoro vā padbhir āhasata*.[29]

'Names of relatives': *anv enaṃ mātā manyatām anu pitānu bhrātā sagarbhyo'nu sakhā sayūthyaḥ* (MS 4. 13. 4 etc.).

'Comparison': *kaśyapevāṃsācchidre śroṇī kavaṣorū* and *śyenam asya vakṣaḥ kṛṇutāt* (MS 4. 13. 4 etc.).

'Organs of sense': *sūryaṃ cakṣur gamayatād vātaṁ prāṇam anvavasṛjatād antarikṣam asuṃ diśaḥ śrotraṁ pṛthivīṃ śarīram / ekadhāsya tvacam āchyatāt purā nābhyā apiśaso vapām utkhidatād antarevoṣmāṇaṃ vārayadhvāt /* (MS 4. 13. 4 etc.).

In this connection it is read in the same section on modification [of the *Mānava Śrauta Sūtra* (5. 2. 9. 7)] that among these [words] the words indicative of siblings and kin *mātā, pitā, bhrātā*, and so on should not be modified.[30] Similarly also limbs of the body have been [specifically] enumerated [as not liable to modification] by some, such as the hands and feet, head and neck, the seven breaths, and so on.

Now *adhriqu*:[31] *daivyāḥ śamitāra uta manuṣyā ārabhadhvam / upanayata medhyā duraḥ / āśāsānā medhapatibhyāṃ medham / prāsmā agniṃ bharata / stṛṇīta barhiḥ / anv enaṃ mātā manyatām / anu pitānu bhrātā sagarbhyo'nu sakhā sayūthyaḥ / udīcīnāṃ asya pado nidhattāt / sūryaṃ cakṣur gamayatāt / vātaṃ prāṇam anvavasṛjatāt / antarikṣam asum / diśaḥ śrotram / pṛthivīṁ śarīram / ekadhāsya tvacam āchyatāt / purā nābhyā apiśaso vapām utkhidatāl / antarevoṣmāṇaṃ vārayadhvāt śyenam asya vakṣaḥ kṛṇutāt / praśasā bāhū / śalā doṣaṇī / kaśyapevāṃsācchidre śroṇī / kavaṣorū srekaparṇā aṣṭhīvantā / ṣaḍviṃśatir asya vaṅkrayas / tā anuṣṭhyoccyāvayatāt / gātraṃ gātram asyānūnaṃ kṛṇutāt / ūvadhyagohaṃ pārthivaṃ khanatāt / asnā rakṣaḥ saṃsṛjatāt / vaniṣṭum asya mā rāviṣṭorūkaṃ manyamānāḥ / nedvastoke tanaye / ravitā ravacchamitāraḥ / adhrigo śamīdhvam suśami śamīdhvam / śamīdhvam adhrigo / adhriguś ca vipāpaś ca devānāṃ śamitārau / tā enaṃ pravidvāṃsau śrapayataṃ yathāsya śrapaṇaṃ tathā /*. This they modify.

In *uruprathā uru prathasvoru te yajñapatiḥ prathatām* (VS 1. 22) there is no modification into *yajñapatayaḥ prathantām* even when there are

seventeen sacrificers, because spreading the sacrificial cake is the main [activity] here.

There is no application of grammar in the modification of prescriptions and songs. These two stand fixed by worldly usage and other grammars such as the Prātiśākhyas. But whatever use of grammar there be regarding the modification of words has been shown merely by way of illustration.

Where the relation 'original-derived' is established, there only modification [takes place], but what is considered as hard to be discarded by misguided people merely on the strength of its mention is not modification. And therefore [the construction] *ubhayeṣāṃ tvā devamanuṣyāṇāṃ priyaṃ karomi* (MS 4. 2. 13) [is possible].[32]

[Furthermore,] if somewhere [something] is recorded in the sacred texts concerning an original rite, it is certainly not subject to modification; for in the field of sacrifices some are original, some derived, some both original and derived, some neither original nor derived. Agniṣṭoma is the original of all soma [sacrifices]. Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa are the originals for all sacrifices that are not animal or soma sacrifices (*iṣṭi*)

[3. 3] "And also the Sacred Texts" (*āgamaḥ khalv api*; Mbh I p. 1 l. 18). 'The Sacred Texts' is teaching [handed down] without interruption from one generation to the next, which is of the nature of Revealed Texts (*śruti*) or of the nature of Traditional Texts (*smṛti*).[33]

But what is that Sacred Text [talked about in the Bhāṣya]? It is: "A Brahmin must study without motive religion in the form of the Veda with its six auxiliaries" (*brāhmaṇena niṣkāraṇo dharmaḥ ṣaḍaṅgo vedo 'dhyeyaḥ*; Mbh I p. 1 l. 18–19).[34] 'Without motive' means 'not being goaded by a motive'. Like obligatory rites which must be performed, so that a transgression is committed in case they are not carried out. But no transgression is committed in case non-obligatory activities are not performed, such as [the following] optional ones: "Let one who desires a son sacrifice" (*putrakāmo yajeta*; cp. BhārŚS 3. 7. 16) and "let him who desires food and edibles sacrifice" (*annādyakāmo yajeta* ;?); because [people] proceed [on such an activity only] when the desire [to perform it] is present. Here however it is shown that this study of grammar is an obligatory activity which must necessarily be performed, like the sacred thread ceremony.[35]

[3. 4] "A Brahmin must know correct word-forms" (*brāhmaṇena śabdā jñeyāḥ*; Mbh I p. I l. 20-21). Teaching is the profession of a Brahmin.[36] And correct word-forms must be known because no [Brahmin] who knows [only][37] incorrect words is approached [by a pupil] for this

reason that his sentences are not [well] comprehended since his speech is incoherent. And to know those [words] there is no easy method except grammar. What is called ' method ' is a particular arrangement of causes to bring about an effect. Therefore grammar is an easy method to get to know correct word-forms[38] Another method is not even possible. Therefore grammar must be studied. Or easiness is correct understanding in a short time. The method to [obtain] that [understanding] is grammar.

[3. 5] "The sacrificers lay down: One should sacrifice a cow that is *sthūlapṛṣatī* to Agni and Varuṇa " (*yājñikāḥ paṭhanti / sthūlapṛṣatīm āgnivāruṇīm anaḍvāhīm ālabheta*; Mbh I p. 1 l. 22–23). *Pṛṣatī kṣudra-pṛṣatī sthūlapṛṣatī tā maitrāvaruṇyaḥ* (MS 3. 13. 3 etc.) is recited in the Veda.[39] Here the word *sthūla* ' big ' in association with *pṛṣatī* is not [immediately] understood as a qualifier of spots (*pṛṣat*), because once [it is known as] a qualifier of *pṛṣat*, it will be obvious that [the compound] refers to another object (and will be Bahuvrīhi by P. 2. 2. 24 *anekam anyapadārthe*). Grammarians know the difference of meaning on the basis of difference of accent. And in that ritual, [the compound under consideration] is without any doubt determined by grammarians to be a Bahuvrīhi [meaning] ' of which the spots are big ', because of the original accent of the first [constituent] word-form (in agreement with P. 6. 2. 1 *bahuvrīhau prakṛtyā pūrvapadam*).

[4]

[4] " Further, these are other motives for [studying] the exposition of correct word-forms " (*imāni ca bhūyaḥ śabdānuśāsanasya prayojanāni*; Mbh I p. 2 l. 3). The word *bhūyaḥ* means *punaḥ*. [With] *imāni*, *punaḥ* means ' other '.

[4. 1] " Those demons, uttering the words *helayo helayaḥ*, suffered defeat " (*te'surā helayo helaya iti kurvantaḥ parābabhūvuḥ*; Mbh I p. 2 l. 7).[1]

[Two explanations of this line are given :]

[4. 1. 1] This arthavāda is mentioned in order to discourage vulgar speech. An arthavāda [is of two kinds :] either it instigates or it discourages.[2]

In this connection the following is an instigating expression :[3] " He who sacrifices an animal gains all these directions, all worlds; all these directions are gained by him, all worlds " (*sarvā vā imā diśaḥ paśuyājy abhijayati sarvāṃl lokān sarvā evāsyemā diśo'bhijitā bhavanti sarve lokāḥ*; MS 3. 9. 5).

A discouraging [arthavāda is :] " He should not let his teeth proceed [to chew]; if he lets his teeth proceed [to chew], snakes would kill him; he pacifies those snakes not to harm him " (*na dato gamayed yad dato gamayet sarpā enaṃ ghātukāḥ syuḥ sarpān eva śamayaty ahiṃsāyai* ; MS 1. 8. 5).[4]

Since they suffered defeat on account of uttering [those words] that way, " therefore a Brahmin should not speak in a vulgar manner " (*tasmād brāhmaṇena na mlecchitavai*; Mbh I p. 2 l. 7–8); this is the meaning of *na mlecchitavai*, formed in accordance with [P. 3. 4. 14] *kṛtyārthe tavai...* .

In answer to the question what then is speaking in a vulgar manner (*mlecchana*) he says : " should not speak faultily " *nāpabhāṣitavai* Mbh I p. 2 l. 8). Speaking in a vulgar manner is speaking faultily (*apabhāṣaṇa*).

What then was spoken faultily by the demons ? [Four opinions are listed (1–4)].[5]

(1) Here some state that the prolated [vowel] prescribed by *haihe-prayoge haihayoḥ* (P. 8. 2. 85) has not been effected.

(2) Others say that a prolated [vowel] has been effected but that vowel sandhi has been applied instead of leaving [the vowels] in their original shape.[6]

(3) Someone else says that doubling has been effected in *he'layo he 'layaḥ* (where only one word should have been doubled).[7]

(4) Others again said that this does not consist of the sound *l* etc., because it is not used [that way] by cultivated people; the use by the [demons] of *l* [in *he 'layaḥ*] is wrong.[8]

And why does he sum up in this way " May we not be vulgar " *mlecchā mā bhūma*; Mbh I p. 2 l. 8), instead of " may we not suffer defeat "? The answer is, as has already been explained, that this is a metaphorical expression (*arthavāda*) by which the non-use of vulgar speech is prescribed.[9]

[4. 1. 2] Others explain : [It should be understood] that [the arthavāda] also states that one does not suffer defeat by avoiding that on account of which the [demons] suffered defeat. But what constitutes the defeat of the demons ? Incurring sin ; because of incurring which they don't rise up even today. And even the sons and grandsons of the demons, who did not use [incorrect language], they too suffered defeat. Therefore grammar must be studied so that we may not suffer defeat as the demons [did].

[4. 2] *Duṣṭaḥ śabdaḥ svarato varṇato vā* (Mbh I p. 2. 1. 11). *tasI* [in *svarataḥ* and *varṇataḥ* has been added] because [*svara* and *varṇa* belong to the gaṇa] ' *ādi* etc. ' (in P. 5. 4. 44 vt. 1 *tasiprakaraṇa ādyādibhya upasaṃkhyānam*). [The above line means :] faulty on account of accent and speech-sound.[10] That which is faulty on account of these two is called ' improperly used ' (*mithyāprayukta*; Mbh I p. 2. 1. 11). Such a kind [of word] does not express the appropriate sense. " That [word] ", not conveying the appropriate sense, " being a thunderbolt in the form of speech, harms the sacrificer " (*sa vāgvajro yajamānaṃ hinasti* ; Mbh I p. 2. 1. 12). Speech which is a thunderbolt is ' a thunderbolt in the form of speech '. Due to the association with the offence and tied up with that offence he (i. e. the sacrificer) is harmed in the next world, because of his sin. Because the sacrificer is most important in the sacrifice. Or, when the priest is harmed, he too is harmed.

" Like *indraśatru* " (*yathendraśatruḥ*; Mbh I p. 2 1. 12). Just as this [word] *indraśatru* harmed the sacrificer,[11] let not in a similar manner another [word] too, on account of its being improperly used, destroy [someone]. For this reason grammar must be studied. Regarding the use of faulty words the following is found in the Sacred Texts : The mantra *svāhendraśatrur vardhasva* (" *Svāhā*, prosper as *indraśatru* "; TS 2. 5. 2. 1) must be recited.[11] [The word *indrśatru*] was recited with the *udātta* accent on the first [component of the compound,] so that it means : " Of him Indra indeed has become the destroyer ".

Here it is objected that even if the last component of the compound has the *udātta* accent, this meaning ' his enemy is Indra ' does not turn into its opposite. Just like ' friend of Soma ' (*somasakha*) and ' friend of the king ' (*rājasakha*).[12] It should further be pointed out : Why is there no vocative, like this : *indraśatro vardhasva* ?

Regarding the statement that the meaning is not annulled even when the *udātta* accent falls on the last [component of the compound], nothing is wrong here. This word *śatru* here used in the mantra, though a word employed in its conventional sense, is used, due to the influence exerted by the meaning-context,[13] [in an extended sense] which is based on the conventional meaning referred to [just now]. Therefore not only the meaning ' enemy of Indra ' or ' his enemy is Indra ' is accepted. How then ? [The word] is used taking the [underlying] activity as the basis [of its meaning,] as follows : an enemy (*śatru*) is a destroyer (*śātayitṛ*) or an annihilator (*śamayitṛ*). Here, while it was intended to use [the compound *indraśatru*] in the sense ' be the destroyer of Indra ', it was [actually] used in the sense ' his destroyer is Indra '.

Concerning the remark that a vocative ending should be used [it must be said] : A vocative ending [is used] where an object which is well-known by its own characteristic is brought to face connection with a different characteristic.[14] As when one brings Devadatta to face a different characteristic with the words : "Devadatta, study, eat." And how could something have a vocative ending exactly when the relevant (*asau*) characteristic is being applied [to it] ? For example, in "Be a king, fight, be a man" the very characteristics of being a king and being a man are being applied, so that no vocative ending is used.[15] In the same way also in the present context ; the very characteristic of being *indraśatru* is being applied, so that there is nothing wrong [in the use of the nominative]. Thus, in the previous [example] faulty use of sounds was exemplified in *he 'layo he 'layaḥ*. Now faulty use of accent [has been exemplified].

[4. 3] "What has been learned by heart but has not been understood is expressed by mere utterance" (*yad adhītam avijñātaṃ nigadenaiva śabdyate*; Mbh I p. 2. l. 15).[16] Hereby the following is conveyed : If the Veda is recited in accordance with grammar, it will indeed be beneficial. The author of the *Nirukta* explains ['not understood'] in this [line] as 'of which the meaning has not been understood'.[17] But here (i. e., in the *Mahābhāṣya*) 'not understood' is taken to mean 'of which accents, sounds and proper formation have not been understood'. And what is such, that is 'expressed by mere utterance', i. e., exclusively [learned] through the teacher's instruction.

"Like dry fuel where there is no fire" (*anagnāv iva śuṣkaidhaḥ*; Mbh I p. 2. l. 16). Just as firewood, though capable of burning but not grasped by fire, is not capable of burning [and is therefore] without purpose, so is the Veda (*śāstra*), though learned by heart but not grasped by grammar, not capable of bringing about results.

"May we therefore not study without object" (*tasmād anarthakaṃ mādhigīṣmahi*; Mbh I p. 2. l. 17) means "may we not study without purpose".

[4. 4] "But he who uses ..." *yas tu prayuṅkte*; Mbh I p. 2. l. 19). Non-association with sin and connection with the desired fruit result from grammar; this is here stated. 'Uses' [means] 'utters'; 'skilful' (*kuśala*) [means] 'who knows'. 'With regard to something special' (*viśeṣe*) : One and the same word [is correct with regard to one particular meaning and] incorrect with regard to another, this is here stated.[18] For example, the word *goṇī* is incorrect [when used] with regard to that which possesses a dewlap etc. (i. e., an ox). Similarly the word *aśva* is correct [when used]

with regard to what possesses manes etc. (i. e., a horse), not with regard to what has no possesion (*niḥsva*). The word *asva* [on the other hand] is correct with regard to what has no wealth, not with regard to that whose characteristics are whole hooves etc. But if for some other reason[19] also the word *goṇī* be used for what has a dewlap etc., so that *goṇī* would mean 'like a sack' (*goṇīva*), it will certainly be correct. Or one may use the word *asva* with respect to a horse (*aśva*) conveying thereby its poverty; that [too] is correct.[20]

Or [we read] *kuśalo 'viśeṣe* 'knowledgeable concerning general [rules of grammar]'. Even though something be a generl [rule] of grammar, e. g., *tata āgataḥ* 'come from there' (P. 4. 3. 74) or *tena khanati* 'one digs therewith',[21] it is only used as a fully correct [rule] in particular cases; not everywhere, as in *vṛkṣamūlād āgataḥ* ('come from the root of a tree') or *aṅgulyā khanati* (he digs with his finger').[22]

The reading of others is *kuśalo viśeṣaiḥ*. [*Viśeṣaiḥ* here] means 'with particular [rules] expounded by the science [of grammar]'. As with the [rule] *tad adhīte tad veda* (P. 4. 2. 59).

Vyavahāra (Mbh I p. 2. 1. 19) is mode of life, practice of the cultured, i. e. sacrifice, mode of conducting rites. "Who? He alone who knows the proper use of speech." (*kaḥ / vāgyogavid eva /*; Mbh I p. 2, 1. 21) Since no other [person] is mentioned [in the stanza] he asks: "Who?" [This is answered :] "He alone who knows the proper use of speech." He thinks as follows: Dharma [is produced] when one works toward a certain goal; when one works toward the opposite of that [goal] a result opposite to [dharma] must come about. For example, dharma is the result of causing happiness to a Brahmin, adharma the result of causing pain [to him]. In the same way, he who knows the proper use of speech obtains dharma because he knows correct words. But knowledge of correct words is inseparably connected with the knowledge of incorrect words, therefore he says: "Because he who knows correct words ..." *yo hi śabdān jānāti*; Mbh I p. 2. 1. 2ı).

In the following manner it is asked [if the speaker is to suffer] on account of the fitness with regard to the object rather than [on account of] his actual use of the words: "Incorrect words there are more, correct words fewer" *bhūyāṃso 'paśabdāḥ alpīyāṃsaḥ śabdāḥ*; Mbh I p. 2 1. 23). Why are there affixes of the comparative degree [in this sentence]? The answer is that identity of qualities is to be assumed with regard to opinion of others.[23] How? You may think that even though one who knows the proper use of speech is acquainted with both [kinds of words, correct

and incorrect], nevertheless little sin [is produced] because correct words are many, incorrect words few. This too is not the case, because correct words are fewer. Moreover, degraded words are not expressive of meaning.[24] This is the position taken here, that they do not convey meaning.

" Ignorance is his refuge " (*ajñānaṃ tasya śaraṇam*; Mbh I p. 2 1. 25). Granted that he may not be associated with merit, at least he is not associated with sin. Similarly animals and the like are not associated with sin because they act out of ignorance. All this is mentioned [in the Bhāṣya in connection with the words] " dharma resides in knowledge ... " (*jñāne dharmaḥ*; Mbh I p. 10 1. 5. vt. 6).[25] But knowledge is inferred from usage.

" Ignorance cannot always be a refuge " (*nātyantāyājñānaṃ śaraṇaṃ bhavitum arhati*; Mbh I p. 2 1. 25–26). For poison does not fail to cause death when eaten out of ignorance. Ignorance is a refuge only in the case of animals etc., it is not [a refuge] for barbarians and the like who go about killing Brahmins.

evaṃ tarhi (Mbh I p. 2 1. 27). He explains this : Since semantic connection is stronger than contiguity,[26] [a supplemented] *avāgyogavid* (' who does not know the proper use of speech ') is connected [with the words *duṣyati cāpaśabdaiḥ* " and ... perishes on account of incorrect words " (Mbh I p. 2 1. 27)]. He who knows the proper use of speech, though knowing [both] correct and incorrect words, will use correct words, not incorrect words. And prosperity or sin arises from the use [of words,] not from their knowledge.

This is not written in the revealed texts (*śruti*) nor in the traditional texts (*smṛti*). Therefore he says : " Where has this been read ? " (*kva punar idaṃ paṭhitam* ; Mbh I p. 2 1. 28). " The verses called *bhrāja* ".[27] The import of this is [as follows]. That which is the purport of the revealed texts has indeed been handed down in the traditional texts; for that reason [this text] should be considered authoritative.

" But, sir, are verses too authoritative? " (*kiṃ ca bhoḥ ślokā api vai pramāṇam* Mbh ; I p. 31 . 1) This does not say that no authority belongs to verses indiscriminately. Because there are verses that are part of the traditional texts and which are authoritative. But [verses] of this kind are not authoritative. If this kind of [verse be considered as] having authority, any [verses] whatever should be authoritative.

Yad udumbaravarṇānām (Mbh I p. 3 1. 3). This verse conveys that the Sautrāmaṇī [rite] is not effective and that therefore one should drink

wine in a drinking-house, disregarding the Sautrāmaṇī. "This [verse] was uttered in bewilderment by its honourable [author]" (*pramattagīta eṣa tatrabhavataḥ*; Mbh I p. 3 l. 5); this means 'by someone whose mind is deranged'. How is that known? Because it is in conflict with both the revealed texts (*śruti*) and the traditional texts (*smṛti*). But this verse (i. e. *yas tu prayuṅkte*) was uttered by someone not in bewilderment because there is the [following] traditional line (*smṛti*): [28] "One word thoroughly understood, well used and conforming to [the prescriptions of] the science [of grammar] becomes wishfulfilling in heaven and on earth."[29]

[4. 5] By means of [the stanza] *avidvāṃsaḥ pratyabhivāde* ... (Mbh I p. 3 l. 7) he informs us that without [knowledge of] grammar [people] are considered like women, marked off from the cultured; they cannot oblige him who greets them.[30] Because purified by a [proper] return of the greeting he partakes of merit and [he who replies] himself becomes the recipient of prosperity.

[4. 6] "The preliminary offerings" (*prayājāḥ savibhaktikāḥ*; Mbh I p. 3 l. 10). The mantras accompanying preliminary offerings (*prayāja*) are meant. Not on account of the endings (*vibhakti*) [already attached] to each of the words of the *prayāja* [mantras] are they called 'with endings' (*savibhaktika*); because those [endings] are always present (and need not be prescribed). Therefore a word-form different from [those prescribed in] the sacred texts is employed in the *prayāja* [mantras]. And since case endings are not used in isolation,[31] a nominal stem is understood as their base, by implication (*arthāpatti*). Moreover, since we see the following statement [in the scriptures] *tvam agne prayājānuyājābhyāṃ purastāt tvaṃ paścāt* ("You, Agni, are before [the mantra of] the preliminary offering and [of] the final offering, you are after them"),[32] no [word] is taken other than [*agni*] which occurs in the revealed texts and refers to the meaning ['fire']. Although it would follow that all case endings be used, the form *agnināgninā* is not used because it has been stated "which have two syllables or four syllables" (*yā dvyakṣarā vā satyaś caturakṣarā vā bhavanti*).[33] Similarly one should not use *śabdajāmi*. *Śabdajāmi* is that which has an ablative ending. Therefore in *agner agneḥ* it is the genitive which is used in this form, [not the ablative]. "In the Punarādheya [rite] one should recite the 'vibhaktis' before or after [the mantras belonging to] the fore- and after - offerings".[34] Or *narāśaṃso agnim agniṃ* [is used instead of *tanūnapād agnim agnim*] because it is seen both ways.[35]

In the *Bahvṛcasūtra Bhāṣya*[36] [it has been said :] "Agreement [of case-endings] is seen in *samidhaḥ samidho'gne 'gne* : disagreement [of case-

endings] is seen in *iḷo 'gnināgne.*" In the *Āśvalāyana* [*Śrauta*] *Sūtra* [we find :][37] *ye yajāmahe samidhaḥ samidho'gne 'gna ājyasya vyantu / tanūnapād agnim agna ājyasya haviṣo vetu / narāśaṃso agnim agna ājyasya haviṣo vetu / iḷo 'gnināgna ājyasya haviṣo vyantu / barhir agnir agna ājyasya haviṣo vetu /* (cp. ĀśvŚS 2. 8. 6). In the *Āpastamba* [*Śrauta*] *Sūtra* the ' vibhaktis " are enumerated in this form : " for the four *prayāja* [mantras] : *agnāgne, ugnāv agne, agnināgne, agnim agne* " (ĀpŚS 5. 28. 6). The last (i. e. fifth) *prayāja* [mantra remains] as it is handed down, i. e. *agnā* ;[38] no ' vibhakti ' is placed after it. Also in a derived rite no ' vibhakti ' is then added. For example : *ye yajāmahe* (cp. MŚS 5. 1. 2. 6 etc.) *svāhāgniṃ svāhā somam* (MS 4. 10. 3 etc.) *agnihotraṃ svāhā agnīṣomau svāhā* (?) *devā ājyapā juṣāṇā agna ājyasya haviṣo vyantu* (MS 4. 10. 3 (with *agnā*) etc.). When case-endings must be added in these *prayāja* [mantras], a grammarian will correctly utter [the words] with case-endings attached. For this purpose grammar must be studied.

[4. 7] *sa ārtvijīnaḥ* (Mbh I p. 3 l. 12–13). He who is fit for [the services of] a priest (*ṛtvij*) and he who [is fit for] the duties of a priest, both are [called] *ārtvijīna*,[39] because only one who is well-informed can organize a sacrifice; not those who are not well-informed because they have no authority [to organize one].[40] One is urged [to study grammar] since it is not possible for a Brahmin to be sacrificer or priest without grammar.

[4. 8. 1] " The four kinds of words " (*catvāri padajātāni*; Mbh I p. 3 l. 17) are his horns as it were.[41] Four are mentioned because the karmapravacanīyas are included in the nipātas. According to others there are two kinds of words, nominal words and verbs. [There are] ' three times ' (*trayaḥ kālāḥ*; Mbh I p. 3 l. 18), either of the name, [i. e.,] of the word : " it is used, will be used, was used "; or of the naming : " it is, will be, was ". " Two essences of the word, one eternal, the other produced " (*dvau śabdātmānau nityaḥ kāryaś ca*; Mbh I p. 3 l. 18). Some consider the [word] to be eternal, others non-eternal. Or the genus (*jāti*) and the individual [are meant]; or sphoṭa and sound. The ' seven case-endings ' (*sapta vibhaktayaḥ*; Mbh I p. 3 l. 19) are *sU* etc. Or the seven kārakas, including *śeṣa* [are meant]. But it is not possible to have also a remaining eighth kāraka.

[4. 8. 2] *na iṅgayanti* (Mbh I p. 3 l. 28) means they do not move irregularly ', " they do not wink, do not move " (*na nimiṣanti na ceṣṭante*; Mbh I p. 3 l. 28). These [terms] are taken as synonyms because [their meanings are] intimately connected. [The idea is :] " May we become the same as those who have control over their mind. " Because they too reached this [high] position by no other means than the science of grammar.

[4. 9) " Though seeing he doesn't see ; though hearing he doesn't hear " (*paśyann api na paśyati / ... śṛṇvann api na śṛṇoti*; Mbh I p. 4 l. 4–5). Because those who study grammar and have mastery over speech rule over speech.

[4. 10] " Like barley with a sieve " (*saktum iva titaunā* ; Mbh I p. 4 l. 10 ; quoted from RV 10. 71. 2). ' Barley ' coimplies ' substance ', denoted [by the word] and hard to cleanse. So [it can be said] that incorrect words are purified by the [denotive] power [of words] with the help of grammar.[42] Long [ā] in *atrā sakhāyaḥ* by [P. 6. 3. 133] *ṛci tunughamakṣu ...* [The word *sakhāyaḥ* in] *atrā sakhāyaḥ sakhyāni* means *samānakhyātayaḥ*, that is ' having the same knowledge '.

[4. 11] " Who uses incorrect words after kindling the [sacred] fire " (*āhitāgnir apaśabdaṃ prayujya* ; Mbh I p. 4 l. 19) conveys the following : Just as one who kindles the [sacred] fire necessarily brings his wife because without her kindling of the [sacred fire] cannot take place, so must he who kindles the [sacred] fire necessarily study grammar. In this way he justifies the obligatory nature [of the study of grammar].

[4. 12] It is said that " one should give a name to a son on the tenth " (*daśamyāṃ putrasya nāma vidadhyāt*).[43] [The result is] that grammar is used right from the Naming Ceremony.

[4. 13] *sudevo asi varuṇa* (Mbh I p. 4 l. 27 ; quoted from RV 8. 69. 12). This is a eulogy to Varuṇa which occurs in a hymn belonging to the Pragāthas (i. e. to *Ṛgveda* Maṇḍala 8) and composed by Bṛhaspati (Āṅgirasa). And Varuṇa receives this praise — " you are the god of truth " *tvaṃ satyadevaḥ* — based on his knowledge of grammar ; for that reason [grammar] must be studied.

[5]

kiṃ punar idam ... (Mbh I p. 5 l. 5). It must not be thought that a student, a teacher or someone siding with the teacher [asks this question]. The author himself[1] distinguishes this composition [from other studies, saying :] " but not also something else " (*na punar anyad api kiṃcit*; Mbh I p. 5 l. 5–6). Because, [the preceding] being a description of motives, one might understand it thus : " I am being urged in this manner [to study something different from grammar. But] these are no motives [for such a different study]. " Or it is explained [as follows] : " Why shall I study something tiresome which has no purpose ? " and as a result one might not study at all.

" Having said *om* " (*om ity uktvā* ; Mbh I p. 5 l. 6). This should not be understood merely to mean " having pronounced the word *om* " but

rather "having assented [to study the Veda][2] without any regard for [ulterior] motives, thinking 'let it be thus' (*evam*)".

vṛttāntataḥ (cp. Mbh I p. 5 l. 6). Prapāṭhakas[3] are called 'Vṛttānta'. *TasI* [has been added to vṛttānta] because [the latter] is included in [the gaṇa] '*ādi* etc.'[4] [This gives the following meaning :] They recite [the Veda] one Vṛttānta after the other, i. e., one Prapāṭhaka after the other. The reading of others is *vṛttāntaśaḥ*. They read (i. e. explain) [the sentence] thus, *vṛttāntaśaḥ paṭhanti*, which means "they read each single Vṛttānta".[5]

"In olden days it was like this" (*purākalpa etad āsīt*; Mbh I p. 5 l. 6–7).[6] This [passage] informs [us] that at the stage at which the [student] is taught grammar he is not at all able to raise questions. How shall [anyone] propound motives [for studying grammar] ? *Tatra sthānakaraṇānupradānajñebhyaḥ* ... (Mbh I p. 5 l. 7-8). In olden days one learned places of articulation, organs of speech etc. from grammar only. After that "Vedic words were taught" (*vaidikāḥ śabdā upadiśyante*; Mbh I p. 5 l. 8). Under these circumstances there would be a question as to the motive for studying the Veda. [In reply to that] the motive for that too (i. e., for grammar) was stated, as follows : "Also grammar, being an ancillary text of the Veda (*vedāṅga*), must necessarily be studied." (Or, in case the reading *tasya na* is accepted : Its purpose is not stated ; and also grammar, being an ancillary text of the Veda (*vedāṅga*), has to be necessarily studied [like the Veda].)

"It is not like that these days" (*tad adyatve na tathā*; Mbh I p. 5 l. 8). *Adyatve* ('these days') is a particle synonymous with 'in this time'. These days mere children are taught the Veda without having studied grammar. [As a result] the places of articulation, organs of speech and external effort, connected with [reciting] the Veda are not known [to them] at all (for want of study of grammar).

"Having memorized the Veda they hurriedly start saying ..." (*vedam adhītya tvaritā vaktāro bhavanti*; Mbh I p. 5 l. 8–9). 'Hurriedly' (*tvaritāḥ*) : They are hurried to gain wealth or to [get] pleasure and enjoyment. Or, thinking "let there not again be a binding duty in one more course of study", they hurriedly say : "[We have learned the language] simultaneously with learning the Veda."

[6]

[6. 1] "The word-form has been discussed" (*uktaḥ śabdaḥ*; Mbh I p. 5 l. 12). Also its nature has been discussed, viz. that the word-form is sound. Also "the motives have been discussed" (*prayojanāny uktāni*; Mbh I p. 5

1. 12), preservation etc. " Now the exposition of word-forms must be done" (*śabdānuśāsanam idānīṃ kartavyam*; Mbh I p. 5 l. 12–13); that means must be introduced, begun. He shows " how that must be done " (*tat kathaṃ kartavyaṃ*; Mbh I p. 5 l. 13), i. e. introduced. How must [exposition of words] be undertaken by him who expounds? [Should there be] teaching of correct words, of incorrect words or of both kinds of words? What is described by its own characteristics as well as by the absence of characteristics of other things, becomes clearer; that is why he includes the activity of teaching both [correct and incorrect words] (*ubhayopadeśa*). But although it becomes clearer [this way, it results in] overburdening the science [of grammar]; therefore he accepts an exposition merely by means of the own characteristics. By using [the word] ' either of the two ' (*anyataraṃ*) [in the line] *anyataropadeśena kṛtaṃ syāt*, it is clear that] the meaning [of this line is that] he is content with [either of the two, teaching] correct and incorrect words. If also teaching of both [correct and incorrect words] had been included, he would have used [the suffix] *-tama*, as follows : *anyatamopadeśena*.

" For example, by restricting things that are to be eaten a prohibition of what is not to be eaten is understood " (*tad yathā, bhakṣyaniyamenābhakṣyapratiṣedho gamyate*; Mbh I p. 5 l. 14–15). In the section on what can and what cannot be eaten it is heard that " five five-nailed [animals] are to be eaten " (*pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyāḥ*; Mbh I p. 5 l. 15).[2] Five-nailed [animals] different from [the ones enumerated in that] section are excluded. Or [the situation can be described like this]. Eating takes place on account of desire, is prompted by hunger and can have everything [edible] as its object when no [scriptural] statement applies to it. Given this situation there is the following [scriptural] enunciation " Five five-nailed [animals] are to be eaten ". If this [utterance] conveyed that five five-nailed [animals] are to be eaten, one would sin on the very day one does not eat [them], because [on that day] he does not do what would have been enjoined. And eating five-nailed [animals] that are different from the porcupine. ,[3] undertaken for no reason, would not even be ruled out [by the enunciation. This is unacceptable for the following reason :] The same eating which is foremost and which takes place when there is a desire [to eat], is prescribed in connection with the five five-nailed [animals]. Removal of hunger is to be brought about by these only, not by other [five-nailed animals]. Since the enunciation [concerns only] this much, there is exclusion of other five-nailed [animals].

This [exclusion] is not expressed. It is rather indicated by the completion of the sense. And such being the case, eating *śrāddha* would

follow by implication also in the following passage on the *aśrāddhabhojin* [which occurs in the Bhāṣya] on the sūtra *vrate* (P. 3. 2. 80) and which states : " If he who eats *aśrāddha* is an *aśrāddhabhojin*, then the very day he eats no *aśrāddha*, that [day] his vow is broken. "[4] Therefore it is said : *śrāddha* should not be eaten. An exclusion is made of eating *śrāddha* which is foremost [in the expression *aśrāddhabhojin*] and which would follow by implication, as follows : " When eating, don't eat *śrāddha.* " [And] how can there be a breach of vow when the eating of *śrāddha* is excluded on the strength of an injunction concerning the eating of *śrāddha* as the foremost thing ? So it is clear that incorrect words are excluded by teaching correct words, even though both correct and incorrect words convey meaning.

" Or there is restriction concerning [animals] that are to be eaten by way of a prohibition of those that are not to be eaten " (*abhakṣya-pratiṣedhena vā bhakṣyaniyamaḥ*; Mbh I p. 5 l. 16). [The illustration is] " the domestic cock is not to be eaten " (*abhakṣyo grāmyakukkuṭah*; Mbh I p. 5 l. 16) because this is a prohibition with the main emphasis on the object. Here [we are] not [dealing with] an interdiction to be inferred from what obtains [as above]. What then ? This is a straightforward interdiction. So here too by teaching incorrect words it is learned that *go* is a correct word, because it is different from *gāvī* etc.

" Which [of the two methods] is better ? " (*kiṃ punar atra jyāyaḥ*; Mbh I p. 5 l. 19-20). Having experienced the excellence [of the two methods discussed just now] because they are less cumbersome than teaching both [correct and incorrect words, now,] in the mutual rivalry [of the remaining two, one of them] is connected with the suffix of the comparative degree. " Furthermore, there will be [the advantage of having] an explanation of desired [forms] " (*iṣṭānvākhyānaṃ khalv api bhavati*; Mbh I p. 5 l. 22). In what way is explaining desired [forms the same as] teaching correct words ? The answer is that just as there is dharma connected with words forming part of the Sacred Texts, in the same way these [words] too give rise to dharma, and hence it is said there is ' explanation of desired [forms]'. Or [one might say that] when incorrect words are taught, knowledge [of correct words] inferential [and of the type] ' this our [utterance] is a correct word '. And since one can imagine no end [of correct words] in case their knowledge is inferential, it is hard to know whether *go*, being different from *gāvī* etc., is a correct word, or rather some other [form]. Therefore this would not be an explanation worth the name.

[6. 2] "If then correct words are taught ..." (*athaitasmin śabdopadeśe sati*; Mbh I p. 1. 23). In 'this time [people] think that only stating each word individually is easy. Because in that case no rules have to be remembered, only the words themselves have to be uttered. Because when bases [of words] etc. are taught, full understanding [is not reached until after] a long time. "Stating each word individually" (*pratipadapāṭha*; Mbh I p. 5 l. 23). 'Stating each word individually' is pronouncing [them] in their own form. A word is that by which meaning is delimited. *Anabhyupāyaḥ* (Mbh I p. 5 l. 25). This word *abhyupāya* is synonymous with the word *upāya* 'means'. "Because it is heard that Bṛhaspati taught Indra ..." (*evaṃ hi śrūyate / bṛhaspatir indrāya*; Mbh I p. 5 l. 25). This metaphorical statement (*arthavāda*) is adopted to discourage reciting word individually. [Even] such a speaker and such a listener could not complete it in so much time. "How much less nowadays" (*kiṃ punar adyatve*; Mbh I p. 5 l. 27-28). "Word-collection[5] of words" (*śabdānāṃ śabdapārāyaṇam*; Mbh I p. 5 l. 26). [This word *śabdapārāyṇa* 'Word-collection'] is a conventional term designating some treatise.[6] Just as "'head-disease' (*śiroroga*) causes pain in the belly". 'Head-disease' (*śiroroga*) is a current name for a particular disease affecting the belly because this [head-disease] causes pain in the whole head as well as in the whole of the belly.[7] In the same way there is a book called 'Word-collection' (*śabdapārāyaṇa*). [This 'Word-collection'] "of words he taught" (*śabdānāṃ ...provāca*; Mbh I p. 5 l. 26).

"Knowledge when used in the four ways is used [in the proper sense of word]" (*caturbhiś ca prakārair vidyopayuktopayuktā*[8] *bhavati*; cp. Mbh I p. 5 l. 28 - p. 6 l. 1). Even when used half it is [properly speaking] unused because it carries no fruit. Alternatively, in society [something] is considered 'used' even though [only] a part [of it] has been used. An example is: "Ghee has been used."[9] Here [however] something is not in similar fashion [considered] 'used' because a part [of it] has been used. Rather, he states that [something] is 'used' when it is used *in toto*.

Āgamakāla (Mbh I p. 6 l. 1) is the time of learning; *svādhyāyakāla* (id.) is the time of drilling ; "the time of teaching" (*pravacanakāla*; id.) is the one to be dedicated to the students; [*vyavahāra* in] *vyavahārakāla* (id.) is the application [of knowledge] in the sacrificial act or [its] ascertained employment in the midst of the cultured.

"Some set of rules, containing generel and special ones, must be framed" (*kiṃcit sāmānyaviśeṣavat lakṣaṇam pravartyam*; Mbh I p. 6 l. 3). In which there are general and special ones, that is 'containing general

and special ones'. For example *karmaṇy aṇ* (P. 3. 2. 1; quoted Mbh I p. 6 l. 6); in this rule *dhātoḥ* (by *anuvṛtti* from P. 3. 1. 91) is the general element. And *ātaḥ* in *āto'nupasarge kaḥ* (P. 3. 2. 3; quoted Mbh I p. 6 l. 8) is the special element. And by means of this [set of rules] one learns " with a small effort larger and larger streams of words " (*alpena yatnena mahato mahataḥ śabdaughān* ; Mbh I p. 6 l. 3-4) : *kumbhakāra, kāṇḍalāva* and the like, (formed by P. 3. 2. 1); similarly *pārṣṇitra*,[10] *goda* and the like (formed by P. 3. 2. 3). This should be applied everywhere ; also in the case of substituends and substitutes and in the case of injunction and prohibition.

[7]

[7] " Is the meaning of the word form or substance ? " (*kiṃ punar ākṛtiḥ padārtha āhosvit dravyam*; Mbh I p. 6 l. 8). There is doubt because there is difference of opinion among the preceptors. According to Vājapyāyana it is form,[1] but according to Vyāḍi it is substance.[2]

(1) Some explain this as follows. Although this is stated in a general way, this is asked concerning words that are fitting, in which both substance and form are possible; i. e. [words] such as ' ox ' and ' horse ', not ' Ḍittha ' and so on.

(2) Others however say : The word ' form ' refers to the qualifier of something else, including ' existence '. [Form is that] by which is formed i. e., by which is delimited, [by which] a different activity is delimited.

(3) Others again say that form (*ākṛti*) is possible in the case of all [words]. That [form] is called ' genus ' (*jāti*).

[First Vājapyāyana's opinion is discussed (I), then Vyāḍi's (II) :]

(I) In this [last mentioned opinion] a word brings [to mind] only the form (*ākṛti*), not substance and so on, according to Vājapyāyana. [Now Vājapyāyana's opinion is shown to be possible in the case of qualities (i), substances (ii), actions (iii) and names (iv)]. For example : (i) The word ' blue ', irrespective of any object and having a quality as its universal (*sāmānya*), appropriates that character. Here [the word ' blue '] having appropriated its character and having that as its substrate, when, being expressive of a quality, it experiences penetration by ' blueness ' on account of its close connection with ' blue ', [in other words, it experiences] that it is characterized by [blueness], when it obtains activity and rests only along with [blueness, then this word ' blue ',] being completely overpowered by the form (*ākṛti*) because it is not differentiated [from ' blueness '] evokes the cognition of a quality.

Just as a crystal, on account of its support, is perceived as having the quality of that [support]; so does this word ' blue ', when designating a substance too (in addition to the quality), superimposes the cognition on the substance which is the substrate of the [quality], even though it is separated [from the substance] by the quality as a result of [the relation called] ' inherence in what is inherent ' (*samavetasamavāya*), in as much as the support of the ' blueness ' designated by itself (i. e., by the word ' blue ') is the quality ; that in its turn is borne by substance. Similarly, [the word may be separated from the substance] by another substance, in the case of a coloured garment.[3] [Or] indirectly as a result of [the relation called] ' inherence in what inheres in the connected (by *saṃyoga*) ' (*saṃyuktasamavetasamavāya*), as in : " A white garment between two coloured garments is perceived as having the quality of those [two] " (Mbh I p. 206 l. 20; on P. 1. 2. 30).

(ii) So the word ' ox ' too, having acquired its own character in ' oxness ', applies to the substance which is the very support of that [oxness].

(iii) Similarly, what is expressed by the word ' [he] cooks ' is the universal (*sāmānya*) which is manifested and covers all [the constituent activities], and which inheres in the same object together with [all] those [constituent] universals, ' putting on the fire ' etc., that belong to each of the activities, ' putting on the fire ' etc., included in the expression '[he] cooks'. Just as ' the universal of revolving ', which ranges over many activities, is expressed by the word ' revolving '.

(iv) In the same way also in Ḍittha there is [something] which [lasts] from birth to death [so that one says :] " This [was] Ḍittha, this [is] Ḍittha." The cognition that he is the same undivided [person] in infancy, adolescence, youth and age, is the form (*ākṛti*) expressed by the word [' Ḍittha ']. And even in a simpleton there is the cognition " This is [a picture of] Ḍittha being drawn." Therefore here too there is a universal (*sāmānya*). That which is the particular arrangement and is a qualifier of the connections [of its parts], just as in the case of elephants etc., that is the form (*ākṛti*). This [word ' Ḍittha '], while made to convey, by secondary thought-connection, that there is a genus (*jāti*), denotes the substance because that is denoted by that word.

(II) But according to him who holds that substance is the meaning of the word, substance is expressed [by the word]. Genus (*jāti*) etc. differentiate the substance in order to convey its existence; because they are qualifiers of the word. Here some [think] that though sweetness etc. are

really speaking not expressed by words like 'lump of sugar' (*guḍa*), [yet] they are attached to those objects. The same is true of 'oxness' etc.

This [word 'ox'] also denotes the genus (*jāti*), [but only] secondarily. The genus which has taken the form of substance-ness (i. e. which is manifested by the substance) is expressed by that word ['ox'].

[Vājapyāyana's and Vyāḍi's opinions are criticized (I'-II')]. In this [connection it can be said :]

(I') Vājapyāyana's view is that because [in this view] the form (*ākṛti*) would always be [denoted] according to Pāṇini, the obstruction of a prohibition when [something] Is once gone,[4] and obtainment of another word [of the same form][5] is not possible.

(II') But if the meaning of the word is substance, [the system of] general rules and exceptions has no scope because all individual cases would be covered by the rules. And the options assigned [to particular cases] would have no scope.

"Both, he says" (*ubhayam ity āha*; Mbh I p. 6 l. 8). [Both] the individual and the form (*ākṛti*) are used by ordinary [speakers] for whom the meaning is the main thing.[6] And among the words of instruction in the science [of grammar] some denote the genus, others the substance. And such being the case they have no secondary meaning, [for] a word [denotative] of the genus has only the genus as meaning, and a word [denotative] of substance has only substance as meaning. Among the words of instruction [the following holds, that] if indeed one resorts to a [particular] meaning on the basis of [actual] usage and of one's desire, all varieties of derivation and of points of view become possible in the science [of grammar].

"In both ways the teacher ..." (*ubhayathā ācāryeṇa*; Mbh I p. 6 l. 8-9). Here it is objected that for someone who holds that both [substance and genus] are the meaning of the word, a plural number will be correct in the case of many [things] when the meaning of the word is [taken to be] substance; when [on the other hand] the meaning of the word is [taken to be] the genus, the singular will denote more than one [thing]. Indeed (*eva*), this view is [possibly] true. But when in teaching or prohibiting a certain action the genus is intended, or in the context [of words] a word [denotative] of the genus, then, in the case of many [things], the plural would be used where it has no scope, because that [genus] is only one. When, [on the other hand,] one wishes to refer to a substance and the context [is fit] for it, then, in case things of similar form are expressed by

several words like in a sentence, e. g. *plakṣa-nyagrodha-dhava-khadira-palāśāḥ* (all names of tress), one tries to cover [all of them] by a single word, [in the present instance] by *vṛkṣa-vṛkṣa-vṛkṣa-* .... (This becomes *vṛkṣāḥ* 'trees' by P. 1. 2. 64 *sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau.*)

Another way [of looking at the two meanings of a word] will here be explained [by studying the Bahuvrīhi compound *śuklavāsas* 'white-clothed']. In "make him white-clothed", white-clothedness itself is being made, the substance is not being made. In "bring the white-clothed one"[7] it is the substance that is acted upon, but the connection [between the man and his white clothes] is not made. Here indeed, in "bring the white-clothed one", the white clothes, though only a secondary characteristic, become involved in the action; for [the man] engages in activity possessed of this secondary characteristic, because he has them. But when [we say] "He must be brought who is seen to be white-clothed", the two pieces of cloth are merely distinguishing attributes of him who wears them; they are not however involved in the action here.[8]

In this connection the view of Vājapyāyana is that in like manner (i. e., just as the word 'white-clothed' in the example "make him white-clothed" refers to 'white-clothedness') the word 'ox' refers to 'oxness', not to the substance. Furthermore, the opinion of Vyāḍi is that the substance too is denoted [like in the example "bring the white-clothed one"]; oxness etc. are secondarily implied. Here however it is told that the revered Pāṇini held that both are denoted by the word. And this connection[9] is communicated in the words *ubhayathā hy ācāryeṇa* (Mbh I p. 6 l. 8-9).

[Some further examples show that words can denote substance as well as form.] When it is said: "What is this here? This dog is a lion," then, in case valour is taken [as denoted by the word 'lion',] the dog is transformed through lion-ness. (Here 'lion' denotes the form [*ākṛti*].) In case one wishes to express the meaning of the root [underlying 'lion' (*siṃha*), i. e. *hiṃs* 'to harm',[10]] (and therefore wishes to denote an individual lion), this lion is transformed through dog-ness. The same in the case of *vrīhi* ('rice'). Since [this word can] denote both [genus (*jāti*) and substance] the plural [*vrīhayaḥ* 'grains of rice'] is justified when genus is treated as substance. And when substance is treated as genus the singular number is justified [in *vrīhiḥ* 'rice']. But [Pāṇini] recites the two rules (i. e. P. 1. 2. 58 *jātyākhyāyām ekasmin bahuvacanam anyatarasyām* and P. 1. 2. 64 *sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau*] in order that not the mention of one thing give rise to a plural form in case the process [just

described] has the reverse import. The words of instruction [in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*] may be interpreted similarly. Therefore it has been said that one [of the two, genus and substance,] is primary, the other secondary.[11]

[8]

[8. 1] "Is the word eternal or produced?" (*kiṃ punar nityaḥ śabda āhosvit kāryaḥ*; Mbh I p. 6. 1. 12). Here too there is a difference of opinion :

(1) [The word] is eternal according to the knowers of the Veda, non-eternal according to others.

(2) Or the idea is as follows. The words ' ox ' and so on are eternal. But [words] the characteristic sign of which is the form (*ākṛti*), this is only something to be produced. This is the agreed opinion adopted by the linguists (*vācika*).

(3) Some think this way : Only those words are eternal which are ' basic ' (*prākṛta*). ' Basic ' (*prākṛta*) is ' residing in the base (*prakṛti*) ' (by P. 4. 3. 53 *tatra bhavaḥ*).[1]

(4) Others think : This is the divine language.[2] But it [has become] confused because of the incompetence of people or their laziness. Just as when a boy who learns [the word] *svasti* pronounces it differently.[3]

(5) Or, just as a material object in this world exists in two ways because of the difference of substance and form (*ākṛti*), so also a word. [As a result the question arises :] Are these words forms of words or individual words ? Here the words ' tree ' and so on [in a sentence like] ' this is a tree ' have [their sounds] produced in sequence, not simultaneously, and are the causes of manifestation of the form belonging to the word ' tree ' (*vṛkṣaśabdatvākṛti*) which [form] is without sequence, just as the dewlap etc. [are the causes of manifestation] of [the form] ' ox-ness '; subsequently understanding of the meaning [arises] from the form belonging to the word ' tree '. And that [form] is eternal. And that form (*ākṛti*) is perceived by someone as a result of experience through the agency of several individual speech-sounds.[4]

(6) In the view of those [who hold] that, in a picture, by means of the lines alone one knows ' this is a man depicted, not an elephant ',[5] the word [itself] is eternal. In this connection it has been said : " With regard to both [*r* and *ṛ*] only the sphoṭa is indicated : the sound *l* for the sound *r* " (Mbh I p. 26 1. 1, on Śivasūtra 4 vt. 11).

(7) The word is also eternal for him who accepts [only the existence of] individual words. But that [eternal word] is to be manifested by sound. [And] the sound is confined to words. Just like the eyes and so on which manifest and are confined to shapes (*rūpa*) etc. that are to be manifested; they also conform to the increase and decrease of shapes; or [like] the raflections in mirrors and the like which are seen to be long, round, big and otherwise. In the same way are the words, too, differentiated by the difference of sound. Just as the one moon is perceived as many in water due to different waves,[6] and the shadow [of an object] differs on account of different lamps, and there is difference of reflection as a result of different mirrors. Therefore also individual words, to be manifested by sound confined [to them] and conforming to the increase and decrease of sound, are eternal.

Some [say] that sound supports the ear. Supported by that the ear becomes capable of perceiving the word.[7] Just like collyrium, [which helps] the eyes.[8] Others [think that sound helps] the word only, [not the ear]. Just like sprinkling water, which [helps] earth only [to manifest its smell, but] does not [help] the organ of smell.[9] Others again [think] that [sound helps] both [the ear and the word]. Just like the eye of someone who has his sense organs under control right from the beginning; it helps both the rays of light and the jar [to become visible].

The situation being as described, speech-sounds, word, and sentence are all eternal. But in Vedic sentences there is this difference : They are not used with [their proper] purpose in view while [the order] of their words is reversed. In secular speech, on the other hand, such use does occur, [as in] *āhara pātram* or *pātram āhara*; *tvaṃ pacasi* or *pacasi tvam*. [But in the Vedic sentence] *iṣe tvorje tvā*[10] is used [only] in this order, not as *tvā iṣe tvā ūrje*. The difference between secular and Vedic [language] is that there is a fixed use of Vedic [expressions, whereas] it is not fixed in the case of secular [expressions.]

Eternality, moreover, is of two kinds :[11] practical (*vyavahārāśrayā*) and ultimate (*paramārthāśrayā*). Ultimate [eternality resides in] atoms, ether etc. according to the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. [An example of] practical [eternality is :] " The decoction of dry ginger, Indian atees and nutgrass helps digestion of the chyme " (*Caraka Saṃhitā*, Cikitsāsthāna 15. 98. p. 520).[12] Here the assistance in digesting chyme provided by these [plants] is not brought about by the word of Caraka. What then ? [It is brought about] by their own nature. In a similar manner, in the present context too the words that are merely taught by Pāṇini or someone else convey meaning of their own accord; therefore only practical eternality is here helpful.

" [The question] whether [the word] is eternal or produced has been prominently examined in the *Saṃgraha* " (*saṃgraha etat prādhānyena parīkṣitaṃ nityo vā syāt kāryo veti*; Mbh I p. 6 l. 12-13). Fourteen thousand topics [are discussed] in this book [called] *Saṃgraha*.[13] The decision [reached] in the *Saṃgraha* is : " In both cases grammar must proceed " (*ubhayathāpi lakṣaṇaṃ pravartyam*; Mbh I p. 6 l. 14) because prosperity arises from [correct] usage supported by [the study of] grammar. *Kathaṃ punar idaṃ bhagavataḥ*...(Mbh I p. 6 l. 14-15) [means : did Pāṇini consider the word] produced or eternal ? Considering which view authoritative has this teacher proceeded ? [The view] of the knowers of the Veda or that of others ? This is what he asks. Or *kathaṃ punar idam*...[means :] Whether Pāṇini favoured eternality or non-eternality [of words,] how was this science [of grammar] begun ? a) Do we really understand [him to say] " I am the creator of words, meanings and their relation" [speaking] the way a Brahmin [does] through pride in respect of begetting offspring.[14] b) Or [one can take] this view. [Pāṇini said :] " Words, meanings and their relations are already established.[15] I shall transmit them because I am a knower of the ways of the world or because I am well-read."

[8. 2] "Since words, meanings and their connection are established" (*siddhe śabdārthasaṃbandhe;* Mbh I p. 6 l. 16). [The eternality of words (I), of meaning (II), and of the connection between these two (III) is now discussed.]

(I) The ultimate or practical eternality of the word resides in an eternal word, because its presence in a non-eternal word is [pure] imagination. Sound originating from the contact of speech-organs, each confined [to its own word], having speech-sounds as its range, manifests [the eternal word]; as a result a memory-impression is brought about concerning the form (*ākṛti*) [of the word] or concerning the individual [word]. This form or this individual [word] conveys the sense. But a memory-impression corresponding to the form [of a word is brought about] by means of an individual [word], just as the killing [of an animal at a sacrifice is brought about by killing a particular animal].[16] In this [context it may be observed] for him who holds that the word is eternal the charge of mutual dependence[17] is easily met. The restriction of [certain] words to particular countries is well-known. As for example '*hammati* among the Surāṣṭras' (Mbh I p. 9 1. 26). And [words] like 'Ḍittha' occur only with reference to a particular object, though taught in a general way. Because this is the way these [words] are used. Pāṇini merely taught them.

(II) According to those who [hold that] the form (*ākṛti*) is the meaning, that [form] is what is denoted; it is eternal. Also when substance

is [considered to be] the meaning of the word [there is eternality, viz.] practical eternality.

(III) Whenever [words] like 'jar' [are used], [objects] of such and such a configuration [are denoted]; and therefore 'connection' is understood to be 'fitness' (*yogyatā*), just as the eye is fit to perceive shapes and colours, not the ear.[18] Or the connection between word and meaning is of the kind 'effect and cause' because the meaning is caused by the word.[19] Since meaning is eternal, also such meanings as are not taught are included: the meaning 'repetition' (*vīpsā*) in *saptaparṇa*;[20] the meaning 'so many times' in *tridaśa* 'thirty';[21] the meaning 'sprinkled with' in *dadhyodana* 'curd-rice'.[22] And thus it has been said: " Of [these word,] which are naturally endowed with meanings, explanation [is given] by way of guidance (or condition). For example: [The path] is on the right hand side of the well. "[23] Also [in the Bhāṣya] on the rule *sarūp*[*āṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau*] (P. 1. 2. 64) it has been said [that] the connection [between word and meaning] is eternal : " Therefore it must be said that [the one remaining word in the case of *ekaśeṣa* stands for two or many objects....[Two or many objects] would be referred to, but would not be understood. Because he who calls a cow 'horse' will never be understood. " (Mbh I p. 240 l. 25–26 and p. 241 l. 5-6; on P. 1. 2. 64 vt. 29).

[8. 3] " Now what is the meaning of the word *siddha* ? " (*atha siddha-śabdasya kaḥ padārthaḥ;* Mbh. I p. 6 l. 17). Not the etymological meaning[24] is asked for; but the common (*lakuika*) meaning conveyed by the whole. [The word *siddha*] is a conventional term on account of its power of expression. " The word *siddha* is synonymous with 'eternal' " (*nityaparyāyavācī siddha-śabdaḥ;* Mbh I p. 6 l. 17-18), i. e., it expresses by way of a synonym the meaning 'eternal]. Because sometimes the word *nitya* expresses that meaning, sometimes the word *siddha*. When the own form is resorted to [we get] : The word *siddha* is expressive of a synonym of the word *nitya*, which is the own form of *nitya*, and the word *siddha* is a synonym of the word *nitya*;[25] and that is what the word *siddha* expresses. Just as the designation *ātman*, which belongs to something going everywhere,[26] applies to the soul because of its omnipresence, since the soul, even though without activity has pervasion as its universal (*sāmānya*); so the word *siddha* applies to things that are not to be accomplished (*asādhya*) (i. e., that are eternal), because [these things] have as their universal (*sāmānya*) that in which the completion (*pariniṣpatti*) of things that are being accomplished (*sādhyamāna*) resides.

" How is that known ? " (*kathaṃ jñāyate*; Mbh I p. 6 l. 18). The intention [behind this question is] : A synonym, irrespective of other word,

expresses that meaning. For example : " Indra, Śakra, Purandara.[27] [The names] ' Śakra ' and so on are not used with regard to other objects than Indra. But this word *siddha* expresses the sense ' non-eternal ' [28] when in close connection with other words. And it is seen [used] with reference to produced things such as jars.

" Because [the word *siddha*] is used with reference to things that are unchangeable (*kūṭastha*) and immovable (*avicālin*) " (*yat kūṭastheṣv avicāliṣu bhāveṣu vartate* ; Mbh I p. 6 l. 18). The word ' unchangeable ' (*kūṭastha*) : This word applies where [something] is not reduced. For example : " Make the heap unchangeable, nothing must be removed from it. " [The word] ' immovable ' (*avicālin*) expresses not coming into contact with another place and non-change. The idea is that something of which [even] a little bit is taken away or changed, is not eternal.

Also a synonymous word is seen [to occur] in apposition [with another word] where the relation [between the two is] general-special. The word *varāha* is used in [the sense] ' mountain ' as well as in [the sense] ' boar ', although it is better known in [the sense] ' boar '. Yet it occurs in apposition with a mountain in ' the mountain Himavat ' (*varāho himavān*), ' the mountain Pāriyātra ' (*varāhaḥ pāriyātraḥ*).[29] Just as the word *varāha*, though synonymous [with ' mountain '], is used in close connection with other words in order to convey its special [sense ' mountain '], so are words like *pṛthivī* (' earth ') taken [together with *siddha*] in order to convey the special [sense] ' eternal ' [of the latter]. This (*iti*) does not contradict synonymity. But when ' white ' becomes synonymous with ' white-cloth ', it is used [in that capacity]. (I. e., one cannot say ' white white-cloth ' (*śuklaṃ śuklavastram*).)

" The sky is eternal, the earth is eternal, the ether is eternal " (*siddhā dyauḥ siddhā pṛthivī siddham ākāśam iti*; Mbh I p. 6. l. 18-19). According to the Jainas and Mīmāṃsakas there is no destruction of these. Or if there be destruction of these, they last longer than the use of words by those who employ them; therefore they are called ' eternal '. Because they are not seen as arising and disappearing with different speakers.

" But, Sir, [the word *siddha*] is seen [used] with respect to produced things as well " (*nanu ca bhoḥ kāryeṣv api dṛśyate*; cp. Mbh p. 6 l. 19).

— We admit that [the word *siddha* is here] taken in order to express a special [meaning], even though there is a synonym [having that [meaning].

— [Do you admit that] the word *siddha* is connected with eternal [things] on account of the state of completion [of these things] ? If this

is [indeed] the case on account of the state of completion, no decision [can be reached] on the basis of the word *siddha*, because a state of completion exists in produced things too. [But] do you [really] think that, even when there is a state of completion right from the beginning, that is what is referred to ?

— What then ?

— The current meaning [is referred to]. For example : [The river] *gaṅgā* when referred to in its own form, having that (i. e. *gaṅgā*) as its name, produces [the suffix] aṆ (by P. 4. 1. 113), [which gives rise to] *gāṅga* ' son of Gaṅgā '. When it is being referred to as the goddess etc. [of that name, it produces the suffix] *ḍhaK*, [which gives rise to] *gāṅgeya* (by P. 4. 1. 121).[30] Similarly in the case of Vāsudeva. When it is expressed that he is a son, the son of Vasudeva, then it is the name of a Kṣatriya.[31] But in case ' Vāsudeva ' means ' in whom the gods dwell ' (*vasanty asmin devāḥ*),[32] then this is the name of God.[33] When ' Duryodhana ' [simply means] ' with difficulty he is made to fight ', then the name [of his son] is ' Dauryodhani ' (by P. 4. 1. 95 *ata iñ*), which does not apply to someone belonging to the Kuru family. [But if ' Duryodhana ' refers to] the member of the Kuru family, [the name of his son is] ' Dauryodhana ' (by P. 4. 1. 114 *ṛṣyandhakavṛṣṇikurubhyaś ca*).

Just as [the word *siddha*], following [the context], is currently used with respect to eternal [things], so too with respect to produced [things]. If in the case of a current term [its meaning] is dependent upon the factors which influence it (*nimitta*), the conclusion that " [*siddha*] is synonymous with ' eternal ' " (*nityaparyāyavācinaḥ* ; Mbh I p. 6. l. 22) is not in this general fashion [possible].

" Because in the *Saṃgraha* [the word *siddha* is used] as the opposite of ' produced ' " (*saṃgrahe kāryapratidvandvibhāvāt*; cp. Mbh I p. 6 l. 21–22). In this [context it must be said that] there are several factors that help to bring to mind the field of application of a general term, [viz.,] association and so on.[34] For example, the general [meaning] of the word ' stone ' is specified by [the words] associated with it. When it is said " bring the iron rod and the stone ", this is not understood [as referring to] a battle.[35] And because [the iron rod] is connected with the stone, [' stone ' must be understood] in the sense ' expedient for grinding.'[36] Similarly, [the word *rāma* in *rāmalakṣmaṇau* ' Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa ' refers to the son of Daśaratha,[37] in *rāmakeśavau* ' Rāma and Keśava ' to Baladeva. Some association also is by opposition, as in *rāmārjunau* ' Rāma and Arjuna '; [here] it is understood that [*rāma*] refers to the son of Jamadagni and

[*arjuna*] to the son of Kṛtavīrya.[38] In the same way [the following] has been put forward in the *Saṃgraha* : "Is the word produced or *siddha* ?" The word *siddha* has the sense of [the word] 'eternal', because it is used in the vicinity of the 'produced'.

That is not correct. What then ? [There is] 'produced' and *siddha* which is 'not produced'. Since being produced is excluded and being *siddha* is not excluded in the *Saṃgraha*, it is decided that [there *siddha* is] "a synonym of 'eternal'" (*nityaparyāyavācinaḥ*; Mbh I p. 6 l. 22).[39] "Here also that same [meaning is to be understood]" (*ihāpi tad eva*; Mbh I p. 6 l. 22). Why ? The *Saṃgraha* too is part of this same science. Because then [that book] belongs to the same discipline and because Vyāḍi is an authority the word *siddha* is accepted in the same way here too.

[8. 4] "Alternatively, there are also restrictions confined to single words" (*atha vā santy ekapadāny apy avadhāraṇāni*; Mbh I p. 6 l. 22–23). At present a statement is made which has no reference to the other (i. e., preceding) passage. In the following cases (*iha*), where the word *eva* is heard, there are some restrictions expressed in two words; *apa eva bhakṣayati vāyum eva bhakṣayati* ("he eats only water, he eats only air" ; Mbh I p. 6 l. 23–24).[40] Of a meaning which is expressed by a certain word, and which is being restricted, the restriction, if not [already] indicated, is indicated by the word *eva*. When, however, that meaning is made manifest on account of meaning-context '[41] and so on, the word *eva* is not heard; here the restriction is said to be 'confined to single words'. It is not [the case] here that someone who eats water is for this reason a 'water-eater' (*abbhakṣa*). The word 'water-eater' excludes [the eating of] other [things] by its power of denotation. [The phrase "bring the water-eater" therefore means :] "Bring the one who eats only water". And someone who has become a water-eater recently, [his food] has become restricted to water, to the exclusion of other things, because he partook of water formerly as well. And just as there is a [special] power of denotation in this [word 'water-eater', so also] in this word *siddha*. Which is that power of denotation ? The answer is [as follows]: After the use of the word *siddha* it is not understood in both its senses; [because] each particular thing is either eternal or non-eternal. Nor is anything else both eternal and non-eternal. In the present case, one accepts the word *siddha*, when occurring alone, which is accompained by steady *siddha*-ness; just as, when it is said "a daughter should be given to a comely man", one proceeds [to find] the most comely man, not just any comely man.[42] *Siddha*-ness belongs to fixed, steady things ; if unsteady, it belongs to produced things, and therefore [the word *siddha*] can apply

to produced things when in the company of other words. And, while applying there as well, it applies to the range of eternal [things] when relying on [another] part [of its meaning]. Therefore it is said : *siddha eva yo na sādhya iti* (cp. Mbh I p. 6 l. 24). And this fits the use of the word relying on the shape of completion,[43] not the one relying on its current sense. And such being the case, [the examples] ' water-eater ' and ' wind-eater ' are fit. But when [the word] ' wind-eater '[44] is the name of a [particular] vow and is thus used in current sense, it designates a genus as well (i. e., in addition to designating someone who eats water or wind) ; then there is absolutely no restriction, because the word is used in its current sense, which is [a particular kind of] activity.

[8. 5] " Or elision of a preceding or following member of the compound must be seen here " (*atha vā pūrvottarapadalopo'tra draṣṭavyaḥ;* cp. Mbh I p. 6 l. 24-25). But what way is there to elide a preceding or following member of a compound ? Certainly neither Pāṇini nor anyone else is capable of bringing about the elision of [a part of] the word ' Devadatta '[45] when it has not [even] been pronounced.

In this matter some think that upon hearing one member of a compound one remembers the whole ; from that [whole] the meaning is understood. This is not correct. Meaning is not conveyed from what is [merely] understood;[45] nor is there a memory-impression of what is [only] inferred. Moreover, the eternality [of words] has been proclaimed in grammar.

Therefore the correct view is as follows. The [members of a naming compound] are produced in consequence [of the latter] at the time of naming; because they follow immediately [upon the compound] they [can be said to] originate with [it]; like the scum [of curdled milk]. The example is : when someone takes milk in order [to make] curds, also scum comes into existence simultaneously with the curds since it is produced by the same means.[47] In the same way are the words ' Satya ' and ' Bhāmā ' produced along with the word ' Satyabhāmā '. And the correctness of such words, which are produced in consequence [of other words] , Pāṇini expresses by means of [the device of] elision.

But not is *jye* uttered [in the place] of *jyeṣṭhā* and the like, nor *khā* [in the place of] *viśākhā*.[48] In a similar fashion the word *siddha* which is produced in consequence of the word *atyantasiddha* (' completely *siddha* ') is here specified, as follows again from the meaning-context (*arthaprakaraṇa*) (in which the word is used). But there is difference of opinion when it is not possible [to consider the word an abbreviation of another one] . Some-

thing given (*datta*) calls attention to someone who gives, or there is such a thing as must be done by Devadatta; as a result Devadatta ('given by god') is understood by the word 'Datta'. Here (i. e., in the case of *siddha*) also the same [applies]. How ? The answer is as follows. Here too, if we take recourse to the shape 'completion' of the state of being completed,[49] that which has been completed is explained [by the word *siddha*]; and in this way the definition [of the term *siddha*] does not refer to several things. Therefore all these - viz., what has been completed, what is being completed, and what will be completed - are *siddha*. And so the state of being completed, the state of going to be completed, and the state of having been completed are present in ether. This [term *siddha*] is said to be produced in consequence of [the term] *atyantasiddha* 'completely *siddha*' because it has the power to express [the sense] "these are completely *siddha*".

[8. 6] "Or the precise [meaning of an ambiguous term] is ascertained from interpretation" (*atha vā vyākhyānato viśeṣapratipattiḥ*; Mbh I p. 6 l. 26).[50] This conveys that it is not the case that [a rule] does not indicate [something definite] because there is doubt [regarding its precise interpretation]. For it is not the case that a face etc., or hands etc., do not characterize a post or a man when there is doubt regarding the object. Therefore, just as it is ascertained from interpretation that [the word *vṛddhi* in] *vṛddhir ād aic* (P. 1. 1. 1) and the like carry over [into subsequent rules;[51] so, in the present context, one understands the word *siddha* to be synonymous with 'eternal' (*nitya*), because [Patañjali] says so.

[8. 7] "For the sake of what is auspicious" (*maṅgalārtham*; Mbh I p. 6 l. 28) The attainment of an object which is desired, without being censured, is [called] 'auspicious' (*maṅgala*), because it is for the sake of that. Here 'for the sake of what is auspicious' [means] 'for the sake of attaining the intended object'.

[The word] *māṅgalika* (Mbh I p. 6 l. 28) [means:] '[who] effects what is auspicious'.[52] He effects [that] because he is a participant in the attainment of the intended object, just as an *aindramahika* [effects the *indramaha* festival].[53]

"Of the great stream which is the science [of grammar]" (*mahataḥ śāstraughasya* ; Mbh I p. 7 l. 1); hereby it is stated that it is hard to cross.

"They spread" *prathante*; Mbh I p. 7 l. 1). Spreading is 'not being defeated'. Someone else says [that it means] 'no discontinuation and so on of study'.

" Such that the men [who study those sciences become] valiant and long-lived " (*vīrapuruṣāṇy āyuṣmatpuruṣāṇi ca*; cp. Mbh I p. 7 l. 2). " And the students [may] reach their aim " (*adhyetāraś ca siddhārthāḥ*; Mbh I p. 7 l. 2). There [may] be success for them, completion of [the study of] the science [of grammar] because there is no obstacle, or prosperity as a result of that. He states that the same situation as in the case of the word *siddha* [would have come about] even if the word *nitya* had been used, in the words " in the sense repetition... " (*ābhīkṣṇye*... ; Mbh I p. 7 l. 4).

[Objection :] Perhaps [the meaning] ' repetition ' is suitable [only] because a word expressive of action is used [along with the word *nitya*].

[Reply ;] Even so, when it is said *nitye śabdārthasambandhe*, this is understood to be an explanation of words that are [54] frequently used [by all] down to the cowherds etc., not of other [words]. Moreover, in [P. 6. l. 147] *āścaryam anitye* what does not occur frequently is called *anitya*; consequently [the word *nitya* can] express repetition without [being accompanied by] a word expressive of action.

[9]

[9. 1] " What is taken [to be] the meaning of a word that [the vārttika] is analyzed as ' Since word, meaning, and the connection [between these two] are eternal ' ? " (*kaṃ punaḥ padārthaṃ matvaiṣa vigrahaḥ kriyate siddhe śabde arthe sambandhe ceti* ; Mbh I p. 7 l. 8). The question concerns the meaning to be expressed in a word. It means : What is taken [to be] the thing denoted belonging to a word that [the vārttika] is analyzed in this way ? " The form (*ākṛti*), he says " (*ākṛtim ity āha*; Mbh I p. 7 l. 8-9). For among genus-words (*jātiśabda*), quality-words (*guṇaśabda*), action-words (*kriyāśabda*) and chance-words (*yadṛcchāśabda*) alike,[1] a word grasps its own form only in the genus (*jāti*), not taking into consideration its connection with other objects. But substance etc. are denoted by identifying [substance etc. with the genus], as when the word *go* ('ox') [denotes] a Vāhīka.[2] And a name (*saṃjñāśabda*) [denotes only] a substance.[3] In this [connection it can further be stated that] a substance which is related to an action is denoted by means of another form (viz., action), [as in] *gām ānaya* ' bring the ox '.[4] similarly in ' white ox ' ox-ness is secondarily distinguished by white-ness through [the relation] inherence in in what inheres (*samavetasamavāya*) in the same object. In ' one Brahmin ' Brahmin-ness is [secondarily distinguished] by one-ness [through the same relation]. In this way all words express the form (*ākṛti*). And the two appearances, viz. being identical with that [form] and being different from

it, cannot simultaneously be effected in one [and the same] object. [It is] for example [not possible to say :] " Yajñadatta is different from Yajñadatta. " But in case one has seen [someone as] a child in Madhurā, weak and brown, and later noticed him again in Pāṭaliputra, dark and big, identity is decided upon on the basis of recognition, as follows : " The same object which is connected with the qualities darkness etc. was seen by me connected with childhood etc. " And recognition does not take place with regard to something not seen. Certainly a thing is seen first, on the basis of which it is then recognized.

Those who hold that all things have a separate genus do not disagree with regard to the eternality [of those genera]. Therefore it is stated : " Because the form is eternal " (*ākṛtir hi nityā*; Mbh I p. 7 l. 9). But that [form] is manifested by non-eternal things such as substance etc. Consequently substance etc. have only to this extent something to do [with the form].

[9. 2] " But if the meaning of the word is substance [the vārttika] must be analyzed [as follows] " (*atha dravye padārthe vigrahaḥ kartavyaḥ*; cp. Mbh. I p. 7 l. 9–10).[5] Only substance is denoted [on this alternative]. Cow-ness etc., on the other hand, not being denoted and being accidental qualifiers of the word, are the cause of using [that word]. Just as swastikas and so on which, though not designating the house of Devadatta, mark the house. And because substance is seen to be subject to destruction, [the vārttika] must, on this alternative (*atha vā*), be analyzed as follows : " Since word and meaning-connection are eternal " (*siddhe śabde arthasambandhe ca*; Mbh I p. 7 l. 10). ' Meaning-connection ' means ' connection with meaning '. Since that [connection] is eternal [unlike the object, the word] ' object ' is not used for its own sake in the sentence, but rather as marking the connection ; just as [the word] *num* is used to mark an anusvāra.[6] Because if only " Since word and connection are eternal " is stated (i. e., without the word ' meaning- '), also the following might be understood : " Since the connection of the word with its own form (*ākṛti*) is eternal ". Since however [the word] ' meaning ' has been used, we understand that what is denoted [by the word is meant].

But if the object denoted is not eternal, how would the connection [with that object] be eternal ? The answer is : like inherence (*samavāya*). Just as inherence is eternal whether it pertains to eternal things, eternal and non-eternal things, or to non-eternal things, this [connection] too may be like that.

Or, with regard to the [mutual] fitness (of word and meaning) — which is the occupation, all the time, of [say,] the word ' pitcher ' with the

[corresponding] object, and whose range is such that the word is completely pervaded by the meaning, all the time — he says, in accordance with the properties of words: "Because the connection with objects of [words] which denote objects is eternal" (*nityo hy arthavatām arthair abhisambandhaḥ*; Mbh I p. 7 l. 10). And this is the view he'll propound in the end, in the words: "Or what difference does it make to us that this is eternal, that non-eternal?" (*atha vā kiṃ na etena idaṃ nityam idam anityam iti*; Mbh I p. 7 l. 23-24).

"Even when the word refers to the substance is this analysis correct —Because substance is eternal" (*dravya eva padārtha eṣa vigraho nyāyyaḥ ... dravyaṃ hi nityam*; Mbh I p. 7 l. 11-12). The element earth is eternal. What is the essence in the element earth? The differentiated idea. What is the essence in the differentiated idea? Consciousness. What is the essence in consciousness? *Om*. And that is Brahman.[7] This is [still] said. After this the use of words and meaning ceases, because this object is beyond [the reach of] language. Here all indications such as "it is non-eternal" or "it is eternal" refer to [particular] aspect (*avasthā*), and those [aspects] are not different from that. Just as a dream or [any] other [form of] consciousness, be it of the three worlds or of a [single] house, is shapeless and not divided by different mountains and so on, [even] when in regions where there are mountains, so [too] that [unspeakable] object. That [object, called] *puruṣa* etc. and transcending all use of words, is conceived of as eternal. And when that is eternal, the analysis [proposed above] works out.

[9. 3] "Also if the form (*ākṛti*) is denoted by the word is this analysis [of the vārttika] correct" (*ākṛtāv api padārthe eṣa vigraho nyāyyaḥ*; Mbh I p. 7 l. 18). The word 'also' (*api*) is meant to show that such [an analysis] is suitable also if substance [is denoted by the word]. "It is not the case that when [the form (*ākṛti*)] has disappeared at one place it has disappeared everywhere" (*na kvacid uparateti kṛtvātaḥ sarvatroparatā bhavati*; cp. Mbh I p. 7 l. 20)[8] It is not correct to say that another form arises because one form becomes invisible while another one becomes visible. According to the dominant view a genus does not come into existence and disappear from existence; it rather becomes visible and invisible.

Ignoring the two [positions explained above] the final position of the revered Pāṇini, the composer of this traditional science (*smṛti*), is that both form and substance are denoted by the word.[9] But even though both [form and substance] are denoted by the word, this is not inconsistent with the eternality [of the form] and therefore it is not possible to conceive

of coming into existencc and disappearing from existence [with respect to form]. In the same way does the unknowable, which resides inside the fundamental substrative cause[10] (*pradhāna*), not fall away from existence.

"It is perceived in another substance" (*dravyāntarasthopalabhyate*; cp. Mbh I p. 7 l. 20).[11] [This means:] it is manifested in another substance. Because there is a contradiction when both identity and difference appear unimpaired in one substrate, they consider the form (*ākṛti*) to be one and not liable to destruction. Moreover, this view (according to which the form is eternal) is like the one expounded [above] (according to which the substance is eternal). What is here called 'form' is called 'substance' by you; because they do not differ [from each other].

This is not the case. If substance is eternal, form too is eternal (but not vice versa).

Or there is also this view. Everything, though one, has various shapes. The reason is that among the multitude of powers (*śakti*), a particular power becomes invisible at one time and visible [again] at another time. This way words apply.

[9.4] "Or the definition of 'eternal' is not only 'fixed, immovable, unchanging ...'" (*atha vā nedam eva nityalakṣaṇaṃ dhruvaṃ kūṭastham avicāli ...*; Mbh I p. 7 l. 21). By means of this passage he says that non-eternality is of three kinds.[12] For non-eternality is of [the following] three kinds: (i) non-eternality by contact; (ii) non-eternality by change; (iii) non-eternality by the destruction of the object. Eternality [is established] as the opposite of this.

(i) An example of non-eternality by contact is as follows. The own colour of a crystal which is hidden by certain other substances that are its support and are in contact with it, is not perceived by itself although it is there.

(ii) And an example of non-eternality by change [is provided] by the appearance of red colour in the jujube while the black colour disappears.

(iii) Non-eternality by the destruction of the object is the total annihilation of all in the indescribable state.

When these characteristics are not present, the above must be understood not [to apply]. That is then called 'eternal'. [This definition of eternal' fits the facts,] because when this is accepted, the soul in Sāṃkhya [philosophy] will be eternal by virtue of the fact that it does not change.

But the fundamental substrative cause (*pradhāna*) is subject to change, and would therefore be non-eternal. Therefore this too [must be accepted as] a definition of 'eternal': "In which the identity is not destroyed, that is eternal" (*yasmiṃs tattvaṃ na vihanyate tan nityam*; cp. Mbh I p. 7 l. 22).[13] ['Identity' (*tattva*) is] the property of being the cause of the same mental impression, in the form 'this is the same as that'. [That is to say:] "This is that same essence (*ātman*)". And the essence, such as jar-ness (*ghaṭatva*) etc., is not destroyed [along] with the object.

Or 'that' [in] "that is the same" is expressed by the following situation. "Or what is the point for us in this?" (*atha vā kiṃ na etena*; Mbh I p. 7 l. 23). [We do not have to determine what is eternal and what not,] for this science [of grammar] is common to all and does not side with anyone. Just as according to the Sāṃkhyas etc. the understanding derived from substance is that a jar is a collection of colours and so on,[14] or something else;[15] one uses the word 'jar' with regard to what one considers to be a jar. In the same way, whatever way someone thinks eternality to be, depending on that [kind of] eternality of the object [the compound] is analyzed as described. According to those who adhere to the doctrine that [all is] momentary (i. e. the Buddhists) eternality is uninterrupted continuation. Others speak of eternality keeping in view the state of the fundamental substrative cause (*pradhāna*).

Alternatively, [the Bhāṣya] here conveys the following. What is the point for us in this that one thing is eternal, another non-eternal?" (*kiṁ na etenedaṃ nityam idam anityam iti*; Mbh I p. 7 l. 23-24). [This means:] What is the point for us to think about objects? "This analysis is made considering that to be the object denoted by a word which is in our opinion eternal" (*yad asmākaṃ nityaṃ taṃ padārthaṃ matvaiṣa vigrahaḥ kriyate*; cp. Mbh I p. 7 l. 24).[16] And for us the object (thus determined) is denoted by the word.

Whether or not the object is eternal, the word and what it denotes are never non-eternal; therefore a word does never not apply to the [corresponding] meaning. Because they are always entered by their own form, the word 'jar' and the word 'hare's horn' are all of them all the time connected with, entered into by [their corresponding] meanings. Such being the meaning of the word, the following analysis is proper: "Since word, meaning and their relation are eternal" (*siddhe śabde arthe sambandhe ca*).

[10]

[10. 1] [A new section] is commenced [with the words] "But how ... ?" (*kathaṃ punaḥ* ...; Mbh I p. 7 l. 26). He asks what proof

there is [that word, meaning and their relation are eternal. The answer is :] " From the world " (*lokataḥ*; Mbh I p. 7 l. 26). For it is well-known from the world what is eternal and what not. The treatment accorded in the world to words is not the same as that accorded to produced things. Those things in the world for which [a special] training is necessary cannot be produced without that training. For example : Someone who is in need of a jar and has not received training to make one [himself], goes to a potter who is skilled in making one [saying :] " Make a jar [so that] I shall make use of it " (*kuru ghaṭaṃ kāryam anena kariṣyāmi* ; Mbh I p. 7 l. 28–29). If words such as ' ox ' etc. were produced by Pāṇini and other [grammarians] in the meanings [needed] for our transactions — like in a game of chess —, a man who has received no training [in grammar] might go to grammarians, skilled in [knowing what words] are to be used. But he doesn't go there.

" He uses words referring to just as many objects [as he thinks of] " (*tāvaty evārtham artham upādāya śabdān prayuṅkte* ; Mbh I p. 8 l. 1).[1] He uses [words] having examined the meaning in his mind.[2] Therefore it must be concluded that words, and the relations [between these two] are eternal.

Others explain : [Words, meanings and their relations] are produced like in the game of moon and sun.[3] Just as one [can] ask for words, one [can] ask for meanings, [as follows :] " Which is the meaning of this word ? " In the same way one also makes the relation [between word and meaning]. Because, having established word and meaning, one does not bring both of them together. Therefore it must be concluded that words, meanings and their relations are eternal; because they are perceived by the mind at one and the same time.

Others explain that by this Bhāṣya the same is expressed as by ' [the word is eternal] since its pronunciation is for the sake of something else, because it is uttered by a seer '.[4] Since moreover only produced [sounds] are used [in actual speech] there is another view with regard to the production [of those sounds]. But the pronunciation[5] as well as the perception and production of the [word] is only for the sake of something else. Because there is never a time when it is not for something else. Therefore it must be understood that the [word] is eternal and is [merely] manifested by the contact of the organs of speech etc. of the speaker. In this interpreation the two (eternal word and manifestation) are not connected.[6]

" If then the world is authoritative in the case of words " (*yadi tarhi lokaḥ śabdeṣu pramāṇam* ; Mbh I p. 8 l. 1–2).[7] *Lokato'rthaprayukte śabda-*

prayoge śāstreṇa dharmaniyamaḥ (second part of vt. 1, Mbh I p. 8 l. 3). *Lokataḥ* [means] ' from the people '. *Arthaprayukta* [means] ' impelled by meaning '. The people from whom one learns [the use of words] are sometimes wrong. They teach both correct and incorrect words. And it is the meaning which impels in [the process of] conveying itself. Just as it impels the [correct] word *go* (' ox '), so also [the incorrect words] *gāvī* etc. Therefore the practice of grammar is for this purpose: how can incorrect [words] be checked ?

And why has the word *prayoga* (' use ') been used in *śabdaprayoga* (' use of words ') ? Only this much should be stated : *lokato'rthaprayukte śabde* (' when words are impelled by meaning [as learned] from the people').

The answer is : Understanding [consists in] conveying the meaning. Here the meaning is [the grammatical object] to be conveyed, conveying [itself] is the result, the word is the means. An activity must be assumed because if there were no entity which is the activity, there would be no connection between the word and its meaning which are object (*karman*) and means (*karaṇa*) [with respect to the activity]. Just as there is connection with what is separated in [the act of] thrashing rice grains by means of raising up and bringing down the pestle;[8] because of that the result comes about, which is freeing the grain and removing the chaff. In the same way is here the word, which is a substance, the instrument; the meaning, which is the grammatical object, is conveyed ; its understanding is the result : the result of an activity. And which is that activity ? The answer is : the attention of the speaker while producing words, directed towards those [words]. This attention is a fluctuation of the mind of the form 'this [word] is fit to convey that meaning '. That is the activity. Because it has been said : " The Self perceives the meanings through the intellect and joins the mind with the desire to speak. "[9] Just as an inattentive eye which is not superintended is not capable of perceiving the object with the mind even though eye and colour are present, so is a word, though firmly connected with its meaning, incapable of conveying [that meaning] without the attention of the speaker.[10] This is expressed by the use of [the word] *prayoga*.

The view of others is : The word has several aspects. For example, [the root] " *iṆ* in the sense ' going ' " (*iṇ gatau*, Dhp II. 36) is understood to be a root on the basis of the fact that it has a meaning, when by way of agreement and difference it is learnt that it has [indeed] a meaning. But when this same [root *i*] is treated as a mere sound, as in [P. 6. 1. 1] *ekāco dve* [*prathamasya*] (" In the place of the first [part] that contains

one vowel, there are two ") where the meaning is left out of consideration, then, though there is a difference [between the sound and the meaningful root][11] because it is the one vowel of that meaningful [root], [the sound] is brought into connection [with that root] because it belongs to it. The case of the words in the Brāhmaṇas is similar. At the time of committing them to memory they are meaningless; while one teaches them to others with the words 'recite this way, recite this way', they refer to their own form; at the time of their application they are meaningful. Here the approach of [the word,] which has meaning, towards the meanings, grasped at the time of application [of the word], is the connection [between word and meaning]. And what is designated as the dependence [of the word], that is the essential characteristic of the word. The essence of the word is eternal. That [essence] is also expressed by the word *prayoga*, as follows: such a word (i. e., possessed of this essential characteristic) is impelled by meaning, not all [words].

Others explain: *prayoga* [is so called] because [something] is used. *Śabdaprayoga* [is a karmadhāraya compound, meaning] 'what is word and used'. There is no restriction for the sake of dharma in the case of words in general, but in the case of words meant to be used.[12]

Others explain: Some words are used, others are not used. The [words intended] in *guhā trīṇi nihitā neṅgayanti ... na ceṣṭante* (Mbh I p. 3 l. 27–28) are not used. The fourth part [referred to] in *turīyaṃ vāco manuṣyā vadanti* (Mbh I p. 3 l. 28–29) is used [among human beings]. There is restriction of [words] that are used. Therefore the knowledge of those three [parts which are not used] derives from the characteristic *par excellence* [of words] (i. e. from the part which is used).

Dharmāya niyamo dharmaniyamaḥ (Mbh I p. 8 l. 5). *Dharmaniyama* is a current expression. In analysis it is shown with a dative case - ending (added to *dharma*, as follows: *dharmāya niyamaḥ*), because the sense 'for the sake of that' is invariably in it. For this is a compound formed with a genitive like the current expression *aśvaghāsa* ('horse-grass'); reeds etc. belong to these [types of grass]. Because the sense 'for the sake of that' is invariably in it. It is analyzed with a dative ending as *aśvebhyo ghāsaḥ*; but it is a genitive compound, for it has been said: "*Aśvaghāsa* etc. are genitive compounds."[13]

In *dharmārtho vā niyamo dharmaniyamaḥ* (Mbh I p. 8 l. 5) the last word [of *dharmārtha*] (i. e. *artha*) is elided because [*dharmaniyama*] belongs to [the gaṇa] '*śākapārthiva* etc.'.[14] Since it is for the sake of

dharma this restriction [is imposed]. By the word 'dharma' is indicated that [the restriction] is the proximate cause with respect to dharma.

" Bringing about[15] dharma ... " (*dharmaprayojano vā*; Mbh I p. 8 l. 5–6) [expresses] the view of the Mīmāṃsakas. [According to them] dharma is eternal. It is however manifested by [such sacrifices as] the Agnihotra etc. Instigated by these [dharma] produces result. Just as a lord is brought closer to his desired end by servants when they are in his service; in the same way is this restriction the instigator of dharma towards the accomplishment of the desired end.

[10. 2] *Yathā laukikavaidikeṣu* (Mbh I p. 8 l. 7; last part of vt. 1). " Southerners are fond of secondary affixes " (*priyataddhitā dākṣiṇātyāḥ*; Mbh I p. 8 l, 8). Is it to be understood that, out of fondness of secondary affixes, [the words *laukika* and *vaidika*] have been wrongly used here ? No, he says. For the parts which are in the world or in the Veda can be covered by the words denoting the wholes without secondary affix, as follows : ' in the world ' or ' in the Veda '.[16] But this ācārya (i. e., Patañjali), separating the things that are not parts (i. e., the wholes ' world ' and ' Veda ') points out that the world and the Veda are locations. What else than fondness of secondary affixes [could have induced the author of the vārttika to say *laukikavaidikeṣu*] ? The situation is exemplified when one person says *vanaspatayaḥ* ' trees ', indicating the difference [which exists between the several trees], while someone else [says] *vānaspatya* ' collection of trees ' [referring to the trees] in their aspect of forming a collection.[17]

" Or the meaning of the secondary affix is appropriate here " (*atha vā yukta evātra taddhitārthaḥ* ; Mbh I p. 8 l. 9). Here there is no relation of part and whole. What then ? In the vārttika[18] by [the words] ' world ' and ' Veda ' something is meant that consists of many parts.

But what is here the *kṛtānta*, i. e., the correct opinion ? The collection of authoritative statements. The following is [meant to be] said : Why is this [collection of authoritative statements] taken as having as its object restriction for the sake of dharma just as other collections of authoritative statements have as their object restriction for the sake of dharma ?

" In the world [it is said that] a domestic cock should not be eaten " (*loke tāvad abhakṣyo grāmyakukkuṭaḥ*; Mbh I p. 8 l. 10). This is not an example based on similarity, but the opposite. Because on this opposite alternative there is restriction of dharma specifying what should not be eaten. From the general [statement] we understand that eating takes place because there is desire [for food]; this (i. e. a domestic cock etc.) [however should]

not [be eaten] because of this prescription. Here a restriction is made of the form ' hunger must be allayed by this, not by something else '.

In this connection some hold the view that if the reading is ' a domestic cock should not be eaten ', dharma results from not taking [a domestic cock]. Others think that just as poison is not eaten because certain death results from eating poison, so dharma results from abstaining from something because it is an offence.

Similarly, every meaning impels both correct and incorrect words to bring about understanding of that meaning. Here the restriction is made that [meaning] must be conveyed by means of correct words, not by means of something else.

[Objection :] Since nothing but *kṣudh* participates in the action, the *kṛtya* [affix] has arisen expressive of *kṣudh* as object. [On this account the reading] must be *śakyā cānena*...[19]

[Reply :] Nothing wrong here. The beginning [of the sentence] is general, [but it comes to] express something special. Here the *kṛtya* [affix] has been applied after [the root] *śak* when the meaning ' object ' [still] attaches to something general. That [*kṛtya* affix], once it has obtained a gender, is characterized by the peculiarity of not abandoning its gender.[20] Here the sense ' object ', [which resides] in something special, is expressed by the *kṛtya* [affix], and therefore [*śakyam* has] a nominative case-ending. Another example [where a neuter and a feminine word are in apposition, is the Bhāṣya passage where] it has been said : *mukhanāsikā vacanam asya*.[21] It is not said *mukhanāsikā vacanī yasya*.

Tathā khedāt (Mbh I p. 8 l. 12). *Kheda* is the incapacity to restrain the senses when they go out to their objects. Or passion is called *kheda*, because it disturbs (*khedayati*). Indeed, out of passion " one approaches women " (*strīṣu pravṛttiḥ* ; Mbh I p. 8 l. 12). Or *kheda* is ' affliction '.

Having thus far cited the tradition (*smṛti*), he shows that this is also written in the Veda : " Also in the Veda [it is said that] a Brahmin keeps a vow of milk ... " (*vede khalv api payovrato brāhmaṇaḥ* ... ; Mbh I p. 8 l. 14).[22] Is keeping a vow of milk for the sake of the sacrifice ? No, he says. If it were for the sake of the sacrifice then, just as other things such as cutting and eating [the sacrificial cake] must necessarily be performed, so would this too. But someone consecrated for the sacrifice does not of necessity keep a vow of milk ; only if he has the desire to do so. Just like [the Vedic sentence] " he scratches with a black horn "[23] (TS 6. 1. 3. 8) ; only the natural scratching which takes place when itching has arisen is done

with a black horn.[24] And if [a vow on food] is agreed to for the sake of the sacrifice, the natural food which is forbidden [for the duration of the sacrifice] he partakes of at another time, if he wishes to. Just as in "the ghee is beheld" (KS 31. 9) ; beholding [ghee] is for the sake of the sacrifice ; beholding other things is therefore not prohibited.

"The sacrificial post must be made of Bilva or Khadira wood" (*bailvaḥ khādiro yūpaḥ syāt* ; Mbh I p. 8 l. 16).[25] A sacrificial post is used to make the sacrificial animal lose its independence.[26] For loss of independence is the visible result that is produced if the sacrificial animal it tied to an octagonal piece of wood with a wooden ring placed on top, as taught.[27]

"Like potsherds in fire ..." (*yathāgnau kapālāni*...; Mbh I p. 8 l. 18).[28] Here too the cooking of the sacrificial cakes is the visible result. But we do not perceive any difference in the cooking on account of this mantra.[29] And therefore there is here also an invisible result. This is what he conveys by this.

Even though the position taken here is that also incorrect words, like correct ones, convey meaning,[30] and that therefore also the visible result, understanding of meaning, is equal ; there is here, as opposed to that (*tu*), an invisible result, viz. that there is prosperity. Therefore he says : "So here too, though the conveying of meaning is the same.." (*evam ihāpi samānāyām arthāvagatau śabdena ca* ...; Mbh I p. 8 l. 20-21). And when he says "it brings about prosperity" (*abhyudayakāri ca bhavati* ; Mbh I p. 8 l. 22), it is accepted by him that by abstaining from what is not enjoined adharma disappears. Others think that by abstaining from that adharma does merely not come about. The prosperity is merely this that here one is not connected with sin.

[11]

[11. 1.] "There are [words] which are not used" (*asty aprayuktaḥ*; Mbh I p. 8 l. 23). It is agreed that [grammar is] the explanation of [words] that are used. But these [words] *ūṣa* etc. are not used in the world ; have they been written in books for the sake of grammar or have they not ? In which book is such conduct possible ?[1]

By way of this objection he wishes to convey that this fact that [certain] words are not used is not established because just anyone says so ; but because learned, cultured people, quiet in their use of words and independent, unanimously say so.

"This is contradictory" (*idaṃ vipratiṣiddham* ; Mbh I p. 8 l. 25). This statement (viz., that things exist without being used) can appropriately be made with regard to things which are known [to exist] without their characteristic activity. For example, a jar is known [to exist] without its characteristic activity, which consists in containing water etc. But a word is never known [to exist] without its characteristic activity. For it attains existential status by no other means than by being used. This is therefore similar to someone saying: "[The word exists] because it is not used." (Both are equally absurd.)

"While using [the words] you [say 'they are not used']" (*prayuñjāna eva khalv api bhavān* ... ; Mbh I p. 8 l. 27). While the activity of his instruments of articulation has not [yet] come to a standstill, he says '[the word] is not used'. He talks about the use [of a word] made just before that. [One could say:] 'This [word] has been used right now.' Just as if someone were to say "I keep silence as long as I live, therefore I don't talk," in the same way you speak.

If the non-use [of a certain word] is agreed upon by you, this would be thought because you use [that word while saying] 'it is not used'. But if you think "I use [these words] but others don't, and therefore they do not exist, because they are not used by others," this too is not correct. For these words may not be uttered by others, but it is not the case that they do not exist for only this reason. After all, many words are not uttered by women.

But if you think "What difference does it make that I utter [these words]? I am not an authoritative speaker", and say this [only] in order to start [the discussion]; [then the reply must be;] "Don't treat yourself with contempt; you are an authoritative person." "Which other [person] like you" (*kaś cedānīm anyo bhavajjātīyakaḥ* ; Mbh I p. 8 l. 27–28) means "which other [man], more learned than you".

"This is not contradictory" (*naitad vipratiṣiddham* ; Mbh I p. 8 l. 28–p. 9 l. 1). What he says is this: Existence occurs in two ways: perceived and inferred. Perceived [existence belongs to such forms as] *dādharti* and *dardharti*.[2] Inferred [existence] must be obtained through the teaching of base and affix ; because the bases and affixes of *ūṣa* and so on have been taught. But *ślu*-elision of *śap* after [the root] *dhṛñ*[3] has not been mentioned [in Pāṇini's grammar] because [the forms to be derived this way, i. e., *dādharti*, *dardharti* etc.,] have a limited field of application. And because they are written in books, the conclusion is reached that they exist. But they are not used in the world, and therefore we say that they are not uesd.

And how can I say that they are not used while pronouncing them ? The answer is : " We do not say that they are not used by us " (*na brūmo 'smābhir aprayuktā iti* ; Mbh I p 9 l. 3). " I am in the world but I am not the world " (*abhyantaro'haṃ loke na tv ahaṃ lokaḥ* ; Mbh I p. 9 l. 4-5). Hereby the following is said : " I do not use these words *ūṣa* etc. the way the world uses them. "

[11. 2] " No, because a word is used with respect to something " (*nārthe śabdaprayogāt* ; Mbh I p. 9 l. 6, vt. 2). ' Things ' are time, souls etc. Since the word is secondary with regard to things, the word must be closely connected with the main thing (i. e., the object which it denotes). Or the perception of things is the means which enables us to infer the existence of words. Because there is nothing which has no word [to denot it]. Just as the words ' heaven ' (*svarga*), *apūrva*, ' god ' (*devatā*), when heard, are the means which enable us to infer the existence of things which are not at all seen by us, is not in the same way, a perceived object understood to be the means which enables us to infer the existence of the [corresponding] word ?

[11. 3] " [These words] are not used because other [words] are used [in their senses] " (*aprayogaḥ prayogānyatvāt*; Mbh I p. 9l. 9 vt. 3). With respect to the reason here indicated for the existence of words ; viz. ' because there would be a meaning without [corresponding] word ', we say : If there were no [other words] expressive of these meanings, we would agree that these [words] (i. e.. *ūṣa* etc.) exist. But because [such other words] do exist, this is not an acceptable reason.

[Reply :] Nothing wrong here. The sentence must be used in such a way that all meaning becomes manifest.[4]

[11. 4] " With respect to unused [words it is] as with the long-continued Soma sacrifices " (*aprayukte dīrghasattravat* ; Mbh I p. 9 l. 14, vt. 4). He explains that [those words] existed in the beginning.[5] Just as long Soma sacrifices were used formerly, and even though they are not used now, the aim of sacrificial activity is attained since curds, honey etc. constitute dharma ; so the laying down of rules for [words] which have been used by others all the time is proper, even though [these words] are not used now.[6] But for those who [hold] that curds, honey etc. constitute dharma, this is not possible in grammar, for here there is no dharma as a result of uttering [mere] sound.

[11. 5] " All [words are used] somewhere or other " (*sarve deśāntare* ; Mbh I p. 9 l. 18. vt. 5). Even nowadays sacrificers who live long say *ari* [instead of] *hari*. In the same way we say that all these [words] are used somewhere or other.

Vākovākya (Mbh I p. 9 l. 22). This is a passage in the form of statement and counterstatement, such as *kiṃsvid āvapanaṃ mahad* (TS 7. 4. 18. 1 etc.).

Itihāsa (Mbh I p. 9 l. 22) is the relating of things which took place in the past.

From among these [regions and literary work] certain words are used in some [of them]. For example, the feminine word *puruṣī*, though not used in some [books], is used in the Kalpa of the Maitrāvaruṇīyas (?), as follows : *tasyām anaḍvāhīṃ ca dhenuke dakṣiṇe dattvā kārapacavaṃ prati yamunām avabhṛtham abhyupeyuḥ* (cp. PB 25. 10. 22-23). " The [verb] *śavati*, meaning ' to go ', "[7] which takes all endings, " is spoken among the Kambojas only, the Aryas speak it with regard to a modification, as *śava* corpse (*śavatir gatikarmā kambojeṣv eva bhāṣito bhavati vikāra enam āryā bhāṣante śava iti* ; Mbh I p. 9 l. 25-26]. A dead person is a modification of a living one, which is the original. ' Dead ' means ' gone to destruction '. Or the modification of going is the cessation of going. With regard to someone whose activity has ceased they speak of ' a corpse '.[8]

In the *Nirukta*, on the other hand, it is read : " They use the modification [of the verbal root *śav*] among the Āryas " (Nir 2. 2). Here the meaning is : The modification of *śav*, with, as ending, the suffix *aC*,[9] is [but] one of the forms [that can be derived from *śav*] ; only this [form] they use, not the stem *śav* with all suffixes as ending.

[12]

[12. 1] " Is there dharma in the knowledge of words or in their use ? " (*kiṃ punaḥ śabdasya jñāne dharmaḥ āhosvit prayoge*; Mbh I p. 10 l. 4). This much has been said that " [there is] restriction for the sake of dharma by the science [of grammar] " (Mbh I p. 8 l. 13, vt. 1). [The question is] if this restriction for the sake of dharma [comes about] as a result of knowledge or of usage.

An understanding [person will] ask : What traditional text [pertains] to this [matter] ? Or someone conversant with the traditional texts [will] ask : A traditianal text (*smṛti*) is at times contradicted by a revealed text (*śruti*). For example, " Chastity must be observed for fortyeight years for [studying] the Veda " (cp. PārGS 2. 5. 13 ; MGS 1. 2. 6). This is a traditional text contradicted by a revealed text. Because it has been said in a revealed text : " A father must make his son sacrifice while his hair is still black. "

Here [the following rule applies] : A traditional text is always authoritative where [it is confirmed] by inference. And a traditional text which aims at the unseen (*adṛṣṭa*) has no [ultimate] authority. For example, it is accepted by some that the goose should not be eaten. By others the marriage of people who are connected through their mothers [is accepted]. This takes in such cases place due to lust or passion. The cultured nowadays act after considering what was dharma in earlier times.

There is a traditional text which states : " One word properly known in agreement with the science [of grammer] and well-used becomes wishful-filling in heaven and on earth. " And this [has been said about it :] " [A word] is properly known by the very fact that it is used. But dharma [comes about] as a result of knowledge alone in case [the word] is correctly used. But if it is used thus it is correcty understood. Correct usage, on the other hand, occurs when there is correct knowledge. "

Here we ask : Which is the traditional text which justifies this ? [And] with which revealed text is it in agreement ?

[12. 2] " If there is dharma in knowledge, there is similarly adharma [in it] " (*jñāne dharma iti cet tadvad adharmaḥ* ; Mbh I p. 10 l. 5, vt. 6).[1] When analyzed, the following is being said : If there is dharma in the knowledge of correct words, adharma results from the knowledge of incorrect words.

With regard to this matter the following [observation] would be possible : Adharma results from killing a Brahmin, dharma on the other hand from keeping [a Brahmin] alive. But it cannot be said that, since adharma results from killing a Brahmin, dharma results from killing a Śūdra. In the [case under discussion] it would be proper [to say] that if dharma results from the knowledge of correct words, adharma would result from the lack of knowledge of those same correct words.

In reply [to this objection] he states that this traditional text (viz., grammar) is [to be considered in this respect] equal to a traditional text the aim of which is visible. Because in a traditional text the aim of which is visible, viz. medicine, [it is said that] while [an oily substance][2] irritates the phlegm, the opposite of that, viz. a dry [substance,[3] irritates] the vital air.[4] (So here the opposite of irritating the phlegm, instead of not irritating the phlegm, is said to be irritating something which is not phlegm, viz. vital air. This justifies the belief that the opposite of knowing correct words, instead of not knowing correct words, is knowing what are not correct words, viz. incorrect words.)

Similarly others think that neither dharma nor adharma results from the knowledge of correct words, but adharma results from the knowledge of incorrect words. [Or] that dharma results from the knowledge of correct words, but no adharma from the knowledge of incorrect words. As [Patañjali] will say later on : " For us words are authoritative " (e. g. Mbh I p. 11 l. 1).

Some think: Dharma and adharma come forth from the knowledge of correct words and the knowledge of incorrect words [respectively]. But adharma is overcome by dharma. By the way of example he will consider [the case of] the digger of a well.[5] There he shows that adharma results from the knowledge of incorrect words. [In this way] a usesless [result] has come from the study of grammar. Therefore the statement that correct words cannot be known without grammar is [worth] nothing.[6] But if it be [thought] that there is more dharma, less adharma, [the answer is :] this is not correct. Since there are more incorrect words, their result too (i. e. adharma) must be more. This is why he says : " Adharma would be more " (*adharmaḥ bhūyān prāpnoti* ; cp. Mbh I p. 10 l. 7–8).

[12. 3] " Restriction with regard to usage " (*ācāre niyamaḥ*; Mbh I p. 10 l. 10, vt. 7). This traditional line (*smṛti*)[7] is opposed to what has been said [elsewhere]. And the revealed texts (*śruti*) are not in agreement with it. Therefore too [that traditional line] is not authoritative. The Ṛṣi (Mbh p. 10 l. 11), i. e., mantra, viz., *te 'surāḥ* ··· , shows with regard to *ācāra*, i. e. use, that this is a [correct] usage. " Therefore one should not speak in a vulgar manner or incorrectly] ". The present traditional text (i. e. the vārttika) states that vulgar and incorrect speech should not be used. It does not state that vulgar and incorrect speech should not be known.

[Objection :] Here only this much is said that these incorrect words should not be used. But it is not the case [that it is said here] that dharma arises from the use of correct words.

[Reply :] Nothing wrong here. When faulty speech is forbidden, does one have to remain silent ? Here it is understood that the language which is favoured is to be considered as bringing about [dharma].

[12. 4] " [If there is dharma] in the use [of words], everyone has it " (*prayoge sarvalokasya* ; Mbh I p. 10 l. 13, vt. 8). The intention [of this statement is :] Taking up grammar is without purpose; because [correct] usage is seen also without grammar.

Here it is objected : " Even though [correct] usage is also [possible] without grammar, the effort [spent on the study of grammar] is not

without purpose. Just as some people go on [with their business], rejecting the advice of the physician, because they are naturally healthy and are therefore not brought to a physician; while others are ill and are therefore treated medically. In the same way grammar too must be continued and studied. It must be promoted for this reason that someone who wishes to use correct words be made to study [it]."

The answer to this objection is: "That is true. But in that same [science of medicine] it has been said with respect to those [healthy people]: 'With reference to those whose digestive fire is inflamed, who are accustomed to hard articles of diet, who are given to constant labour and have a huge capacity for the consumption of food, the consideration of heavy and light qualities of things is not necessary.' (*Caraka Saṃhitā* Sūtrasthāna 27. 344 p. 174).[8] But here (i. e. in grammar) there is nothing like that. This much is said : Correct words cannot be known without grammar."

[12. 5] "There is prosperity in usage preceded by grammar" (*śāstrapūrve prayoge 'bhyudayaḥ*; Mbh I p. 10 l. 21, vt. 9).[9] Prosperity arises from usage which takes place while there is knowledge based on grammar. "He who uses correct words," knowing them "in accordance with grammar, is connected with prosperity" (*yaḥ śāstrapūrvakaṃ śabdān prayuṅkte so 'bhyudayena yujyate*; Mbh I p. 10 l. 22).[10] This explains that traditional line "One word correctly known ... ".[11]

Tat tulyaṃ vedaśabdena (Mbh I p. 10 l. 22) : Similar to the meaning expressed by the Veda.[12] [That is, similar] to the meaning expressed by [the following passage from] the Veda : *yo 'gniṣṭomena yajate ya u cainam evaṃ veda*.[13] This Vedic utterance conveys the following meaning. He who knowingly performs the Agniṣṭoma [sacrifice] is connected with prosperity, because [only] a knowing person is entitled to sacrifice.

"Someone else says" (*apara āha* ; Mbh I p. 10 l. 24). Now all Vedic sentences serve as examples. It is determined that just as those [Vedic sentences] when memorized under observance of such restrictions as chaste studenthood (*brahmacarya*) give rise to dharma, so prosperity results from the use [of words] which is characterized by the circumstance that the knowledge [accompanying that use] is derived from grammar, because use is the means of obtaining dharma.

"Or again, let there be [dharma] only in case there is knowledge [of correct words]" (*atha vā punar astu jñāna eva* ; Mbh I p. 10 l. 26). This traditional science (*smṛti*) is not on a par with [the other traditional science] the aim of which is visible (i. e., medicine).[14] It has been hand-

ed down through an uninterrupted tradition that dharma arises from knowledge. [And] only what is enjoined or forbidden on the authority of tradition is done or shunned.

[The objection can be raised that] here it is stated either that adharma arises from a knowledge of incorrect words, or that no dharma arises from a knowledge of incorrect words. And there is no virtue or vice in doing or leaving what has been neither enjoined nor forbidden. This is why he says (*iti*): "Or knowing incorrect words is nothing but a means for knowing correct words" (*atha vābhyupāya evāpaśabdajñānaṃ śabdajñānasya*; cp. Mbh I p. 11 l. 4).[15] If one thing is a means for something else, the latter does not take place without the former. As a result the [knowledge of incorrect words] is subordinate to [and inseparable from] the [knowledge of correct words]. It is as if someone were to think that whiteness is a quality of earth and that dharma arises from seeing it. [In reality] it (i. e., earth) is black. So that [person], though looking, cannot see [anything] white there. Therefore [the black colour] is only a means for seeing a white [object].[16] Another example is the injury inflicted during the Aśvamedha [sacrifice] and the like, which is nothing but a means for [obtaining] dharma. In the same way is the knowledge of correct words inseparably connected with the knowledge of incorrect words. The [knowledge] of incorrect words is not connected with adharma. In this way the traditional discipline (i. e. grammar) is vindicated. [And] thus the traditional discipline is not without purpose.

"Or like the digger of a well" (*atha vā kūpakhānakavad*; Mbh I p. 11 l. 6). The argument here [runs]: Even if adharma results from the knowledge of incorrect words, it is [but] little. But the dharma derived from the knowledge of correct words is excellent and more. Therefore he continues in his study even though [some] blemish attaches to it. Because it is shown in the traditional texts, it is understood that superior dharma is the result of the knowledge of correct words. The example which illustrates this is the digger of a well: Expecting to be joined to more prosperity, he continues to dig even though this work makes him dirty, thinking "I shall be able to remove this dirty too". By this [example] the knowledge of correct words is praised. Just as it has been said: "Not should one who keeps his head down heap up an altar in the shape of a falcon, for the sacrificer of that is likely to perish."[17] This does not censure him who keeps his head down. What then? By this means he who keeps his head high is praised. "Know this: Who have died? Women."[18] After this the following statement of Yājñavalkya will be uttered: "These hoary arms – what in the world has become of the Brahmin's word? (ŚB 3. 8. 2.

25).[19] That is to say (*iti*), if one who keeps his head down causes the death of the sacrificer, I who know this would not have been here. [But I am here, and] that is why you see also this rite [being performed by me].

The view of others is that this is nothing but censure of one who keeps his head down.

" Restriction in case of a sacrificial rite " (*yājñe karmaṇi ... niyamaḥ*; Mbh I p. 11 l. 11). This is said: That revealed text (*śruti*)[20] does not concern [correct speech] in general, but in a [specific] context. Such a kind [of restriction] for the sake of a [specific] context exists in other cases as well: illicit intercourse with a woman in the case of the Gosava [sacrifice]; drinking wine in the case of the Sautrāmaṇī [sacrifice] ; killing a Brahmin in the Sarvamedha [sacrifice]. And when for example no tortoise is available, its substitute is of a specified kind: " If one doesn't find a tortoise, [one should use a white turtle] " (MŚS 3. 6. 16). (Another restriction which is confined to a specified context can be seen in the following :) " [At the end of the Avabhṛtha sacrifice] one should offer the oblation on the head of an Ātreya [priest], tawny, bald-headed and moist with perspiration, who has bathed in water, saying *jumbakāya svāhā*, "[21] Because of all this he informs us that "this restriction applies to sacrificial rites", not elsewhere.

" Because it is stated in the revealed texts " (*evaṃ hi śrūyate* ; Mbh I p. 11 l. 11). In a previous era. The characteristics of the world which are invisible to the world are visible to those who are *pratyakṣadharmāṇaḥ* (Mbh I p. 11 l. 12). *Parāparajñāḥ* (Mbh I p. 11 l. 12) [means] ' those who know what is proper and what is not '. There may be people to whom the characteristics of the world are visible due to the tradition, but they do not know what is proper and what is not. " Who know what must be known " (*viditaveditavyāḥ* ; Mbh I p. 11 l. 12): those who are fit to sacrifice are not overcome even if they speak incorrect language outside the sacrificial rite.

[13]

[13. 1] " And what is the meaning of the word *vyākaraṇa* ? " (*atha vyākaraṇam ity asya śabdasya kaḥ padārthaḥ*; Mbh I p. 11 l. 15). By using the word ' meaning ' (*padārtha*) he asks what is denoted by this [word *vyākaraṇa*], to what does it conventionally refer ? Because some words, though having the same form with regard to each other, have different meanings and different conditions of application (*pravṛtti*-

nimitta). For example, the word *aśvaḥ* is both noun and verb.[1] Some [words which have the same form] are used because they have the same conditions of application. For example, the word *ap* 'water' has [the same] genus as condition of application both when it refers to the ocean and to a drop.[2] Some [words] are used [to denote different things] even though the genera are different, because the same action [common to them all] is covered by the conventional meaning [of those words]. For example, all [things denoted by the word] *akṣa* derive from *aśnoti*, [all] *pāda* from *padyati*, [all] *māṣa* from *mimīti*.[3] This is attained because the activity is the same.[4] Some [words are used to denote different things even though the genera are different] because [one thing] has attained the state of the [other thing] or because [the properties of one thing] are attributed [to something else]. For example, the word *go* 'ox' [is used] to denote a Bāhika, the word *sarpa* to denote a rope.

Here [the question is] " what is here being referred to that is called *vyākaraṇa* " ? Desiring to explain the condition of application [of the word *vyākaraṇa*] by this means, he makes this statement. Because [someone might say:] " You must explain the meaning of this [word *vyākaraṇa*] because again and again you said [such things as] ' not without *vyākaraṇa* ' (*na cāntareṇa vyākaraṇam*), ' therefore one who is not a *vaiyākaraṇa* ' (*tan nāvaiyākaraṇaḥ*). "[5]

Sūtram (Mbh I p. 11 l. 15). [This means] that the collection of sūtras in the Aṣṭādhyāyī are referred to by this [word *vyākaraṇa*].

" The meaning of the genitive case-ending doesn't fit " (*ṣaṣṭhyartho 'nupapannaḥ*; Mbh I p. 11 l. 16, part of vt. 10). But isn't it the case that the use of word *sūtra* doesn't fit either? The answer is that *sūtra* [is used] when the designation concerns something general. [Upon the question] ' which sūtra ? ' the specification ' *vyākaraṇa* ' is added. Like in " the tree is a Śiṃśapā. "[6] But [that] meaning of the word [*sūtra*] is not used, because it is not different [from the meaning of *vyākaraṇa*]. But when the word *vyākaraṇa* refers to the collection, and the word *sūtra* is used with regard to some part (of that collection), such as *vṛddhir ād aic* (P. 1. 1. 1), then the meaning of the genitive case-ending fits. When however both these words (*sūtra* and *vyākaraṇa*) designate the collection, the meaning of the genitive-ening is not present; this is what the objection amounts to.

[13. 2] " Non-comprehension of words " (*śabdāpratipattiḥ*; Mbh I p. 11 l. 19, vt. 11). For we do not comprehend words from the [sūtra] *vṛddhir ād aic*. " What then? From explanation " (*kiṃ tarhi/vyākhyānataḥ*; Mbh I p. 11 l. 21).[7] From an example we comprehend words that are of the

same kind. "But doesn't that same sūtra when analyzed become the explanation?" (*nanu ca tad eva sūtraṃ vigṛhītaṃ vyākhyānaṃ bhavati*; Mbh I p. 11 l. 21–22). 'Explanation' is the means of making the meaning of a sūtra manifest. For example, the meaning of *vaṭavṛkṣasthito daṃṣṭrī* 'the boar is in the Banyan tree' is made manifest in *vaṭe vṛkṣe sthito daṃṣṭrī*. "Not only the repeated words" (*na kevalāni carcāpadāni*; Mbh I p. 11 l. 22). The meaning is not made clear from an analyzed sūtra as it is from the repeated words *vaṭe vṛkṣe....*

[13. 3] "If [*vyākaraṇa* means] 'word', the meaning of [the suffix] *lyuṭ* [does not fit]" (*śabde lyuḍarthaḥ*; Mbh I p. 11 l. 25, vt. 12). [Only] when there is a difference [can] the meaning of the genitive ending be understood (in *śabdasya vyākaraṇam*). For the sūtras are connected with words in that they explain the latter. But "the meaning of [the suffix] *lyuṭ* does not fit" (*lyuḍarthaḥ ... nopapadyate*; Mbh I p. 11 l. 26). For the word, which is being completed, is the main thing because it is not for the sake of something else.[8] And it is not proper [to ascribe] instrumentality to the main thing. Just as the sacrificial cake (*puroḍāśa*) is the main thing, because at the production [it is the sacrificial cake that] is to be produced, at the consecration [it is the sacrificial cake that] is to be consecrated, at the conclusion [it is the sacrificial cake that] is to be concluded;[9] the understanding of words is secondary.

[13. 4] "And in the sense 'being'" (*bhave ca*; Mbh I p. 12 l. 2). Are [rules] not in the [words] on account of the fact that [the latter] explain [the former]? If such were the case, every possible rule would be *vaiyākaraṇa*.[10] Therefore a part-whole relation is here intended.

[13. 5] "[*Taddhita*-suffixes in the sense] 'uttered [by him]' and so on do not fit either" (*proktādayo 'pi nopapadyante*; cp. Mbh I p. 12 l. 5),[11] "For the words were not uttered [by Pāṇini]" (*na hi ... śabdāḥ proktāḥ*; Mbh I p. 12 l. 6). "This was formerly ..." (*purastād idam*; Mbh I p. 12 l. 8). Since [questions of] prolixity and brevity are not taken into consideration in Bhāṣya sūtras,[12] and since both general injunctions and specific amplifications are used in the basic sūtras,[13] [the author of the vārttikas] proceeds here too by way of general rule and specific amplification.[14]

"For example, *praskandana* and *prapatana*" (*tad yathā praskandanaṃ prapatanam iti* Mbh I p. 12 l. 12). Are these [words] not included in [the gaṇa] '*bhīma* etc.'? The answer is that this very [passage in the Bhāṣya] indicates that [the gaṇa] '*bhīma* etc.' is a specific amplification of [the sūtra] *kṛtyalyuṭo bahulam* (P. 3. 3. 113).

" Or words are explained by means of words as well " (*atha vā śabdair api śabdā vyākriyante*; Mbh I p. 12 l. 12-13). Because a word directs attention towards the own form of an utterance, and it makes manifest that what is different is excluded.[15] It brings to mind other words of the same kind, and excludes completely words of a different kind, even if correct. [The passage] in the Bhāṣya " not a horse, not a donkey " (*nāśvo na gardabhaḥ*; Mbh I p. 12 l. 13) concerns one aspect of these.[16]

[13. 6] " Let then forms to be derived and rules [together constitute] *vyākaraṇa* " (*evaṃ tarhi lakṣyalakṣaṇe vyākaraṇam*; Mbh I p. 12 l. 14-15, vt. 14). It should not be thought that [one word *vyākaraṇa* denotes the forms to be derived, and another identical word the rules,] just as one word *bilva* denotes the tree and another [word *bilva*] the fruit. Nor are they one single word on account of the fact that they have one single condition of application, like the word ' water ' (*ap*);[17] nor because their activity is the same, as in *akṣa*.[18] Nor can *ekaśeṣa* be resorted to, because once that is supposed to be the case every word is in agreement with the Bhāṣya.[19] [Moreover,] if one [word *vyākaraṇa*] denotes what is to be derived, i. e., what is going to be spoken, another one rules, and a third one the totality [of rules and words to be spoken], why then is it stated " words denote totalities [and parts] " (*samudāyeṣu ca śabdaḥ pravṛttaḥ*; cp. Mbh I p. 12 l. 18-19) ?[20]

— In order to account for this (*tasmāt*) [we say] that also the word *vyākaraṇa* denotes the totality but not the parts, just as the words *saṅgha* ' community ', *maṇḍala* ' multitude ', *senā* ' army ' and *vana* ' forest ' denote totalities but not parts. " So also the following undesired consequence [would arise] " (*evam apy ayaṃ doṣaḥ*; Mbh I p. 12 l. 17). [This means :] as these [words] *vana* ' forest ' etc. do not refer to the parts, so does also this [word *vyākaraṇa*] not refer to the parts.

Pūrve pañcālāḥ (" Eastern Pañcāla "; Mbh I p. 12 l. 19). What has reached the state of being a totality is indicated with the help of a word expressive of a totality. Just as a Bāhīka who has reached the state of an ox is indicated with the help of the word ' ox '. For it is not possible for a word [expressive of a totality] to denote a part, leaving the totality. From this it follows that a word expressive of a totality is used when the totality superimposes itself fully on a part. In this same way also the word *vyākaraṇa*, which is expressive of a totality; if it causes itself to enter into a part, i. e. the sūtras, who then has to bring about the applicability of that [word with respect to that meaning] ?[21]

" Oil has been eaten, ghee has been eaten " (*tailaṃ bhuktaṃ ghṛtaṃ bhuktam*; Mbh I p. 12 l. 20). The whole resides in the parts, having assign-

ed the word (viz. *ghṛta* and *taila* respectively) to ghee and oil; who is there to promote this ? Similarly with respect to ' white ' etc. : this totality called ' cloth ' has been given another colour because some part of it has been made white ; for this reason the word expressive of the totality refers to the parts. Just as one does not perceive a jar in its entirety, yet there is the notion of a jar [which rests] on but some parts; just so does someone use the word *vyākaraṇa* only with regard to the sūtras, if he knows the totality merely on the basis of them. [Or take the following] example : Someone uses the words ' he cooks ' when he sees merely [the act of] putting on the fire, because [putting on the fire is usually] for the sake of [cooking];[22] he is [however] told : " That [man] is not cooking ; he puts on the fire, [to be sure,] but he is preparing water. "

[13. 7] " It will be [all right] because [sūtras] are like what is denoted [by the word *vyākaraṇa*] " (*vyapadeśivadbhāvena bhaviṣyati* ; Mbh I p. 12 l. 22). ' Being like what is denoted ' (*vyapadeśivadbhāva*) [is met with] here and there, in one way or another. In the context of [P. 6. 1. 1] *ekāco dve prathamasya* ' In the place of the first [portion,] containing a single vowel, there are two ' [*i* is] verbal root — because its meaning is understood by means of agreement and difference — as well as sound. In this case something which is resorted to in one capacity (viz., that of being a sound) has a designation connected with its other capacity (viz., that of being a root).[23] Alternatively, on the supposition that totality connected with usage [accounts] for the difference between the words *eti*, *itaḥ* and *ayana* (all derivatives of *i*); on this [supposition] *eti* is a part [of the totality of derivatives from *i*].[24] [Another] example is the following : " The grindstone here, which is seen as having several activities, has this body. "[25] But in " Rāhu has a big head " there is the designation [' Rāhu ' as if the head were a part of Rāhu] even though there is no part-whole relation, since there is no difference, merely because the words are used [that way]. For a word is applied, without regard for the correctness or incorrectness of the knowledge of the thing, after only a part of the meaning has been ascertained. For example, the word ' finger ' does not express the fact that a finger is a limb [of the body] even though it is one. In the same way does the word ' Rāhu ' not express the fact that Rāhu consists of a head only, even though that is in fact the case. For only that much meaning is expressed as is denoted by the word ' Rāhu '. [And] his designation is connected with his head (because there is no more).

Just as a suffix of the comparative degree [can be used] even though there is only one thing, on account of the fact that the state of that thing is referred to, as in " Last year you were clever, this year you are more clever".

(Mbh II p. 417 l. 2–3, on P. 5. 3. 57 vt. 1) ; so in our present case *vyākaraṇa* can be a collection of texts, and a part [of that]. Because of the differences of state [between these two] the [same] designation is appropriate. Or because the relation general-particular exists [between them], Here *sūtra* is known to designate the general [notion]. [Upon the question] ' [*śūtra*] of what ? ', when particularity [is asked for, the reply] *vyākaraṇa* is accepted even [in the opinion] of him who maintains that there is no difference [between *sūtra* and *vyākaraṇa*]. When the word *vyākaraṇa* [is used] in its collective sense and the word *sūtra* [refers] to some particular Sūtra only, there is no difference [between the two] occurring in their primary senses. In that case only the particular [meaning of *sūtra* prevails], or only the general [sense of *vyākaraṇa*].

[If *vyākaraṇa* and *sūtra* are synonymous, the expression *vyākaraṇasya sūtram*] is not a case of ' being like what is denoted ' (*vyapadeśivadbhāva*), [as little as] ' sandalwood of sandalwood ' and ' colour etc. of colour etc.' [are cases of ' being like what is denoted ']. If, on the other hand, the relation [between *sūtra* and *vyākaraṇa*] is that of general and particular, even those who hold that there is no difference [between the two, must admit that] the designation of sandalwood [would] be ' smell ' (just as the designation of *vyākaraṇa* is *sūtra*).

" This is so for the ignorant " (*avijānata etad evaṃ bhavati* ; Mbh I p. 12 l. 26). This has been said : Some do not even understand from explanation, but [only] from winking and the like. What can be said in such a case ? Because [such people] understand words [only] from gestures. Here the following must be understood. These means (such as winking, and gestures) do not [work] for every word. But there is manifestation [of meaning] on the basis of the sūtras. Because words are used on the basis of the sūtras only, once their meanings are manifest. One should not say that the use of examples etc. belongs to the vārttikas (*anutantra*)[26] or to the Bhāṣya so that one might understand other words. What then ? So that it may make manifest what is not manifest in the sūtras. And it determines the same meaning (as that expressed by the sūtra).

" Who speaks what deviates from the sūtras, that is not understood " (*yo hy utsūtraṃ kathayen nādo gṛhyate* ; cp. Mbh I p. 12 l. 27). [*Na gṛhyate* means :] that is not understood.[27] Why is that what deviates from the sūtras not understood ?

The answer is : This is a traditional science (*smṛtiśāstra*). When someone says ' this is a correct word ' he will certainly be asked ' How is that to be known by us ? If [then that person] utters [the appropriate]

sūtra from the traditional science, people agree and understand that his is no idle talk. For example, *nyaṅkoḥ pratiṣedhaḥ* is no sūtra of Pāṇini.[28] In connection with this [sūtra] the following controversy exists : '[The correct form] must be *naiyaṅkava.*' But if someone were to use *nyāṅkava* we would not consider it an incorrect word. But if he shows one traditional passage (viz. P. 7. 3. 3, which prescribes *ai* before *y*), [the answer is :] there is prohibition of that in another traditional work (i. e., in Āpiśali's grammar).

In the case of *nyagrodhasya ca kevalasya* (P. 7. 3. 5), for example, we understand without doubt that this (viz. *naiyagrodha*) is a correct word. Therefore it must be understood that examples etc. are obtained on the basis of the sūtras alone, once their meaning is known, [and thus] correct words are used.

[14]

[14. 1] " For what aim teaching of sounds ? " (*kimartho varṇānām upadeśaḥ* ; Mbh I p. 13 l. 1). There is restriction of dharma when words are used instigated by meaning (cp. vt. 1) . [But] these [sounds] here have no meaning. Teaching them is aimless. Nor is it possible that they are taught for the sake of the wholes [of which they are going to be parts], because when verbal roots, nominal stems and suffixes are taught, also the sound contained in them are taught.

" The teaching [of sounds] has as aim their grouping for the sake of the progress [of grammar] " (*vṛttisamavāyārtha upadeśaḥ* ; Mbh I p. 13 l. 2, vt. 15). They are not taught in order to determine their own form, but rather for their sequence, so that they may have some effect in the science [of grammar] by virtue of this sequence. Or he explains [that they are] for this purpose that it may serve the aim of collecting the elements auxiliary to the science [of grammar].

Vṛttaye samavāyo vṛttisamavāyaḥ (Mbh I p. 13 l. 4). This is a genitive [tatpuruṣa] compound. Its analysis is shown as [containing the sense] ' for the sake of that ', like *āśvaghāsa.*

Vṛttyartho vā samavāyaḥ (Mbh I p. 13 l. 4). The causal nature of grouping for the sake of the progress [of grammar] is explaind with respect to that progress. Because [the device referred to as] ' in accordance with the order of enumeration ' (*yathāsaṃkhyam*)[1] applies only by virtue of this arrangement. [The word] *pravṛttisamavāya*[2] [is a karmadhāraya compound to be analyzed as] ' for the sake of progress and grouping ' (*pravṛttyarthaś cāsau samavāyaś ca*), like *śākapārthiva.*[3]

Vṛttiprayojano vā (Mbh I p. 13 l. 4–5). The causal relation [between the grouping of sounds and the progress of grammar] is shown

to work both ways.[4] The progress of the science [of grammar] indirectly prompts the grouping [of sounds]. [And] this grouping is indirectly the cause of the progress of the science [of grammar], characterized by indicatory letters, as in *akaḥ savarṇe* (P. 6. 1. 101). And this same thing will be seen in the Bhāṣya as well.[5]

" What then is [this] *vṛtti* ? It is the progress of the science [of grammar] " (*kā punar vṛttiḥ / śāstrapravṛttiḥ /* ; Mbh I p. 13 l. 15). Why this ? *Vṛtti* is action. And an action requires means. The science of teaching words, which is here topical, is understood to be a means. [The vārttika *vṛttisamavāyārtha upadeśaḥ* (vt. 15) now means :] Teaching sounds is for the sake of grouping [them, to be used] in the progress by means of the science [of grammar].

Does ' teaching ' (*upadeśa*) mean that something is taught (*upadiśyate*) by it ? No. For nothing is taught by these [sounds].

Someone else explains that [*upadeśa* itself] is a means connected with an action [as follows] : " [*Upadeśa* means] uttering. Why so ? [The root] *diś* refers to the action of uttering, for having uttered sounds one says ' Sounds have been uttered (*upadiṣṭāḥ*) by me ' " (*uccāraṇam / kuta etat / diśir uccāraṇakriyaḥ / uccārya hi varṇān āhopadiṣṭā mayā varṇā iti /* ; Mbh I p. 13 l. 6–7).[6]

Here [it must be observed that] the word which is used immediately after an activity is completed, is understood to refer to that [activity]. For example, when Brahmins have eaten, [it is said] ' The Brahmins have eaten ', when they have entered [we say] ' The Brahmins have entered '. It is then understood that this is the meaning of *bhuj* ' eating ', that of *praviś* ' entering. ' In the same way in our present case [Patañjali] asks the question ' For what aim *upadeśa* [of sounds] ? ' immediately after the sounds have been uttered. [From this] we know that *diś* means ' uttering'.

[14. 2] " And for the sake of attaching markers " (*anubandhakaraṇārthaś ca*; Mbh I p. 13 l. 8, vt. 16). Attaching markers, which is auxiliary to the progress of the science, must necessarily take place. And that is not [possible] without teaching [sounds]. The markers here (in the Śivasūtras) are only consonants, but there is one marker which is a vowel, viz., *a* in *la* of *laṇ* (Śivasūtra 6). Its purpose is that [the vowel replacing] *ṛ* and *ḷ* be followed by *r* and *l*, in accordance with [P. 1. 1. 51] *ur aṇ raparaḥ*.

" For the sake of abbreviations " (*pratyāhārārtham*; Mbh I p. 13 l. 11). An abbreviation (*pratyāhāra*) is an abridged form of something

extensive. Here it is stated that the abbreviations formed with the help of [P. 1. 1. 71] *ādir antyena saha* [*itā*] are not possible without the arrangement [of sounds] and markers. " Grouping and attaching markers is for the sake of abbreviations. Abbreviations are for the sake of the progress [of grammar]. " (*samavāyaś cānubandhakaraṇam ca pratyāhārārtham / pratyāhāro vṛttyarthaḥ /*; Mbh I p. 13 l. 11–12).[7] [Examples of the use of abbreviations are] *akaḥ savarṇe dīrghaḥ* (P. 6. 1. 101) and *eco'yavāyāvaḥ* (p. 6. 1. 78).

[14. 3] " Teaching sounds is meant to create a notion of [which sounds are] desired " (*iṣṭabuddhyarthaś ca varṇānām upadeśaḥ*; Mbh I p. 13 l. 13). Because when [sounds] are taught [we know] that they are correct as uttered, but incorrect when different. For this reason [sounds] must be taught so that it be known what is correct.

" Also *udātta* etc. must be taught " (*udāttādīnām apy upadeśaḥ kartavyaḥ*; cp. Mbh I p. 13 l. 17). Because these sounds form a list of vowels that is recited without accents (*ekaśrutyā*). It would follow that [these vowels enumerated] here are correct when distinguished [from each other by accents,] *udātta* etc., and when their durations differ ; consequently all of them should be taught.

— But are not all these, *udātta* etc., explained by the science ?

— The answer is : How should *udātta* etc. be understood if [the vowels] to which they belong are not taught ? Therefore, since [*udātta* etc.] have not been taught in their own form, an understanding with regard to them is not possible.

[14. 4] " Since it is the form (*ākṛti*) that is taught [the desired end] is obtained " (*ākṛtyupadeśāt siddham*; Mbh I p. 13 l. 19). Where the form is taught, the particular is inseparable [from it]. But the particular [sound] is not refered to at that time, and since the form resides in [sounds] which differ [from each other] in the characteristic which is duration, [people] will understand : " This is that same sound which is taught in the enumeration of letters ". Just as when a single form (*ākṛti*) is taught even with regard to different [particulars], one understands that what resides in the particulars connected with [that] form is the same as that. Here, just as [sounds] which differ [from each other] in the characteristic which is duration, are [all] correct because there is a form (*ākṛti*) [which resides in them all], so would also [the sounds] which differ [from each other] in the characteristic which is [the exact] sound be correct because there is [such] a form. To avert this an offort has to be made. That is why he says :

" The exclusion of [the defects called] *saṃvṛta* etc. must be stated " (*saṃvṛtādīnāṃ pratiṣedho vaktavyaḥ*; Mbh I p. 13 l. 22). The external effort called *saṃvṛta* [is here intended], for the internal effort [of that name] brings about the sound *a*.[8] Such is not the case with *kala*. *Dhmāta* is too much of breath. *Eṇīkṛta* is indistinct.

Etāḥ svaradoṣabhāvanāḥ (Mbh I p. 13 l. 26) [means :] These are the kinds of defects relating to vowels. For it is understood that defects relating to vowels find their origin in carelessness and incompetence on the part of the speakers.

" There will be exclusion of *saṃvṛta* and so on by virtue of the fact that [gaṇas like] *garga* etc. and *bida* etc. are enumerated [without these defects] " (*gargādibidādipāṭhāt saṃvṛtādīnāṃ nivṛttir bhaviṣyati*; Mbh I p. 13l. 27 - p. 14 l. 1). He thinks as follows. Sounds are nowhere uttered [in isolation]. They are, on the contrary, only recited in the collection which is the word. Such a collection consists of sounds, and such a collection is recited without *kala* etc. [In this way] the exclusion of *saṃvṛta* etc. has been accomplished in these case.

" The recitation of *garga* etc. and *bida* etc. serves another purpose " (*asty anyad gargādibidādipāṭhe prayojanam*; Mbh I p. 14 l. 1). It has been said that reciting *garga* etc. and *bida* etc. serves this purpose that [it be known that] the word is correct in this arrangement, *garga*, and that it should not be [used] in another arrangement. What else should be done ? Let *kala* etc. be excluded from [words] enumerated [in the gaṇas]. But *kala* etc. may not be excluded in the case of words that are not enumerated [in gaṇas].

[This explains Patañjali's remark which can be paraphrased as] " And therefore I shall [restore these sounds,] taking as example the restoration, at the end of the treatise, [of *vivṛta a* to *saṃvṛta a*] which is of eighteen varieties. "[9]

But why should the word *nivṛttakalādikām* ' without *kala* etc.' (Mbh I p. 14 l. 2) be used, not *nivṛttasaṃvṛtādikām* ' without *saṃvṛta* etc.' ? Because [the sound *a*] is *saṃvṛta*.

[Now] *kala* etc. are accepted to bring about [certain] effects. [Take e. g.] *śīṅ* (Dhp II. 22) and *āsa* (Dhp II. 11). I shall recite *kala* or *dhmāta* [as markers instead of *ṅ* and *a*]. And I shall say : There are *ātmanepada* [endings] after *kala* and *dhmāta*.

— But on this [alternative] it is not possible to understand [rules like] *iko yaṇ aci* (P. 6. 1. 77). And without markers rules which use the

designation *it*, [such as] *ādir antyena sahetā* (P. 1. 1. 71) cannot exist [either]. In this case all [the abbreviations] have to be taught.

[14. 5] " Then both [purposes] are served by this " (*evaṃ tarhy ubhayam anena kriyate*; Mbh I p. 14 l. 10-11). The whole (i. e., *garga* etc.) is made known to be correct. [And] the sounds *a* etc. are taught [to be correct] only in the form in which [they occur in these wholes]. *Kala* etc. are incorrect wherever [they occur].

" But how can both [these purposes] be served by a single effort ? " (*kathaṃ punar ekena yatnenobhyaṃ labhyam*; Mbh I p. 14 l. 11-12). As far as the diphthongs are concerned, the teaching here [in the Śivasūtras] is confined to the whole; as a result the two parts [which make up a diphthong] are not taught as sounds [by virtue of the fact that the diphthong which combines them is taught].

[Reply :] Just as the teaching of sounds [takes place] in order to distinguish the part, [not to make the whole of the Śivasūtras known,] so that in [this] enumeration of letters only the parts (i. e., the sounds) count, not the whole ; so only the parts may be intended to be distinguished in the lists *garga* etc., *bida* etc. The wholes, on the other hand, have been adopted in accordance with that [aim].

— Or only the wholes [are intended to be made known].

— If [only] wholes [are meant to be made known] there will be absence of *kala* etc. in the parts (i. e., sounds) that belong to those [wholes], [but] elsewhere there will be no [absence of those faults]. But if [wholes are used] for the sake of the parts, it is not possible to know that [these] wholes are correct. And as a result of this [the wholes] *garga* etc. would be as if not produced.

" [Both purposes] can be served, he says. How ? There are also causes that serve two purposes " (*labhyam ity āha / katham / dvigatā api hetavo bhavanti /*; Mbh I p. 14 l. 12). *Dvigatāḥ* ' that serve two purposes ' [means] ' reaching two aims '. *Hetavaḥ* ' causes ' [mean] ' capable of bringing about effects '. In this world one single cause is seen to bring about two things. [For example,] one [quantity of] water; the action performed with it on the root of a mango tree, if characterized by renunciation, is the same single cause both of refreshing the manes and of watering the trees. Elsewhere that same water does not serve two purposes, [as] when both Devadatta and Yajñadatta are to be refreshed. Besides, mango trees must be watered from a far-away place.[10] Just as in this case the visible [activity which consists in] giving water is capable of leading to something

invisible, and therefore [giving water,] when it takes place, brings about both [the effects,] provided that it is done by someone who keeps this in mind; so the enumeration of *garga* etc. and of *bida* etc. is capable of producing both parts and whole, while performing its task.

Or the attainment of the object is characterized by *prasaṅga*. If [something,] while not aiming at an object, attains [that] object through something else, that is called *prasaṅga*.[11] For example, someone wishing to eat aims [at that, but] does not [primarily] aim at [such constituent activities of cooking as] 'putting on the fire', as little as someone who eats remains of food (*vighasāśin*) [aims at these activities]. For [only someone] who has [food] cooked again even when food is ready, is such (i. e., aiming at 'putting on the fire' etc.), when for his sake much food is [again] prepared. [In the present context] prohibition of *saṃvṛta* etc. is urged. What fault would result here if the parts (i. e., the sounds) made their own form known as throughout qualified by a word whose main function is to teach the whole? The mango trees, similarly, instigate the watering separately (i. e., on their own); the manes do not instigate [anything]. They experience the pouring of water in this case, instigated [by the mango trees], by virtue of *prasaṅga*.

"Sentences are also seen to perform two functions" (*tathā dviṣṭhāny api vākyāni dṛśyante*; cp. Mbh I p. 14 l. 14).[12] He tells [us] that this is not only a characteristic of things, but also of words. Among these [latter] there are some words in which power of denotation has accumulated. Of these only a part of the denotative power is used [in a particular context].[13] Just as the single word *purā* is expressive of [the two meanings] 'formerly' and 'along with',[14] and the word *ārāt* is expressisve of [the two meanings] 'nearby' and 'far off';[15] so is the word *śvetaḥ* [a word] in which the power of expression connected with several [expressions] has accumulated. Of this only a part of the denotative power is used [in a particular context]. A speaker uses [one part of the denotative power] in *śveto gauḥ* 'the white ox', [another part in *śvetaḥ* meaning] 'that dog is gone' (*śvā sa itaḥ*). The listeners understand the meaning in accordance with the part of the denotative power [that is used].[16] [In case they understand the word] in its other meaning [as well, they think that] two words have been uttered. Just as a lamp, operating in accordance with [the principle called] *tantra*,[17] accomplishes the intended object of [several people] who are in need of it. Or it brings about [more than one thing at a time,] knowledge and the like, by means of *tantra*, even though the observer (lit., the one desirous to see) is alone.[18] It is similar in the case of words: [a word may express] such an activity— [an activity] by which a change of expression (*karaṇa*) is effected[19]—that

[really] two words are uttered by means of *tantra*. Two ways, moreover, [are possible] in the world : the [actual] use of [both] words, or simultaneous expression. Sometimes one uses words in succession. How ? " One *akṣa* (' axle ') must be broken, *akṣa* (' die ') must be played with ". Sometimes one utters them simultaneously, contracting [them to the extent that] the order [disappears] : " The *akṣas* must be broken and played with. " [20]

" There are two established ways of using words : successive or simultaneous use; the world cannot do without them " (VP 2. 467). Therefore here too, the enumeration of *garga* etc. and *bida* etc. [in grammar] is a means, making use of *tantra*, which makes known both wholes and parts.

" Or rather the [objector] should be asked this " (*atha vedaṃ tāvad ayaṃ praṣṭavyaḥ;* Mbh I p. 14 l. 15). The intention [of this statement is] : The [sounds] which occur in [these] wholes are taught to occur in all [words]. It is [therefore] well-known that there is absence of *kala* etc.

" Also the verbal roots are enumerated " (*dhātavo'pi śuddhāḥ paṭhyante* ; Mbh I p. 14 l. 17). This means to say that also *culump* etc. [which occur] only in the Bhāṣya,[21] are uttered [pure].

" The nominal stems which are not listed [in grammar] " such as *ḍittha* etc., " their teaching too must " necessarily " be done, to make known their accent and the order of their sounds " (*yāni tarhy agrahaṇāni ... eteṣām api ... svaravarṇānupūrvījñānārtham upadeśaḥ kartavyaḥ* cp. Mbh I p. 14 l. 18–19). Or *garga* etc. and *bida* etc. must be taught for the sake of their accents and the order of their sounds, It is [to be] remembered that these [forms] are here uttered for the sake of prescribing suffixes [after them].

Or [Pāṇini], while uttering [these words] did so because all these are used in derivations. What is the point in [enumerating] those words which are not used in derivations ?

Response : He makes known that not even these [words] *garga* etc. which are enumerated [in the grammar], are produced by Pāṇini. What then ? They are handed down in this form. Just as those [words] are handed down exactly in these forms, so also other words, viz. [all those] which have been taught in a general way by [P. 3. 3. 1] *uṇādayo bahulam.* [That is why it is said ;] " That is to be inferred on the basis of suffix and base " (P. 3. 3. 1 vt. 2)[22]. Observing the usage of the cultured, the base is

to be inferred as well as the suffix. And this must necessarily be understood thus. Because even if *udātta* etc. are taught and *kala* etc. excluded, [we must be informed that] *ḍittha* is correct, not *ḍuttha*. The knowledge of the cultured must be relied upon. Therefore, without the usage of the cultured it [would] not be [possible to say] that the exclusion of *kala* etc. is proper everywhere.

Thus the first Āhnika of the first Adhyāya in Bhartṛhari's Ṭīkā [is completed].

NOTES

[1]

1. *Prādhānyasya* in the sense *pradhānasya* may be explained by P. 5. 1. 124 vt. 1 *brāhmaṇādiṣu cāturvarṇyādīnām upasaṃkhyānam*; or it is a scribal error due to *prādhānya* in the (reconstructed) earlier sentence and to similarly formed *sāmānya* in the same sentence.

2. This may be the earliest reference to the 'Brāhmaṇa-Vasiṣṭha Nyāya'; see Kane, 1962: 1347. – Correction! For अथ वा (line 3) read प्रथमं, and delete [न ?].

3. The words *dṛṣṭānuvidhitvāt teṣu* refer implicitly to P. 1. 1. 6 vt. 1 ... *dṛṣṭānuvidhitvāc ca cchandasaḥ* ... and the Bhāṣya thereon: *dṛṣṭānuvidhiś ca cchandasi bhavati* 'with regard to Vedic forms, there is exposition of what is seen [only]'. This principle is listed e. g. in Vyāḍi's Paribhāṣāpāṭha no. 68 (PS p. 40) and discussed by Bhartṛhari himself in the fourth Āhnika of his commentary, on P. 1. 1. 6 (Ms 42 a 5–7; AL 126. 3–7; Sw 147. 7–13).

4. The predilection for retroflex *ṇ* instead of dental *n* among the Taittirīyas finds expression in TB 3. 3. 11. 3 *indra eṇaṃ* for ... *enaṃ*; TĀ 6. 7. 1 *eṇīḥ* for *enīḥ*. The form *agṇi* is not attested in Vedic literature as now known, but Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's *Nyāyamañjarī* was acquainted with it where it says (I, p. 263): *yady api ca agnir vṛtrāṇi jaṅghanad iti vede kṛtaṇatvam agniśabdaṃ paṭhanti* .... The mantra *agnir vṛtrāṇi jaṅghanad* ... occurs TS. 4. 3. 13. 1; 5. 5. 6. 1; TB 3. 5. 6 (and elsewhere). Śabara on Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1. 3. 30 (p. 230) remarks: '*agnir vṛtrāṇi jaṅghanad*' *ity anyad idaṃ rūpaṃ laukikād agniśabdāt*.

5. Cf. TS 2. 6. 3. 5, which has *saṃkhyāyodvāsayati* in a context that deals with potsherds.

6. Untraced.

7. The Bhāṣya in its present form has the words *śakunir mṛgo* inserted between *hastī* and *brāhmaṇa*.

[2]

1. *Avayavaśabda* can have either of the following two meanings: (i) 'word [denoting something] that has parts', which might then refer to the

enumeration of the parts of an ox in the Bhāṣya (*sāsnālāṅgūla-kakudakhuraviṣāṇyartharūpam*; I p. 1 l. 6); or (ii) 'word that has parts', possibly referring to the analysis of *go* into *gam*+*ḍos* by Uṇādi sūtra 2. 26 *gamer ḍoḥ*.

2. The well-known meaning of words is 'sound'. This will be stated explicitly in section 2. 3 below (*p*. 3, *l*, 23; AL 4. 8-9; Sw 5. 2) in the words: *śabda ity etasya pratītaḥ padārthaḥ dhvaniḥ*.

3. This is a parody of the style of a sūtrakāra. Compare Vaiśeṣika sūtra 1. 1. 1: *athāto dharmaṃ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ*.

4. The pointlessness of teaching known meanings is emphasized in the *Mahābhāṣya* on P. 2. 1. 1 (I p. 363 l. 26-27): *na khalv api nirjñātasyārthasyānvākhyāne kiṃcid api prayojanam asti*.

5. Compare this passage with Mbh I. 370. 9-12 (on P. 2. 1. 1 vt. 21): *dravyapadārthikasyāpi tarhi guṇabhedāt sāmarthyaṃ bhaviṣyati / aśakyo dravyapadārthikena dravyasya guṇakṛta upakāraḥ pratijñātum / nanu cābhyantaro'sau bhavati / yady apy abhyantaro na tu gamyate / na hi guḍa ity ukte madhuratvaṃ gamyate* ... .

6. Compare this with Mbh I. 38. 26-27 (on P. 1 1. 1 vt. 6): *loke'pi hy ākṛtimato māṃsapiṇḍasya devadatta iti saṃjñā kriyate*.

7. The example of *ekaśeṣa* of numerals must be understood as an example how words are not used in the case of substances. Normal application of *ekaśeṣa* leads, where two objects are referred to by the same substantive, to a single mention of the substantive with a dual ending: *puruṣaś ca puruṣaś ca* becomes *puruṣau*. The case of numerals is different: *ekaś ca ekaś ca* does not become *ekau**, but *dvau*. Substances are not like numerals; they are not at one time designated as, say 'ox', and at another time as "the word 'ox'".

8. Here Bhartṛhari explains the terms *iṅgita*, *ceṣṭita* and *nimiṣita* as meaning different things. Mbh I. 3. 28, however, explains the first word with the help of the other two: *guhāyāṃ trīṇi nihitāni neṅgayanti / na ceṣṭante / na nimiṣantīty arthaḥ*. Bhartṛhari seems to accept their synonymity while commenting on the passage (see below).

9. The 'etymology' of *go* is also dealt with in VP 2. 174: *kaiścin nirvacanaṃ bhinnaṃ girater garjater gameḥ / gavater gadater vāpi gaur ity atrānudarśitam //*.

10. This is an obvious misquotation (from memory?) of Mbh I. 251. 5-7 (on P. 1. 2. 71 vt. 4): *samāne rakte varṇe gaur lohita* (!) *iti*

bhavaty aśvaḥ śoṇa iti / samāne ca kāle varṇe gauḥ kṛṣṇa iti bhavaty aśvo hema iti / samāne ca śukle varṇe gauḥ śveta iti bhavaty aśvaḥ karka iti.

11. This discussion on *jāti* 'genus' and *sāmānya* 'universal' is very difficult. Bhartṛhari seems to distinguish the two, while admitting their similarity. The universal (*sāmānya*) is a quality, the genus (*jāti*) is 'a different thing' (*arthāntarabhūtā*). Perhaps this kind of *sāmānya* is meant in VP 2. 44 : *sarvabhedānuguṇyam tu sāmānyam apare viduḥ / tad arthāntara-saṃsargād bhajate bhedarūpatām //*. A similar distinction between the words *sāmānya* and *jāti* prevails in the *Mahābhāṣya* according to Biardeau (1964 : 52 fn. 3; also pp. 293–94). These meanings had however completely merged in the time of Bhartṛhari, Biardeau maintains. Note that Kaiyaṭa does not make a distinction between *sāmānya* and *jāti*. In point of fact, he uses *sāmānya* where Bhartṛhari has *jāti*: *bhinneṣv abhinnam iti / anena sāmānyasya ekatvaṃ kathyate / chinneṣv acchinnam ity anena tu nityatvam /*. Kaiyaṭa distinguishes between a *mahāsāmānya*, which is *sattā*, and a *sāmānyaviśeṣa*, i. e. *gotva* etc., in order to be able to follow Bhartṛhari in interpreting *-bhūta* as 'similar to'. The sense of *-bhūta* is, incidentally, attested in the *Nirukta* and its commentaries. *Nighaṇṭu* 3. 13. 8 has: *meṣo bhūtozbhi yannayaḥ*. The *Nirukta* (3. 16) explains: *meṣa iti bhūtopamā*. Durga in his turn comments (ed. Bhadkamkar vol. I p. 308) : *meṣa ity eṣā bhūtaśabdenopamā / ... meṣo bhūtaḥ: meṣa iva ...* . Similarly Maheśvara on Nir 1. 1 : *bhūtaśabdaḥ pitṛbhūta ity ādivad upamāyāṃ draṣṭavyaḥ*.

12. The reference is to P. 1. 2. 64 vt. 35 : *ākṛtyabhidhānād vaikaṃ vibhaktau vājapyāyanaḥ*.

13. This idea of words without sequence that reside in the mind is also met with in the *Vākyapadīya*, e. g. in verse 1. 47 : *araṇisthaṃ yathā jyotiḥ prakāśāntarkāraṇam / tadvac chabdo'pi buddhisthaḥ śrutīnāṃ kāraṇaṃ pṛthak //*.

14. This may possibly refer to the state called *vaikharī*.

15. The two powers of the word are also described in VP 1. 56 *grāhyatvaṃ grāhakatvaṃ ca dve śaktī tejaso yathā / tathaiva sarvaśabdānām ete pṛthag avasthite //*. The example of a lamp, or fire, which illuminates both itself and its object, is already used in Nyāya sūtra 2. 1. 19 to illustrate the self-illuminating nature of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and in Nāgārjuna's discussion of this problem (see Bronkhorst, "Nāgārjuna and the Naiyāyikas"). Bhartṛhari's denial that the senses illuminate themselves, here and in VP 1. 58 (*nendriyāṇāṃ prakāśye'rthe svarūpaṃ gṛhyate tathā*) may show his disagreement with Nyāya sūtra 2. 1. 19.

16. On the meaning and analysis of the compound *arthaprakaraṇa* see Bronkhorst, "The meaning of *arthaprakaraṇa* in Bhartṛhari's Mahābhāṣyadīpikā". Also note the similar line in the *Yuktidīpikā* p. 56: *sāmānyaśabdāś ca nārthaprakaraṇaśabdāntarābhisambandham antareṇa viśeṣe'vatiṣṭhante.*

17. This has a curious parallel in P. F. Strawson's "On referring" (*Logico Linguistic Papers*, London 1971, p. 27): "A literal-minded and childless man asked whether all his children are asleep will certainly not answer 'Yes' on the ground that he has none; but nor will he answer 'No' on this ground. Since he has no children, the question does not arise."

18. This line occurs in the *Vṛtti* on VP 1. 23 (ed. Iyer p. 62) in the form *sphoṭaḥ śabdo dhvanis tasya vyāyāma upajāyate.* The *Paddhati* ascribes it to a *ślokavārttikakāra.*

19. Bhartṛhari accepts here, at least in the context of grammar, the meaning 'sound' for 'word'. It is interesting to see that Śivarāmendra Sarasvatī's *Ratnaprakāśa* takes the same position while criticising Kaiyaṭa, making an explicit reference to Bhartṛhari's commentary. Kaiyaṭa states: *anyatra dhvanisphoṭayor bhedasya vyavasthāpitatvāt ihābhedena vyavahāre'pi na doṣaḥ dravyādayo na śabdaśabdavācyā ity atra tātparyāt.* Śivarāmendra Sarasvatī rejects this (MPV I p. 24): *etena 'dhvanisphoṭayor bhedasya taparasūtre vyavasthāpitatvād ihābhede'pi na doṣaḥ, dravyādayo na śabdavācyā ity atra tātparyāt' iti nirastam / sphoṭasyaiva śabdavācyatvaṃ na tu dhvaner ity atra mānābhāvāt /· 'śabde ninādaninadadhvanidhvānaravasvanāḥ'* (Amarakoṣa 1. 6. 22) *iti dhvaniparyāyatvena śabdasya bālakenāpi jñātatvāt / 'uktaḥ śabdaḥ' 'svarūpam apy uktam' ity uttarabhāṣyeṇa taddharigranthena ca virodhāc ca /.* The reference is to section 6. 1 below, where Bhartṛhari sums up: *uktaḥ śabdaḥ / svabhāvo'py asya vyākhyātaḥ dhvaniḥ śabda iti.*

[3]

1. Note that Bhartṛhari says the opposite in section 3.3 below (*idaṃ tu vyākaraṇādhyayanaṃ nityaṃ karmāvaśyaṃ kartavyam upanayanādivat*) and in section 4. 11 (*iti nityakarmatām eva samarthayate*). Perhaps Bhartṛhari would have agreed with Śivarāmendra Sarasvatī, who makes the necessity of studying grammar dependent on caste (MPV I p. 35): ... *kṣatriyaviśor vedādhyayanajñāne na nitye ....* Nāgeśa refers to this (NSP I p. 22): *atra brāhmaṇenety ukter anyasyaivam adhyayanaṃ kāmyam eveti sūcayatīti kaścit.*

2. This is a quotation from Mbh III. 175. 6–7 (on P. 6. 3. 109 vt. 6): *pīvopavasanādīnāṃ chandasi lopo vaktavyaḥ / pīvopavasanānāṃ payopavasanānāṃ śriyedam / /*.

3. The rule *nīcāyā duk chandasi* is untraced. The augment *duk* occurs in P. 6. 3. 99. The indeclinable *nīcā*, on the other hand, is unknown to Pāṇini's grammar. The form *nīcā́d uccā́* is found in RV 1. 116. 22, KS 10. 13 and TS 2. 3. 14. 6. It is explained in the *Taittirīya Prātiśākhya* (5. 8): *nīcāpūrvo dakāra uccāparaḥ*.

4. This quotation is clearly related to ŚB 4. 1. 5. 8–9 : *tau* (i. e. *aśvinau*) *sukanyām upeyatuḥ / tasyāṃ mithunam īṣāte ... / tau hocatuḥ : sukanye kam imaṃ jīrṇiṃ kṛtyārūpam upaśeṣe / āvām anuprehīti /*. Also the word *anarthyam* occurs nearby ; ŚB 4. 1. 5. 2 : *tasya kumārāḥ krīḍanta imaṃ kṛtyārūpam anarthyaṃ manyamānā loṣṭair vipipiṣuḥ / /*. The essential word for Bhartṛhari is of course *jarbhurāṇam*, which he apparently considers a derivative of *hṛ* even if the shape of the derivation is not clear. Whitney (*Roots* p. 113) lists a root *bhur*, which does not however occur in the Pāṇinian Dhātupāṭha.

5. This example is also given at Mbh III. 404. 11 (on P. 8. 2. 32 vt. 1).

6. This phrase is given at Mbh I. 315. 11 (on P. 1. 4. 9) as an example of *liṅgavyatyaya* : *madhoḥ* instead of *madhunaḥ*. Bhartṛhari apparently considers this a Vedic quotation.

7. What follows (*syādīnām ... prāpnoti*) is influenced by the Bhāṣya on P. 3. 1. 85. So Mbh II. 64. 17 *vyatyayo bhavati syādīnām*, 1. 18 *tato bahulam*.

8. *tato* sc. *anyatra*.

9. *bāhulakena*, i. e. by the word *bahulam* in P. 3. 1. 85 *vyatyayo bahulam*. The Bhāṣya on this rule contains the following stanza (Mbh II. 65. 5–6) : *suptiṅupagrahaliṅganarāṇām / kālahalacsvarakartṛyaṅāṃ ca / vyatyayam icchati śāstrakṛd eṣām / so'pi ca sidhyati bāhulakena / /*.

10. The *Mahābhāṣya* on P. 1. 4. 9 (I. 315. 10–11) and on P. 3. 1. 85 (II. 64. 28) gives the same quotation as an example of *varṇavyatyaya*, adding : *suhitam iti prāpte*.

11. *upaśliṣyet*. Also Kaiyaṭa (NSP I p. 24) uses this verb in the sense ' approach ' (*na cāśabdajñaṃ tam upaśliṣyanti śiṣyā iti*).

12. Kaiyaṭa gives more details (NSP I p. 20) : *tatrāgner mantro'sti ' agnaye tvā juṣṭaṃ nirvapāmi ' iti, tatra ' sauryaṃ caruṃ nirvaped brahma-*

varcasakāmaḥ' iti sauryacarau mantra ūhyate 'sūryāya tvā juṣṭaṃ nirvapāmi' iti. Kaiyaṭa further observes that Bhartṛhari has dealt with the topic at length (*vistareṇa bhartṛhariṇā pradarśita ūhaḥ*). Two subcommentaries, the (*Bṛhad-*) *Vivaraṇa* and Annambhaṭṭa's *Uddyotana* (MPV I p. 28f.) give further examples which also occur in Bhartṛhari's commentary and may been taken from the latter.

13. Śivarāmendra Sarasvatī's *Ratnaprakāśa* (MPV I p. 30–31) and Puṇyarāja' commentary on VP 2. 258 (ed. Iyer p. 10_) give and discuss the same example.

14. If one accepts the view that a *prātipadikārtha* comprises five things, viz., genus, individual, gender, number and noun-verb relation (*pañcaprātipadikārthapakṣa*; see S. D. Joshi, 1968: tr. p. 13), the result is that *śuddham* has the same gender and number as *ājya*.

15. See Śabara's Bhāṣya on PMS 2. 1. 41.

16. This example is discussed in Śabara's Bhāṣya on PMS 9. 3. 10-14, and in Bronkhorst's forthcoming article "Bhartṛhari and Mīmāṃsā".

17. This passage has been discussed in Bronkhorst, "On some Vedic quotations in Bhartṛhari's works".

18. This incomplete and corrupt passage seems to refer to KS 30. 8-9. KS 30. 9 has ... *stambhaṃ vā dāru vābhidadhyāt pāśam evāsmin pratimuñcati* ... KS 30. 8 contains the mantra referred to; see next note.

19. The original must be *tā asmai pratīvedaya* which occurs KS 30. 8.

20. The root *ghas* (Dhp. I. 74) ought to take the aorist suffix *aṄ* by P 3. 1. 55 *puṣādidyutādyḷditaḥ parasmaipadeṣu*. P. 2. 4. 80 prevents that in the case of mantras. It seems that Bhartṛhari's question regarding *aghastām* is inspired by MŚS 5. 2. 9. 6: *haviṣi praiṣe sūktavāke ca adat adatām adan, ghasat ghastāṃ ghasan, aghasat aghastām aghasan, karat karatāṃ karan, agrabhīt agrabhīṣṭām agrabhīṣuḥ, akṣan.* This passage lists the forms to be used in case of modification. As far as the root *ghas* is concerned, *ghastām*, *aghastām* and *akṣan* agree with P. 2. 4. 80 and are therefore 'mantric', the other forms are 'non-mantric'.

21. This is the basic mantra which is to be modified; the 'mantric' form *aghastām* is therefore appropriate. After modification only 'non-mantric' forms are allowed.

22. The root *tap* occurs thrice in the Dhātupāṭha, in the first (*tapA saṃtāpe* ; I. 1034), fourth (*tapA aiśvarye* ; IV 51) and tenth gaṇa (*tapA dāhe* ; X. 275). The context in *gharmasya tapasā tapyadhvam* excludes the meaning *aiśvarya*, so that *tapyadhvam* here is a Vedic irregularity justified by P. 3. 1. 85 *vyatyayo bahulam.* The same Vedic irregularity can be maintained after modification only because modified mantras are mantras in their own right. (This passage is also discussed in Bronkhorst, 1981 a : 353-54.)

23. Cf. the *Vṛtti* on VP 1. 11 (ed. Iyer p. 40 1. 3-4) : *idam ūhyam idam anūhyam iti nyāyād avasthite samyag vipariṇatau liṅgavacanādīnāṃ vyākaraṇaṃ nibandhanam iti.*

24. This stanza is quoted by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in his *Tantravārttika* and ascribed to a *ṭīkākāra* whom he also credits with the authorship of the stanza that we know as VP 2. 14. Swaminathan (1963 : 69) concludes from this that in Kumārila's opinion *Vākyapadīya* and *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* had one and the same author.

VP 3. 14. 591 seems to make an implicit reference to this stanza : *ūhas tathopamānānām aṅgavan nopalabhyate.* Helārāja thereon actually quotes the stanza and gives some explanatory remarks.

Something comparable is found in ŚŚS 6. 1. 6 : *barhiś cakṣuḥ śrotraṃ prāṇo'sus tvaṅ nābhir ūṣmā jñātināmāni śyenaṃ śalā kaśyapā kavaṣā sreka-parṇovadhyagohamasneti yathāsamāmnātām.*

25. See below.

26. This quotation is given at MŚS 5. 2. 9. 4 to illustrate the rule *dvipaśuprabhṛtipratyaṅgānāṃ bahuvacanāni* ' For the limbs of two or more animals the plural (is used instead of the dual) ' (tr. van Gelder, p. 174).

27. This interpretation is based on MŚS 5. 2. 9. 5 *yāny avyayāny anekāni tāni dvir abhyasyante ... yathaikadhaikadhā ... ṣaḍviṃśatiḥ ṣaḍviṃśatiḥ ...* ŚŚS 6. 1. 10-11 is similar; *ekadhaikadhā ṣaḍviṃśatiḥ ṣaḍviṃśatir iti samāsena vā / eṣa saṅkhyānyāyaḥ /.* See also PMS 9. 4. 1-16 and Śabara's Bhāṣya thereon.

The whole of MS 4. 13. 4, including the words that follow the present passage, is given below.

28. This must be the correet reading of MŚS 1. 8. 3. 34, with *āhata* rather than *āhutaḥ*; see Bronkhorst, " Further remarks on Bhartṛhari's Vedic affiliation ".

Helārāja on VP 3. 14. 590 (ed. Iyer p. 413–14) explains: *aṅgānām anūho yathā; 'yat paśur māyum akṛtoro vā padbhir āhatāgnir mā tasmād enasaḥ pramocayatu' ity atraikapaśuke prakṛtiyāge ura ity ekavacanam aṅganāma / dvipaśuke'pi vikṛtiyāge asyohābhāvāt paśū ity āhaṃsātām iti cāsyaiva vipariṇāmo na punar urasī iti vipariṇamyate / aṅgibhedād evāṅgānāṃ saṅkhyābhedasyāvadhāraṇād iti cātra nyāyaḥ /.*

29. The words denoting 'limbs of the body' in this passage are *māyum, uro, padbhir*; they do not undergo modification. The words *paśur, akṛta* and *āhata*, on the other hand, are not covered by anything in the quoted stanza and do undergo modification.

30. Cp. MŚS 5. 2. 9. 7: *mātā pitā bhrātā sagarbhyo(, nu) sakhā sayūthyo nābhirūpam āsaṃsargiśabdāś cakṣuḥ śrotraṃ vāṅ manas tvaṅ medo havir barhiḥ śyenaṃ vakṣa ity anūhyam.* The similarity with Bhartṛhari's words is obvious, but it seems that Bhartṛhari interpreted (and perhaps even changed) this passage after his own fashion. Jeannette M. van Gelder translates (p. 174) the words *nābhirūpam āsaṃsargi* as 'the form of *nābhi*, joined with the ending *ā*', i. e. *nābhyā*. It is also possible that Bhartṛhari's is the original text of MŚS 5. 2. 9. 7; see the one but preceding note.

31. The *adhrigu* passage which now follows occurs with minor variations at MS 4. 13. 4; KS 16. 21; TB 3. 6. 6; AB 2. 6–7 (6. 6–7); ĀśvŚS 3. 3; ŚŚS 5. 17; it is discussed in KB 10. 4; PMS 9. 3. 22 – 9. 4. 27 (+Bhāṣya). It appears that Bhartṛhari quoted this passage from the *Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā*, but a subsequent scribe substituted some features of the Taittirīya version; see Bronkhorst, "Further remarks on Bhartṛhari's Vedic affiliation".

32. It seems that we have to understand this in the light of MŚS 9. 5. 6. 23: *govarcasaṃ guptasyeti sarpiṣa 'ubhayeṣāṃ tvā devamanuṣyāṇām iti vyākhyātaṃ' priyaṃ karomīti śrotriyasya priyāṃ karomīti kumāryāḥ patikāmāyāś cāmuṣya cety avabhṛthe.* "As govarcasa (cow lustre) (he shall rub the face of a cow) with preserved ghee, with: 'I make thee dear to both gods and men', as is explained; thus also (the face) of a learned brahmin, of a girl and of one desirous of a husband; at the lustral bath (he shall add to the formula): 'and to yonder one, (the sacrificer)'." (tr. van Gelder, p. 286).

33. The definition of *āgama* here given is close to the sense in which this word is often used in the *Vākyapadīya*; see Iyer, 1969: 92. The idea that *āgama* covers both *śruti* and *smṛti* was not generally accepted. Nāgeśa's

Uddyota (NSP I p. 22), the *Vivaraṇa* (MPV I p. 32) and Śivarāmendra Sarasvatī's *Ratnaprakāśa* (MPV I p. 35) agree that only *śruti* is *āgama*. Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita's *Śabdakaustubha* (I p. 10–11) includes *smṛti* : *śrutir eṣeti haradattādayaḥ / smṛtir iti tu bhaṭṭācāryāḥ / tatra yadi smṛtiṇ eveti prāmāṇikaṃ tarhi ' āgamaḥ khalv api ' iti bhāṣye'py āgamamūlakatvād āgamaḥ smṛtir eveti vyākhyeyam /*. Note that the allegedly āgamic line *brāhmaṇena niṣkāraṇo dharmaḥ* etc. remains untraced both in *śruti* and *smṛti* (Limaye, 1974 : 5).

34. The absence of *jñeyaḥ* in this quotation from the Bhāṣya may not be without significance. Also Kumārila's *Tantravārttika* on PMS 1. 3. 24 (p. 199) (probably under the influence of Bhartṛhari's commentary) and one of the Mss used by Kielhorn for the preparation of his edition of the *Mahābhāṣya* quote the line without *jñeyaḥ*. See further Bronkhorst (forthcoming), " Bhartṛhari, Kaiyaṭa, and the tradition of the Mahābhāṣya ".

35. We saw in the beginning of section 3 above that there grammar was said to be not an obligatory activity. Perhaps the contradiction can be solved by taking *adhyayana* in the sense ' memorizing without understanding '. This sense is supported by Mbh I p. 2 l. 15–16 : *yad adhītam avijñātaṃ nigadenaiva śabdyate / anagnāv iva śuṣkaidho na taj jvalati karhicit //*; and Mbh I p. 446 l. 6–7 (on P. 2. 3. 6) : *māsam adhīto'nuvāko na cānena gṛhīta iti*. Possibly only memorizing (*adhyayana*) the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is an obligatory activity. This meaning of *adhyayana* may also explain the absence of *jñeyaḥ* in the earlier quotation from the *Mahābhāṣya* (see the preceding note). In this connection Nāgeśa's remark is of interest (NSP I p. 23) : ... *jñeyaḥ ity asya saṃyagarthabodhaparyavasāyy adhyayanaṃ kāryam ity arthe tātparyam.*

36. Cf. *Manusmṛti* 1. 88 : *adhyāpanam adhyayanaṃ yajanaṃ yājanaṃ tathā / dānaṃ pratigrahaṃ caiva brāhmaṇānām akalpayat //* Also see *Manusmṛti* 3. 69–70 and 10. 75.

37. We interpret *apaśabdajña* in the same way as *vāyubhakṣa* and *abbhakṣa* in Mbh I p. 6 l. 23f.

38. On *upāya* ' method ' cp. VP 2. 38 (which may really contain an ' etymology ' of the word) : *upādāyāpi ye heyās tān upāyān pracakṣate / upāyānāṃ ca niyamo nāvaśyam avatiṣṭhate //*. In VP 3. 14. 77 Bhartṛhari warns not to take the methods of grammar as real : *aviprayogaḥ sādhutve vyutpattir anavasthitā / upāyān pratipattṝṇāṃ nābhimanyeta satyataḥ //*.

39. The sentence quoted in the *Mahābhāṣya* (*sthūlapṛṣatīm āgnivāruṇīm anaḍvāhīm ālabheta*) is untraced; *āgnivāruṇīm anaḍvāhīm ālabheta*

occurs KS 13. 6. The fact that Bhartṛhari quotes another Vedic sentence containing *sthūlapṛṣatī* suggests that he could not trace the sentence quoted in the *Mahābhāṣya* either.

[4]

1. Limaye (1974 : 5-6), following Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita (*Śabdakaustubha* p. 14) points at the close resemblance of this passage with ŚB 3. 2. 1. 23-24 and quotes Renou's remark to the extent that the quotation in the Bhāṣya is a corruption of the ŚB passage.

2. Bhartṛhari's ideas about both kinds of arthavāda are again dealt with in VP 2. 319-23, where also the second example of the *Dīpikā* is referred to :

> *yā pravṛttinivṛttyarthā stutinindāprakalpanā |*
> *kuśalaḥ pratipattā tām anyathārthāṃ samīhate || 319 ||*
>
> *vidhīyamānaṃ yat karma dṛṣṭādṛṣṭaprayojanam |*
> *stūyate sā stutis tasya kartur eva prayojikā || 320 ||*
>
> *vyāghrādivyapadeśena yathā bālo nivartyate |*
> *asatyo'pi tathā kaścit pratyavāyo'bhidhīyate || 321 ||*
>
> *na saṃvidhānaṃ kṛtvāpi pratyavāye tathāvidhe |*
> *śāstreṇa pratiṣiddhe'rthe vidvān kaścit pravartate || 322 ||*
>
> *sarpeṣu saṃvidhāyāpi siddhair mantrauṣadhādıbhiḥ |*
> *nānyathā pratipattavyaṃ na dato gamayed iti || 323 ||*

3. The Ms (3 d 3) reads *tatrāyṃ pravartako nivādaḥ*. AL p. 9 1. 12 change the last word into *nigadaḥ*. But a *nigada* is a sacrificial formula to be uttered aloud, the meaning of which is not taken into consideration. See section 4. 3 below where *nigadena* is explained as *ācāryopadeśenaiva kevalenety arthaḥ*. Durga on Nir 1. 18 (ed. Bhadkamkar p. 140) remarks : *nigadenaiva śabdyate : nigada-mātreṇaiva nityakālaṃ śabdyate uccāryate na punar arthataḥ vicāryate*. We therefore opted for *vādaḥ*.

4. Puṇyarāja (on VP 2. 323) explains the arthavāda *na dato gamayed* ... as follows (ed. Iyer, p. 133) : ' *na dato gamayed, yad dato gamayet sarpā enaṃ ghātukā bhavanti* ' *ity anena puroḍāśasya dantopadaṃśana-pūrvakaṃ bhojanaṃ niṣidhyate.*

5. Kaiyaṭa gives the same four opinions divided in two groups of two (NSP I p. 26) : *tatra kecid āhuḥ* ' *haiheprayoge haihayoḥ* ' *iti plute prakṛtibhāve ca kartavye tadakaraṇaṃ mlecchanam iti | padadvirvacane kārye vākyadvirvacanaṃ latvaṃ ca mlecchanam ity apare |* .

6. P. 6. 1. 125 *plutapragṛhyā aci nityam* prescribes that *pluta* and *pragṛhya* vowels keep their original shape before a vowel.

7. P. 8. 1. 8 *vākyāder āmantritasyāsūyāsaṃmatikopakutsanabhartsaneṣu* prescribes doubling of a vocative at the beginning of a sentence to express envy, praise, anger, blame or threat. This however concerns doubling of a single word. See Kaiyaṭa's observation quoted in note 5 above.

8. Another possibility is to read *arir* where the Ms has *lapir* and our edition *lepur*. The reading *arir* is supported by Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita's comments on this same Bhāṣya passage in his *Śabdakaustubha* p. 14 : ... *ariśabde rephasya latvam apaśabda ity avadheyam*. Similarly Haradatta's *Padamañjarī* (I p. 12) : *ariśabde rephasya latvam ity apare.*

9. Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita may have been influenced by this passage in his *Śabdakaustubha* p. 14 : *ata evehāpi parābhūtā mā bhūmety adhyeyaṃ vyākaraṇam iti nopasaṃhṛtaṃ kiṃ tu mlecchā nindyāḥ / śāstrabodhita-viparītānuṣṭhānād iti bhāvaḥ /*. The *Vivaraṇa* (MPV I p. 39) ascribed the same ideas to Kaiyaṭa : *tasmāt ' parābhūtā mā bhūmety adhyeyaṃ vyākaraṇam '-iti vaktavaym ity ata āha : nindārthavādeneti.* This introduces Kaiyaṭa's remark (NSP I p. 26) : *nindārthavādena ' na mlecchitavai ' iti mlecchanaṃ niṣidhyate.*

10. It is not impossible that *svaravarṇābhyām* has an instrumental ending. This is suggested by the following remark in the *Kāśikā* on P. 5. 4. 45, which explains *Pāṇinīya Śikṣā* 52 (in the Ṛk recension ; see Manomohan Ghosh, 1938 : 44) : *kathaṃ ' mantro hīnaḥ svarato varṇato vā ' iti / naiṣā pañcamī / kiṃ tarhi / tṛtīyā / svareṇa varṇena vā hīna ity arthaḥ /*. Kaiyaṭa has (NSP I p. 28) : *svareṇa svarataḥ, ādyāditvāt tasiḥ*. Bhartṛhari's line has been quoted by Vardhamāna in his *Gaṇaratnamahodadhi* (ed. Eggeling, p. 220), mentioning Bhartṛhari's name ; see Swaminathan, 1963 : 61.

11. The idea is found in TS 2. 5. 2. 1–2 ... *yad abravīt svāhendraśatrur vardhasveti tasmād asyendraḥ śatrur abhavat* ... and more clearly in MS 2. 4. 3 : *svāhendraśatrur vardhasva itīndrasyāhainaṃ śatrum acikīrṣad indram asya śatrum akarot.* See also ŚB 1. 6. 3. 10.

12. ' Friend of Soma ' and ' friend of the king ' amount to the same as ' whose friend is Soma ' and ' whose friend is the king '. See Mbh I p. 384 l. 7–8 (on P. 2. 1. 24 vt. 5) : *rājñaḥ sakhā rājasakhaḥ / sambandhād etad gantavyaṃ nūnaṃ rājāpy asya sakheti / ubhayaṃ khalv apīṣyate / svasti somasakhā punar ehi / gavāṃsakha iti /*.

13. See Bronkhorst, " The meaning of *arthaprakaraṇa* in Bhartṛhari's Mahābhāṣyadīpikā ".

14. Cp. VP 3. 7. 163 : *siddhasyābhimukhībhāvamātraṃ sambodhanaṃ viduḥ / prāptābhimukhyo hy arthātmā kriyāsu viniyujyate / /*.

15. Cp. VP 3. 10. 5 : *sambodhanaṃ na loke'sti vidhātavyena vastunā / svāhendraśatrur vardhasva yathā rājā bhaveti ca / /*

16. This line occurs also at Nir 1. 18, with this difference that *adhītam* here is replaced by *gṛhītam* there.

17. This is not actually stated in the *Nirukta* (1. 18) but is clear from the context. The present line is e. g. preceded by the clause .. *adhītya vedaṃ na vijānāti yo'rtham*.

18. The reading here adopted has been influenced by Kaiyaṭa who probably based himself on Bhartṛhari's text as he knew it. Kaiyaṭa states (NSP I p. 31) : *sa eva śabdaḥ kvacid arthe kenacin nimittena prayuktaḥ sādhuḥ, anyathā tv asādhuḥ*.

19. *nimittāntarāt* is to be understood as *pravṛttinimittāntarāt*.

20. Cp. VP 1. 176 : *asvagoṇyādayaḥ śabdāḥ sādhavo viṣayāntare / nimittabhedāt sarvatra sādhutvaṃ ca vyavasthitam / /*. The *Vṛtti* thereon reads (ed. Iyer p. 229 1. 9 – p. 230. 1. 3) : *āvapane goṇīti svaviprayogābhidhāne cāsva ity etayor avasthitaṃ sādhutvam / tathā sāsnādimati hreṣitādiliṅge ca nimittāntarāt pravṛttāv etayor anyatra viṣaye labdhasaṃskārayoḥ sādhutvam eva vijñāyate / goṇīveyaṃ gaur goṇīti bahukṣīradhāraṇādiviṣayād āvapanatvasāmānyād abhidhīyate / tathāvidyamānaṃ svam asya so'yam asva iti /*.

21. In P 4. 4. 2 *tena dīvyati khanati jayati jitam*.

22. That is to say, no such formations as * *vārkṣamūla* (with *aṆ*) and * *āṅgulika* (with *ṭhaK*) are permitted.

23. Cp. Kaiyaṭa (NSP I p. 31) : *paramatāpekṣayā prakarṣapratyayaḥ*.

24. Similarly VP 1 177-80 : *te sādhuṣv anumānena pratyayotpattihetavaḥ / tādātmyam upagamyeva śabdārthasya prakāśakāḥ / / na śiṣṭair anugamyante paryāyā iva sādhavaḥ / te yataḥ smṛtiśāstreṇa tasmāt sākṣād avācakāḥ / / ambv ambv iti yathā bālaḥ śikṣamāṇo 'pabhāṣate / avyaktaṃ tadvidāṃ tena vyaktau bhavati niścayaḥ / / evaṃ sādhau prayoktavye yo'pabhraṃśaḥ prayujyate / tena sādhuvyavahitaḥ kaścid artho'bhidhīyate / /*. Note however that Bhartṛhari elsewhere maintains that incorrect words are expressive of meaning.

25. Note that Mbh I p. 10 l. 6-9 repeats p. 2 l. 21-25.

26. It is not impossible that this is Bhartṛhari's version of a well-known principle of Mīmāṃsā; see Bronkhorst, "Bhartṛhari and Mīmāṃsā".

27. These verses are ascribed to Kātyāyana, the author of the *Sarvānukramaṇī*; see Limaye, 1974 : 10.

28. According to Kaiyaṭa (NSP I p. 34) it is *śruti*.

29. This line is found at Mbh III p. 58 l. 14-15 (on P. 6. 1. 84 vt. 5) with this difference that the order of the two words *suprayuktaḥ śāstrānvitaḥ* is reversed.

30. P. 8. 2. 83 *pratyabhivāde 'śūdre* prescribes that the last vowel of a sentence uttered in answer to a salutation becomes *pluta* and *udātta*.

31. So Mbh I p. 2?4 l. 15-16 (on P. 1. 2. 64 vt. 5 : *na kevalā prakṛtiḥ prayoktavyā na kevalaḥ pratyaya iti.*

32. Untraced. The same line is again quoted in the *Vivaraṇa* (MPV I p. 55) and in Nāgeśa's *Uddyota* (NSP p. 36).

33. MS 1. 7. 3, KS 9. 1 and KapS 8. 4 have *yad dvyakṣarāḥ satīś caturakṣarāḥ kriyant*[*e*].

34. MŚS 5. 2. 6 throws further light on the meaning of our passage : *punar ādheye prayājānuyājānāṃ purastād vopariṣṭād vā vibhaktīḥ kuryāt / ye yajāmahe 'samidhaḥ samidho 'gnā ājyasya vyantv' agnir agnis, 'tanūnapād agnā ājyasya vetv' agnim agnim, 'iḍo 'gnā ājyasya vyantv' agner agner, 'barhir agnā ājyasya vetv' agner agner, iti / yathāmnāta uttamaḥ /.* The 'vibhaktis' here agree with Bhartṛhari's in excluding the instrumental *agnināgninā* and dative *agnaye 'gnaye*, both of which have five, not four syllables. However, Bhartṛhari rejects the ablative *agner agneḥ* and has the locative *agnāv agnau* instead. Śivarāmendra Sarasvatī's *Ratnaprakāśa* confirms our understanding of Bhartṛhari (MPV I p. 56) : *tatrāpi sambuddhiṭāṅe'ntānāṃ na prayogaḥ 'āvṛttyā dvyakṣarāḥ santaś caturakṣarā bhavanti' iti vacanāt / sambuddhyantasya dvyakṣaratve'pi dvirvacanottaraṃ pūrvarūpe sati 'agne' gne' iti tryakṣaratvāt / ṭāṅe'ntayor ādita eva dvyakṣaratvābhāvāc ca / tathā ṅasyantam api na prayoktavyam 'na śabdajāmi hi kuryāt / śabdajāmi tad bhavati yat pañcamyantam' iti vacanāt / ... / evaṃ ca caturṣv avaśiṣṭaprayājamantreṣu yathākramaṃ prathamādvitīyāṣaṣṭhīsaptamyekavacanāntānām agniśabdaprakṛtikānāṃ padānāṃ prayogaḥ kartavyaḥ / sa ca prayogaḥ 'tvam agne prayājānuyājānāṃ purastāt tvaṃ paścāt' iti prāguktavacanena prayājamantrebhyaḥ purastāt paścād vā bhavati, na madhye teṣām /*

... / *tathā cāyaṃ purastātprayogaḥ* : '*ye yajāmahe agnir agniḥ samidhaḥ samidho' gna ājyasya vyantu vauṣaṭ*' / '*ye yajāmahe agnim agniṃ tanūnapād agna ājyasya vetu vauṣaṭ*' / '*ye yajāmahe agner agner iḍo' gna ājyasya vyantu vauṣaṭ*' / '*ye yajāmahe agnāv agnau barhir agna ājyasya vetu vauṣaṭ*' *iti* / *paścātprayogas tu* '*ye yajāmahe samidhaḥ samidho'gna ājyasya vyantu agniḥ vauṣaṭ*' *ityādiḥ* /.

35. A similar substitution of *narāśaṃso* for *tanūnapād* is possible according to the Āśvalāyanas ; see below note 37.

36. In view of the quotation from and mention of the *Āśvalāyana* (*Śrauta*) *Sūtra* immediately afterwards, and the occurrence of both *samidhaḥ samidho 'gne 'gne* and *iḷo agnināgne* therein, the *Bahvṛca Bhāṣya* is likely to be the Bhāṣya on that Sūtra. The commentator Gārgya Nārāyaṇa on the ĀśvŚS provides some information on this Bhāṣya and its author (ed. Rāmanārāyaṇa Vidyāratna, p. 1) : *āśvalāyanasūtrasya bhāṣyaṃ bhagavatā kṛtam* / *devasvāmisamākhyena vistīrṇaṃ sad anākulam* //.

37. It is clear that the Ms is corrupt in the following quotation. After *samidhaḥ samidho 'gne 'gna ājyasya vyantu* and before *narāśaṃso agnim agna* ... it inserts *tanūnapād agnimadhognegna iti sandhir dṛṣṭaḥ iḷo agnināgna ti vivṛgna ājyasya haviṣo vetu*. A part of this — *dhognegna* ... *vivṛ* — is an obvious repetition of what occurred in the preceding line of the Ms. What remains is *tanūnapād agnim agna ājyasya haviṣo vetu* which indeed occurs, apart from *haviṣo*, in ĀśvŚS 2.8.6. The lines *iḷo 'gnināgna ājyasya vyantu* / *barhir agnir agna ājyasya vetu* / that belong in the quotation, are misplaced in the Ms ; they occur (again with *haviṣo*) in the following section dealing with the *Āpastamba Sūtra*, after *vibhaktaya uktāḥ* and before *agnā* [*i*]*ti yathāmnāta* ..., but have been brought to their proper place in our edition. Independent evidence in support of our reconstruction is found in Śivarāmendra Sarasvati's *Ratnaprakāśa* (MPV I p. 47) : *hariṭīkāyāṃ tu* '*ye yajāmahe samidhaḥ samidho 'gne 'gna ājyasya vyantu*', '*narāśaṃso 'gnim agna ājyasya vetu*', '*iḍo' gnināgna ājyasya vyantu*', '*barhir agnir agna ājyasya vetu*' *iti pradarśitam* / *tatra tanūnapātsthāne narāśaṃsaḥ pravarabhedena vyavasthitaḥ* /. The interchange of *tanūnapād* and *narāśaṃsa* is also drawn attention to by Gārgya Nārāyaṇa on ĀśvŚS 2.8.6 (ed. Rāmanārāyaṇa Vidyāratna p. 131) : *narāśaṃsināṃ narāśaṃso 'gnim agna iti bhavati*. Our reconstruction of the text (which is also Swaminathan's) includes, unlike the version known to Śivarāmendra Sarasvatī, a line on *tanūnapād*. ĀśvŚS 2.8.6 has all the lines except the alternative concerning *narāśaṃsa*. Note finally that according to Vaidyanatha Pāyaguṇḍa a closely similar passage, allegedly discussed in Bhartṛhari's commen-

tary, is ascribed to the *Chāndogya Brāhmaṇa*, mistakenly as it seems (Bronkhorst, 1981 : 174 n. 3).

38. Cp. MŚS 5.1.2.6 *yathāmnāta uttamaḥ*; also ĀpŚS 5.28.7 *nottame*.

39. By P. 5.1.75 *yajñartvigbhyāṃ ghakhañau* and P. 5.1.75 vt. 1 *yajñartvigbhyāṃ tat karmārhatīty upasaṃkhyānam* respectively.

40. Kaiyaṭa quotes (NSP I p. 40) : '*vidvān yajeta vidvān yājayet*' *iti dvayor api viduṣor adhikārāt*.

41. The stanza *catvāri śṛṅgā* ... (RV 4.58.3) quoted in the *Mahābhāṣya* and now being discussed by Bhartṛhari, is about a bull (*vṛṣabha*) that is identified with the word (*mahān devaḥ śabdaḥ*) by Patañjali, and sameness with which is desired (*mahatā devena naḥ sāmyaṃ yathā syād*...). Bhartṛhari does not say much about this 'bull. in his present commentary, but returns to it in his *Vākyapadīya* 1.143 [122] : *api prayoktur ātmānaṁ śabdam antar avasthitam / prāhur mahāntam ṛṣabhaṃ yena sāyujyam iṣyate //*. See also the *Vṛtti* on this verse (ed. Iyer p. 200-01).

42. This seems to refer to the idea that incorrect words are not expressive. Cp. Mbh I p. 2, l. 11 *mithyāprayukto na tam artham āha* and Bhartṛhari above, section 4.4, with note 24.

43. Bhartṛhari seems to paraphrase MGS 1.18.1 *daśamyāṃ rātryāṃ putrasya nāma dadhyāt* rather than Mbh I p. 4 l. 22 which reads *daśamyāṃ putrasya / yājñikāḥ paṭhanti / daśamyuttarakālaṃ putrasya jātasya nāma vidadhyād*. Kaiyaṭa remarks (NSP I. p. 45) : *ye 'pi gṛhyakārāḥ paṭhanti 'daśamyāṃ putrasya' iti tair daśamyām iti sāmīpikam adhikaraṇaṃ vyākhyeyam*. See Limaye, 1974 : 14-15.

[5]

1. I. e. the Bhāṣyakāra according to Kaiyaṭa (NSP I p. 47).

2. The reading *abhyupagamya* rests on the authority of Kaiyaṭa.

3. The *Taittirīya Saṃhitā*, *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*, *Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā*, *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* and *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa* are divided into Prapāṭhakas.

4. Cf. P. 5.4.44 vt. 1 *tasiprakaraṇa ādyādibhya upasaṃkhyānam*. The Bhāṣya lists the following forms (II p. 436 l. 12) : *āditaḥ madhyataḥ antataḥ*. The *Kāśikā* gives some additional examples and calls it an *ākṛtigaṇa*.

5. This meaning is obtained by P. 5.4.43 *saṃkhyaikavacanāc ca vīpsāyām*.

6. Śivarāmendra Sarasvatī (MPV I p. 68) and Nāgeśa (NSP I p. 48) remark : *purākalpa iti yugāntara ity arthaḥ.*

[6]

1. Cp. Mbh I p. 5 l. 13-14 : *kiṃ śabdopadeśaḥ kartavyaḥ āhosvid apaśabdopadeśaḥ āhosvid ubhayopadeśa iti.*

2. On this passage and on the conclusion which can be drawn from it, see Bronkhorst, " The origin of an Indian dietary rule : evidence for a lost Mānava work on Dharma ",

3. The five five-nailed animals are : porcupine (*śalyaka*), another kind of porcupine (*śvāvidh(a)*), alligator (*godhā*), hare (*śaśa*), tortoise (*kūrma*). So according to *Rāmāyaṇa* 4. 17. 34.

4. Cp. Mbh II p. 109 l. 12-17 (on P. 3. 2. 80) : *kiṃ yo'śrāddhaṃ bhuṅkte so'śrāddhabhojī / kiṃ cātaḥ / yadāsāv aśrāddhaṃ na bhuṅkte tadāsya vratalopaḥ syāt / ... evaṃ tarhi ṇinyantena samāso bhaviṣyati / na śrāddhabhojy aśrāddhabhojīti / naiva śakyam / svare hi doṣaḥ syāt / ... evaṃ tarhi nañ evāyaṃ bhujipratiṣedhavācinaḥ śrāddhaśabdenāsamarthasamāsaḥ / na bhojī śrāddhasyeti /.*

5. Cf. the first verse of the *Kāśikā* and its two commentaries, where *dhātupārāyaṇa* and *nāmapārāyaṇa* are used.

6. This explains the otherwise superfluous word *śabdānām* in the Bhāṣya. See Kaiyaṭa (NSP I p. 51) : *śabdānām iti / śabdapārāyaṇaśabdo yogarūḍhaḥ śāstraviśeṣasya, tatra ' pratipadoktānāṃ ' iti viśeṣaṇābhidhānāya gamyamānārthasyāpi ' śabdānām ' ity asya prayogaḥ /.*

7. It is not clear what disease is meant. See however Vāgbhaṭa's *Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya*, Nidāna 12. 28-30 (p. 265) : *pakṣmavālaiḥ sahānnena bhuktair baddhāyane gude / / durnāmabhir udāvartair anyair vāntropalepibhiḥ / varcaḥpittakaphān ruddhvā karoti kupito'nilaḥ / / apāno jaṭharaṃ tena syur dāhajvaratṛṭkṣavāḥ / kāsaśvāsor usadanaṃ śirohṛnnābhipāyuruk / /.*

8. On the reading *vidyopayuktopayuktā* see Bronkhorst, " Bhartṛhari, Kaiyaṭa, and the tradition of the Mahābhāṣya ".

9. Kaiyaṭa explains (NSP I p. 51) : *ekadeśopayogād api loke 'upayuktam' ity ucyate / yathā auṣadhasaṃskṛtaghṛtamātraikadeśopayoge ' upayuktaṃ ghṛtam ' iti vyavahāraḥ, tatheha na ...* See in this connection VP 2. 159 : *saṃskārādiparicchinne tailādau yo vyavasthitaḥ / āhaikadeśaṁ tattvena tasyāvayavavartinā / /.*

10. Note that the *Kāśikā* on P. 3. 2. 3. has *pārṣṇitram* where Bhartṛhari has *pārṣṇitraḥ*.

[7]

1. Cf. P. 1. 2. 64 vt. 35 : *ākṛtyabhidhānād vaikaṃ vibhaktau vājapyāyanaḥ*.

2. Cf. P. 1. 2. 64 vt. 45 : *dravyābhidhānaṃ vyāḍiḥ*.

3. Cf. P. 4. 2. 1 *tena raktaṃ rāgāt*, 4. 2. 2 (*Kāśikā* version) *lākṣā rocanāśakalakardamāṭ ṭhaḥ*, and the *Kāśikā* on 4. 2. 2 : *lākṣayā raktaṃ vastraṃ lākṣikam*. See further VP 3. 1. 7-8 : *yathā rakte guṇe tattvaṃ kaṣāye vyapadiśyate / saṃyogisaṃnikarṣāc ca vastrādiṣv api gṛhyate / / tathā śabdārthasambandhāc chabde jātir avasthitā / vyapadeśe'rthajātīnāṃ jātikāryāya kalpate / /*.

4. The reference is to a Paribhāṣā (no. 42 in Nāgeśa's *Paribhāṣendušekhara*) which reads *sakṛdgatau yad bādhitaṃ tad bādhitam eva* " When (two rules), while they apply (simultaneously), mutually prohibit each other, that (rule of the two) which is once superseded (by the other), is superseded altogether (and cannot therefore apply again after the latter has taken effect). " (tr. Kielhorn). This Paribhāṣā occurs repeatedly in the *Mahābhāṣya* and twice in the *Paribhāṣāvṛtti* ascribed to Vyāḍi (ed. Abhyankar p. 27 and 34).

5. In *ekaśeṣa*.

6. S. D. Laddu prefers to read : *vyaktir ākṛtiś ca / ubhayapadārtha parāḥ laukikaiḥ śabdāḥ prayujyante /*. He translates : " I. e. the individual and the form (*ākṛti*). Words are used by ordinary people having both [these types of] meaning. "

7. *śuklavāsasam ānaya* ; this occurs at Mbh I p. 405 l. 24 (on P. 2. 1. 69 vt. 6) ; p. 426 l. 23 (on P. 2. 2. 24 vt. 22) ; III p. 3 l. 23 (on P. 6. 1. 1 vt. 15).

8. This passage seems indebted to some examples in the Bhāṣya on P. 1. 1. 27 (I p. 86 l. 5-8) : *tad yathā / citragur ānīyatām ity ukte yasya tā gāvo bhavanti sa ānīyate na gāvaḥ / ... / tad yathā / citravāsasam ānaya / ... tadguṇa ānīyate ... /*.

9. Is *sambandham* here nominative neuter ? Kaiyaṭa seems to consider this a possibility ; see CE III Notes p. 49.

10. Cp. Mbh I p. 31 l. 16 (on Śivasūtra 5 vt. 15) *hiṃseḥ siṃhaḥ*, and Dhp. 7. 19 and 10. 286 *hisi hiṃsāyām*.

11. Cp. Mbh I p. 246 l. 15-16 (on P. 1. 2. 64 vt. 53): *ubhayor ubhayaṃ padārthaḥ kasyacit tu kiṃcit pradhānabhūtaṃ kiṃcid guṇabhūtam / ākṛtipadārthikasyākṛtiḥ pradhānabhūtā dravyaṃ guṇabhūtam / dravyapadārthikasya dravyaṃ pradhānabhūtam ākṛtir guṇabhūtā /.*

[8]

1. This presumably means that in this view only 'bases', i. e. verbal roots, nominal stems, affiixes etc. are eternal.

2. Cp. VP 1. 182: *daivī vāg vyatikīrṇeyam aśaktair abhidhātṛbhiḥ / anityadarśināṃ tv asmin vāde buddhiviparyayaḥ //*

3. Cp. VP 1. 179: *ambv ambv iti yathā bālaḥ śikṣamāṇo'pabhāṣate / avyaktaṃ tadvidāṃ tena vyaktau bhavati niścayaḥ //*

4. Note the similarity between this view and the one in section 2. 3 above, described in the following words: *anye manyante / yathā varṇeṣu varṇaturīyā bhāgā varṇajātiṃ vyañjayanti evaṃ varṇā vākyāntareṣu ye kramajanmānaḥ ayugapatkālās te tāṃ padasthāṃ varṇajātim abhivyañjayanti / vṛkṣaśabdo vṛkṣatvam / jāter arthasya pratipttiḥ / etac ca arthasvarūpaṃ sphoṭo'yam eva śabdātmā nityaḥ / ye tu kramajanmānaḥ ayugapatkālā vyaktayo dhvanyātmānas te iti /*

5. This view seems opposed to the one described in VP 1. 53: *yathaikabuddhiviṣayā mūrtir ākriyate paṭe / mūrtyantarasya tritayam evaṃ śabde'pi dṛśytae //.*

6. CP. VP 1. 50: *pratibimbaṃ yathānyatra sthitaṃ toyakriyāvaśāt / tatpravṛttim ivānveti sa dharmaḥ sphoṭanādayoḥ //*

7. Cp. the *Vṛtti* on VP 1. 80 (78) (ed. Iyer p. 145 l. 2-3): *tatra kecin manyante dhvanir utpadyamānaḥ śrotraṃ saṃskaroti / tac ca saṃskriyamāṇaṃ śabdopalabdhau dvāratāṃ pratipadyate/.*

8. Cp. the *Vṛtti* on VP 1. 81 (79) (ed. Iyer p. 145 l. 11) *tathāñjanādidravyaṃ cakṣur eva saṃskaroti na bāhyaṃ viṣayam.*

9. Cp. the *Vṛtti* on VP 1. 81 (ed. Iyer p. 146 l. 1-2): *viṣayasaṃskāras tu tailādīnām ātapādibhiḥ pṛthivyāś codakena gandhapratipattikāle dṛṣṭo na ghrāṇendriyasya.*

10. These are the initial words of the *Taittirīya Saṃhitā.*

11. A threefold division of non-eternality is found below (section 9. 4). For another description of eternality see VP 1. 28 *nityatve kṛtakatve vā teṣām ādir na vidyate / prāṇinām iva sā caiṣā vyavasthānityatocyate //.*

It is not impossible that *vyavaśthānityatā* in this verse must be read as two words: *vyavasthā nityatocyate*; so Pillai, 1971 : 5.

12. The translation follows *The Caraka Saṃhitā* vol V, Jamnagar 1949, p. 692.

13. Nāgeśa observes (NSP I p. 58) *saṃgrahaḥ vyāḍikṛto lakṣaśloka-saṃkhyo grantha iti prasiddhiḥ.*

14. The reading adopted by Abhyankar and Limaye (*brahmaṇo'bhi-mānaḥ*) has much to recommend itself in terms of the better sense it yields: " just as the Creator would have pride in respect of producing creatures ".

15. The same is said below, section 10. 1.

16. Cp. the pūrvapakṣa in Śabara's Bhāṣya on Mīmāṃsā sūtra 1. 3. 30 : *tad ucyate vyaktiḥ śabdārtha iti / kutaḥ / prayogacodanābhāvāt / ālambha-naprokṣaṇaviśasanādīnāṃ prayogacodanāḥ ākṛtyarthe na sambhaveyuḥ /.*

17. Often mentioned in the Bhāṣya. See e. g. P. 1. 1. 1. vt. 8 and vt. 9 (Mbh I p. 40 1. 18 and 26) : ... *itaretarāśrayatvād aprasiddhiḥ / siddhaṃ tu nityaśabdatvāt /.* Further Mbh I p. 394 1. 10–12 (on P. 2. 1. 51 vt. 4) : *nanu coktam ... itaretarāśrayatvād aprasiddhir iti / naiṣa doṣaḥ / itaretarā-śrayamātram etac coditaṃ sarvāṇi cetaretarāśrayāṇy ekatvena parihṛtāni siddhaṃ tu nityaśabdatvād iti /.*

18. Cp. VP 3. 3. 29 *indriyāṇāṃ svaviṣayeṣv anādir yogyatā yathā / anādir arthaiḥ śabdānāṃ sambandho yogyatā tathā //.*

19. Similarly VP 3. 3. 32 : *śabdaḥ kāraṇam arthaṣya sa hi tenopaja-nyate / tathā ca buddhiviṣayād arthāc chabdaḥ pratīyate ...//*

20. Cp. Mbh I p. 439 1. 8–9 (on P. 2. 3. 1 vt. 1) : *saptaparṇaḥ ... / samāsenoktatvād vīpsāyā dvirvacanaṃ na bhavati /.*

21. Cp. Mbh I p. 427 1. 13-14 (on P. 2. 2. 25) : *atha dvidaśāḥ tridaśā iti ko'yaṃ samāsaḥ / bahuvrīhir ity āha / ko'sya vigrahaḥ / dvir daśa dvidaśā iti /.*

22. Cp. Mbh I p. 387 1. 7–9 (on P. 2. 1. 35 vt. 4) : *samānādhikaraṇā-dhikāre vaktavyaṃ ktas tṛtīyāpūrvapadaḥ samasyate supottarapadasya ca lopo bhavatīti / dadhnopasikto dadhyupasiktaḥ dadhyupasikta odano dadhyo-danaḥ /.*

23. Cp. Mbh I p. 363 1. 11-13 (on P. 2. 1. 1 vt. 1) : *svabhāvata eteṣāṃ śabdānām eteṣv artheṣv abhiniviṣṭānāṃ nimittatvenānvākhyānaṃ kriyate / tad yathā / kūpe hastadakṣiṇaḥ panthāḥ / ... / svabhāvatas tatra-*

sthasya patha[ḥ] ... nimittatvenānvākhyānaṃ kriyate /. The translation follows Joshi, 1968 : p. 67 of the translation.

24. *avayavārtha*; cp. above section 2. 1, AL p. 2 1. 1 *avayavaśabda.* When Kaiyaṭa virtually copies Bhartṛhari's line *nityasyārthasya paryāyeṇa vācakaḥ* (see below), saying (NSP p. 56) : *nityalakṣaṇārthasya paryāyeṇa vācakaḥ*, Vaidyanātha comments in his *Chāyā* (ed.) : *paryāyeṇa avayavārthānapekṣarūḍhyeṣā.*

25. Bhartṛhari here uses the word *paryāya* 'synonym' in two ways : (i) the word *siddha* is expressive of a *paryāya* of the word *nitya* ; (ii) the word *siddha* is a *paryāya* of the word *nitya*. Also elsewhere he uses the word both ways : *paryāyavācinaḥ* and *paryāyeṇa vācakaḥ* (section 8. 3) illustrate usage (i) ; *varāhaśabdaḥ paryāyaḥ san* (id.) and *śuklaśabdas tu paryāyo bhūtvā* (id.) illustrate usage (ii). Nāgeśa observes (NSP I p. 57) : *evam eva ghaṭapadaṃ kalaśaparyāyaḥ ityādiprayogaḥ / anyathā paryāyavāci iti prayojyaṃ syāt /.* This means, in view of the context, that *paryāya* can be used as a short form for *paryāyavācin*, which alone is properly speaking correct in Nāgeśa's opinion. Annambhaṭṭa seems to introduce a third possibility (MPV I p. 75) : *nityaparyāya ity evālam, vācīty adhikam, ananvitaṁ ca ...*; he then continues : *nityapadam arthaparaṃ na tu śabdaparam.*

26. Cp. *Uṇādikośa* (ed. Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka) 4. 154 : *sātibhyāṃ maninmaniṇau*, and Dhp I. 38 : *ata sātatyagamane.*

27. The phrase *indraḥ śakraḥ puruhūtaḥ puraṃdaraḥ* repeatedly illustrates synonymity in the Bhāṣya. See Mbh I p. 220 1. 1 (on P. 1. 2. 45 vt. 9) ; p. 296 1. 5 (on P. 1. 4. 1 vt. 1) ; p. 370 1. 16 (on P. 2. 1. 1 vt. 21).

28. This interpretation (*'nityārtham* rather than *nityārtham*) agrees better with the immediately following sentence, and with section 8. 4 *kāryeṣu padāntaropasaṃhitaḥ pravartate.*

29. Cp. e. g. Mbh III p. 364 1. 23 (on P. 8. 1. 4) : *himavān khāṇḍavaḥ pāriyātraḥ samudra iti-*

30. See Bronkhorst, "Pre-Bhartṛhari commentaries on the Mahābhāṣya"'

31. Derived by P. 4. 1. 114 *ṛṣyandhakavṛṣṇikurubhyaś ca* with the suffix *aṆ*, since Vasudeva belongs to the Vṛṣṇi family. Cp. Mbh II p. 257 1. 11 (on P. 4. 1. 114 vt. 7) : *vṛṣṇyaṇo'vakāśaḥ / vāsudevaḥ /.*

32. Cp. *Padamañjarī* on P. 4. 3. 98 (III p. 682), about the name 'Vāsudeva' : *saṃjñaiṣā devatāviśeṣasyeti / vasaty asmin sarvam iti vyutpat-*

tyā paramātmana eṣā saṃjñā/. According to Satyavrata Sāstrī "Mahābhārate nirvacanāni " p. 245, the *Mahābhārata* contains the following explanation of ' Vāsudeva ' : *vasanti devā asmin.*

33. Cp. Mbh II p. 314 l. 12–13 (on P. 4. 3. 98) : *atha vā naiṣā kṣatriyākhyā / saṃjñaiṣā tatrabhavataḥ /.*

34. Enumerated in VP 2. 315–16 : *saṃsargo viprayogaś ca sāhacaryaṃ virodhitā / arthaḥ prakaraṇaṃ liṅgaṃ śabdasyānyasya saṃnidhiḥ // sāmarthyam aucitī deśaḥ kālo vyaktiḥ svarādayaḥ / śabdārthasyānavacchede viśeṣasmṛtihetavaḥ //.*

35. Perhaps *lohadaṇḍa* ' iron rod ' is to be taken in the sense ' battle-axe ', recorded in Monier-Williams ' Dictionary. In the *Vṛtti* on VP 2. 315–16 *śilā* is again associated with *vyāyāma*, but that is where the similarity with the present passage seems to end (p. 274) : *tathā vyāyāme pravṛtte śilām ānaya, dhanur ānaya, grahakarmaṇi rūpasaṃskāre vā prakrānte śilām ānayeti viśiṣṭasampratyayo bhavati.*

36. It may be that the *Vṛtti* on VP 2. 315–16 had this or a similar example. What is now left of the relevant passage seems unintelligible to us. Iyer's edition has (p. 274) : *sāhacaryād avacchedo dṛśyate / tilā ānīyantāṃ gandhadravyāṇi mā śilā ... ānīyantam atyudgadā dhanuṣi ceti* (?) /

37. Puṇyarāja on VP 2. 315–16 has (ed. Iyer p. 128) : *sāhacaryād yathā : rāmalakṣmaṇau ity ukte lakṣmaṇasāhacaryād dāśarather eva pratītiḥ.* The *Vṛtti* (p. 274) mentions this and the following example but does not elaborate.

38. The *Vṛtti* (ed. Iyer p. 274) on VP 2. 315–16 mentions this instance, and Puṇyarāja (id. p. 128–29) expands :

virodhād apy artho'vadhāryate / yathā : ' rāmārjunau ' ity atra arjunasaṃnidhāne nisargavairiṇo jāmadagnyasyaiva pratītiḥ / ... / śabdāntarasaṃnidhānād api viśeṣāvagatiḥ / yathā : arjunaḥ kārtavīryo rāmo jāmadagnyaḥ iti /.

39. It seems that the gist of the objection concerns the way in which the meaning of *siddha* is arrived at : not because it occurs in the vicinity of *kārya* ' produced ' but rather in opposition to the latter. In terms of VP 2. 315–16 *virodhitā* rather than *saṃnidhi* constitutes the reason.

40. This remarkable use of the root *bhakṣ* is dealt with in Mbh III p. 333 l. 5–6 (on P. 7. 3. 69) : *nāvaśyaṃ bhakṣiḥ kharaviśada eva vartate / kiṃ tarhi / anyatrāpi vartate / tad yathā / abbhakṣaḥ vāyubhakṣa iti /.*

41. For this translation of *arthaprakaraṇa* see Bronkhorst, " The meaning of *arthaprakaraṇa* in Bhartṛhari's Mahābhāṣyadīpikā ".

42. This reflects Mbh I p. 331 l. 17-18 (on P. 1. 4. 42): *loke... abhirūpāya kanyā deyeti na cānabhirūpe pravṛttir asti tatrābhirūpatamāyeti gamyate.*

43. The *Nyāsa* on P. 8. 2. 1 (IV p. 330) equates the meanings of *siddha* and *niṣpanna,* saying : *siddhaśabdo niṣpannavacanaḥ / siddhaṃ niṣpannam ity arthaḥ /.*

44. The construction *abbhakṣo vāyubhakṣa iti ca* meaning " [the word] *abbhakṣa* and [the word] *vāyubhakṣa* " is not uncommon. A similar construction is found, e. g., in the *Kāśikā* on P. 1. 4. 53 : *hārayati bhāraṃ māṇavakaṃ māṇavakena iti vā,* which clearly means : " ' *hārayati bhāraṃ māṇavakam* ' or ' ... *māṇavakena* ' ".

45. The example ' Devadatta ', abbreviated to ' Datta ', has been taken from Mbh I p. 6 l. 25 : *devadatto dattaḥ satyabhāmā bhāmeti.*

46. Cp. Mbh I p. 178 l. 19 (on P. 1. 1. 69 vt. 3) : *uccāryamāṇaḥ śabdaḥ sampratyāyako bhavati na sampratīyamānaḥ.* The same in the *Vṛtti* on VP 2. 357 (no. 359 in Rau's edition), ed. Iyer p. 288 l. 15-18 : *kecit tu manyante nāvaśyaṃ śrūyamāṇa eva śabdaḥ pratyāyakaḥ / kiṃ tarhi niyamenānumīyamāno'pi śrūyamāṇavad eva pratyayam utpādayati / samudāyāc ca nirjñātasvarūpāṇāṃ pṛthag apy upalabdhau samudāyināṃ samudāyeṣu smṛtir utpadyate / tathā ca smaryamāṇaḥ sa eva kṛtasambandhaḥ samudāyaḥ saṃjñinaṃ pratyāyayati /.* See also Bhartṛhari's *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* on Mbh I p. 111 l. 22-23 (on P. 1. 1. 45 vt. 3; MS 94 c 1-2, AL 272. 3-4) : *tatra kecid evaṃ pratipannāḥ ekadeśa uccarite samudāyānumānaṃ tasmād arthapratipattir iti.*

47. The same example in Nārāyaṇa's *Nārāyaṇīya* (MPV I p. 81 l. 8-9) : ... *yathā tapte payasi dadhyānayanam āmikṣārthaṃ vājinaṃ tu tadanuniṣpāditaṃ tadvat ...*

48. Similarly VP 2. 363 : *tulyāyām anuniṣpattau jye-drā-khā* (Rau's Mss read *ghā*) *ity asādhavaḥ / na hy anvākhyāyake śāstre teṣu dattādivat smṛtiḥ //,* and the *Vṛtti* thereon (361 in Iyer 's edition ; p. 289 l. 21-22) : ... *jyeṣṭhārdrāviśākhā ityevamādiṣu jye-ṣṭhā-rdrā-khā ity asādhavo vijñāyante* ... . Also see Bhartṛhari's *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* on Mbh I p. 111 l. 22-23 (on P. 1. 1. 45 vt. 3; Ms 94 c 3-4, AL 272. 6-7) : *anye manyante anuniṣpādīni saṃjñāntarāṇy evaitāni / teṣāṃ tu lopadvāreṇa anuniṣpādinaḥ evaṃbhūtāḥ sādhavaḥ, na tu drā khā evambhūtā iti /.*

49. The meaning of this phrase remains obscure.

50. The translation of this Paribhāṣā follows Kielhorn's translation of Nāgojībhaṭṭa's *Paribhāṣenduśekhara* p. 2.

51. This seems to refer to Mbh I p. 44 l. 4 (on P. 1. 1. 3 vt. 2) : *prakṛtṃ guṇavṛddhigrahaṇam anuvartate / kva prakṛtam / vṛddhir ād aij ad eṅ guṇa iti /* and l. 14 : *atha vobhayaṃ nivṛttaṃ tad apekṣiṣyāmahe.*

52. *māṅgalika* is derived from *maṅgala* with *ṭhañ* in the sense *prayojana* by P. 5. 1. 109 (*prayojanam*) and 5. 1. 13 (*prāg vateṣ ṭhañ*).

53. Cp. Mbh II p. 341 l. 15-20 (on P. 5. 1. 12): *tadartham iti kṛtyanāmabhyaṣ ṭhañ* (vt. 1) / ... *indramahārtham aindramahikam* ... / *na vā prayojanena kṛtatvāt* (vt. 2) / ... *yad dhīndramahārtham indramahas tasya prayojanaṃ bhavati tatra prayojanam* (P. 5. 1. 109) *ity eva siddham* /.

54. The text is irregular in having singular *yaḥ śabdaḥ* which is then referred to with plural *teṣām*.

[9]

1. These are the four kinds of words according to Mbh I p. 19 l. 20-21 (on Śivasūtra 2. vt. 1).

2. The identification of *go* 'ox' and Vāhīka is common in the Bhāṣya. So e. g. Mbh III p. 368 l. 17 (on P. 8. 1. 12) *gaur vāhīkaḥ*. Similarly Mbh I p. 71 l. 18-19 (on P. 1. 1. 11 vt. 1): *gauṇamukhyayor mukhye kāryasampratyaya iti / tad yathā / gaur anubandhyo 'jo 'gnīṣomīya iti na bāhīko 'nubadhyate.*

3. We may assume that *saṃjñāśabda* means the same as *yadṛcchāśabda* a few sentences earlier.

4. Here apparently the action-words (*kriyāśabda*) are dealt with. Note that both *kṛdantas* and *tiṅantas* are called *kriyāśabda* in the second Āhnika of the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* Ms 18 b4 ; AL 60. 6; Sw 70. 23-24): *yāvati ca śabde kriyānuṣaṅgo' sti sarvasya kriyāśabdatvaṃ kṛdanteṣu tiṅanteṣu.* This makes *go* 'ox' a *kriyāśabda* by virtue of its derivation with the Uṇādi suffix *ḍos* (sūtra 2. 68; p. 67) from *gam*.

5. Kielhorn's edition has the additional word *katham*. Yet the reading without *katham* makes sense and cannot be discarded. See further Bronkhorst, " Bhartṛhari, Kaiyaṭa and the tradition of the Mahābhāṣya ".

6. The reference is to P.8. 3. 58 and 4. 2, both of which contain the term *numvyavāya* 'intervention by *num*'. The Bhāṣya on P. 8. 4. 2 vt. 8 has a similar remark: *anusvāraviśeṣaṇaṃ numgrahaṇam* (Mbh III p. 454

l. 4). The *Kāśikā* on P. 8. 4. 2 is identical with the *Dīpikā* : *numgrahaṇam anusvāropalakṣaṇārtham draṣṭavyam.*

7. The passage *pṛthivīdhātau ... tad brahma* is quoted by Helārāja on VP 3. 1. 32 (ed. Iyer p. 41 l. 1–2) without indication of its source. Helārāja, moreover, reads *vijñāna* where Bhartṛhari has *jñāna.*

8. None of Kielhorn's Mss has the word *ataḥ.*

9. See Mbh I p. 6 l. 8–9 and p. 246 l. 14–15 (on P. 1. 2. 64 vt. 54).

10. This translation for *pradhāna*, also called *prakṛti* and prominent in Sāṃkhya, is taken from Koelman, 1970 : 7.

11. The Bhāṣya has *dravyāntarasthā tūpalabhyate.*

12. A twofold division of eternality was given in section 8. 1. above.

13. The Bhāṣya reads : *tad api nityaṃ yasmiṃs tattvaṃ na vihanyate.*

14. Puṇyarāja on VP 2. 135 (ed. Iyer p. 63 l. 16), who may echo the unfortunately lost *Vṛtti* on that same verse, states : *vaiśeṣikeṇāvayavinaṃ pratipādayituṃ ghaṭaśabdaḥ prayuktaḥ sāṃkhyair guṇasamāhāramātram abhimanyate, jainasaugataiḥ paramāṇusaṃcayamātram iti ···*

15. See the preceding note.

16. Kielhorn's Mss do not contain the word *asmākam.*

[10]

1. Kielhorn's Mss read *prayuñjate* for *prayuṅkte.*

2. The *Pāṇinīya Śikṣā* contains the following line : *ātmā buddhyā samarthyārthān mano yuṅkte vivakṣayā.* This line is also quoted in the first Āhnika of the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*; see section 10. 1 below.

3. What this means is not clear. Perhaps the reference is to the eclipses and subsequent reappearance of sun and moon.

4. Note the similarity with PMS 1. 1. 18 : *nityas tu syād darśanasya parārthatvāt.* Śabara explains *nityaḥ śabdaḥ ··· darśanam uccāraṇam.* The word *viprapravṛttatvāt* is clearly part of Bhartṛhari's quotation, but does not occur in the sūtra.

5. See the preceding note.

6. This paragraph is obscure.

7. Kielhorn's edition reads *eṣu* for *śabdeṣu*.

8. Here the means is the pestle, corresponding to the word ; the object is the rice grains, which correspond to the meaning. The activity brings means and object in contact with each other.

9. This line occurs in all the five recensions of the *Pāṇinīya Śikṣā* which have been edited by Manomohan Ghosh, with this qualification that the text as commented upon in the commentary *Pañjikā* and the Yajus-recension have *samarthya*, where the others have *sametya*. This same verse (with *samarthya*) is quoted in the *Vṛtti* on VP 1. 110 [107] (ed. Iyer p. 176 l. 5-6).

10. Cp. VP 2. 404 :

yathā praṇihitaṃ cakṣur darśanāyopakalpate |
tathābhisaṃhitaḥ śabdo bhavaty arthasya vācakaḥ || ;

VP 2. 406 :

bahuṣv ekābhidhāneṣu sarveṣv ekārthakāriṣu |
yat prayoktābhisaṃdhatte śabdas tatrāvatiṣṭhate ||.

11. Cp. VP 3. 14. 18-19 :

prayogabhedāddhātūnāṃ prakalpya bahurūpatām |
bhedābhedāv upādāya kvacid ekātvam ucyate ||
anvayavyatirekābhyām arthavān parikalpitaḥ |
eko dhātvarthavigamād varṇatvenopacaryate ||.

Helārāja on these verses (ed. Iyer p. 157) illustrates them with the help of the root *i*.

12. The translation cannot do full justice to the Sanskrit text, for *śabda* means both ' word ' and ' sound, noise '.

13. This is a restatement of the Bhāṣya on P. 2. 1. 36 which rejects vt. 3 *vikṛtiḥ prakṛtyeti ced aśvaghāsādīnām upasaṃkhyānam*. The Bhāṣya reads (I p. 389 l. 11-13) *yad apy ucyate'śvaghāsādīnām upasaṃkhyānaṃ kartavyam iti | na kartavyam | aśvaghāsādayaḥ ṣaṣṭhīsamāsā bhaviṣyanti | yad dhi yadarthaṃ bhavaty ayam api tatrābhisambandho bhavaty asyedam iti |*.

14. See P. 2. 1. 69 vt. 8 : *samānādhikaraṇādhikāre śākapārthivādīnām upasaṃkhyānam uttarapadalopaś ca*.

15. It seems that Bhartṛhari considers *prayojana* synonymous with *prayojaka* and *dharmaprayojanaḥ* a genitive tatpuruṣa compound. This is clear from *tatpreritas* and *niyamo dharmasya ··· prayojaka*[*ḥ*] in the following lines. For a more detailed discussion see Bronkhorst, " Bhartṛhari and Mīmāṃsā ", note 9.

16. The words *laukika* and *vaidika* are apparently formed in the sense *tatra bhavaḥ* (P. 4. 3.53) with the suffix *ṭhañ*, possibly because *loka* and *veda* are deemed to belong to the *ākṛtigaṇa adhyātmādi* mentioned in P. 4. 3. 60 vt. 1.

17. Cp. Mbh II p. 237 1. 14–15 (on P. 4. 1. 85 vt. 10): *vanaspatīnāṃ samūho vānaspatyam.*

18. For the use of *vākya* referring to vārttikas, see Bronkhorst, "Vārttika".

19. Mbh I p. 8 1. 11 reads *śakyaṃ … kṣut pratihantum.* The objection raised claims that the sense 'object' (*karman*) is expressed by the *kṛtya* affix *ya*, by P. 3. 4. 70 *tayor eva kṛtyaktakhalarthāḥ.* This would leave a nominative ending for *śakya*, and, since it is in apposition with *kṣudh*, a feminine affix as well: *śakyā … kṣut pratihantum.*

20. So Bhartṛhari admits two possibilities: *śakyaṃ kṣut pratihantum* and *śakyā kṣut pratihantum.* Kaiyaṭa suggests a third possibility (NSP I p. 61): *kṣudhaṃ pratihantuṃ śakyam*; this is criticized by Nāgeśa (id.).

21. This derives from the *Mahābhāṣya* on P. 1. 1. 8, most probably from the line *mukhadvitīyā vā nāsikā vacanam asya* (I p. 60 1. 4) which Bhartṛhari himself paraphrases as *mukhanāsikā vacanam asya* (Ms 45d4-5; AL 140. 9; Sw 162. 8).

22. Cp. TA 2. 8. 8: *payo brāhmaṇasya vrataṃ yavāgū rājanyasyāmikṣā vaiśyasya.*

23. Or 'horn of the black antelope' as Keith (1914: II: 489) translates.

24. This Vedic sentence is (apparently) referred to in PMS 6. 2. 6 and 11. 3. 13–14, and quoted in Śabara's Bhāṣya thereon. Both times however the discussion does not deal with the issue raised by Bhartṛhari.

25. The Bhāṣya adds *vā* after *khādiro.*

26. Cp. VP 3. 1. 4: *asvātantryaphalo bandhiḥ.*

27. In MŚS 1. 8. 1. 14 and 16.

28. The Bhāṣya has *tathā* for *yathā.*

29. 'This mantra' must be *bhṛgūṇām aṅgirasām gharmasya tapasā tapyadhvam* (MS 1. 1. 8), mentioned in the Bhāṣya.

30. Kaiyaṭa is of the opinion that incorrect words do not directly convey meaning. The opinion here expressed by Bhartṛhari he ascribes to

'others'. See NSP I p. 62 : *anye tu manyante sādhuśabdavad apabhraṃśā api sākṣād arthasya vācakā iti.*

[11]

1. The use of *katara* 'which of the two' is puzzling.

2. These forms are enumerated as such in a *nipātana* sūtra, P. 7. 4. 65.

3. This would be a possible way of deriving *dādharti* and *dardharti.*

4. What seems to be intended is that *ūṣa* and *uṣitāḥ* are not fully synonymous.

5. Concerning the instrumental ending of *ādyena samayena* see Speijer, 1886 : "the third case occasionally denotes even at what time, as R [āmāyaṇa] 1, 72, 12 *ekāhnā* (at one and the same day) *rājaputrīṇām catasṛṇām pāṇīn gṛhṇantu catvāro rājapūtrāḥ,* and such standing phrases as *tena kālena, tena samayena,* which are especially frequent in Buddhistic and Jain books."

6. The Ms reading here is clear but nonsensical (Ms 11b 3-5) : *yathā pūrvakālaṃ prayuktāni dīrghasatrāṇi idānīm aprayujyamānāny api dadhimadhvādayo dharma iti karmatādviṣaya sidhyata evam anyaiḥ prayuktāṃmānāni sarvakālam idānīm āprayuktānijyamānānām apy anuvidhānaṃ yuktam.* One wonders if *sarvakālam* should not be *pūrvakālam.* The reading accepted in AL p. 34 l. 8–11 is defended in Limaye, 1974 : 24–25.

7. Cp. Dhp I. 761 *śava gatau.*

8. These lines try to show the connection between 'going' (*śav*) and 'corpse' (*śava*). At the same time they try to make sense of Patañjali's use of *vikāra* 'modification' when referring to a corpse.

9. For the derivation of *śava* from *śav* plus *aC*, see Bhānuji on *Amarkoṣa* 2. 8. 118, p. 397. The word can also be derived from *śvi* with *asUN*, by UṇS 4. 194 *samprasāraṇaṃ ca*, but this is not relevant here.

[12]

1. Kielhorn's edition has *tathā* for *tadvad.*

2. Kaiyaṭa provides us with the word *snehadravyam* 'oily substance', saying (NSP I p. 66) : *yathā śleṣmaṇaḥ prakopanaṃ snehadravyam, rūkṣaṃ vāyoḥ.*

3. Cp. *Suśruta Saṃhitā* Sūtrasthāna 46. 516 p. 252 : *snehamārdavakṛt snigdho balavarṇakaras tathā / rūkṣas tadviparītaḥ syād viśeṣāt stambhanaḥ kharaḥ //.*

4. Cp. the commentary *Āyurveda Dīpikā* to *Caraka Saṃhitā* Vimānasthāna 4. 6 p. 248 : *prakopanaṃ vāyo rūkṣatvādihetuḥ.* Limaye (1974 : 30) draws attention to the following passage of the *Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya* (Uttara 40. 86 p. 614) from which we learn that oil pacifies the vital air : *vāte pitte śleṣmaśāntau ca pathyam / tailaṃ sarpir mākṣikaṃ ca krameṇa //* Limaye explains : " Here *vāte* = *vātaśāntau* (*tailam*) and *pitte* = *pittaśāntau* (*sarpiḥ* = *ghṛtam*), *śleṣmaśāntau* (*mākṣikam* = *madhu*). "

5. At Mbh I p. 11 l. 6-10.

6. This seems to mean that it does not matter if one knows correct words on the basis of grammar ; one will anyway know more incorrect words.

7. What is meant cannot be the present vārttika, for this is in agreement with the *śruti*, as is clear from the Bhāṣya. Most probably the *smṛti* here referred to is the line *ekaḥ śabdaḥ samyag jñātaḥ śāstrānvitaḥ suprayuktaḥ svarge loke kāmadhug bhavati* quoted earlier, here understood to mean that correct knowledge is wishfulfiliing.

8. The translation follows *The Caraka Saṃhitā*, Shree Gulabkumverba Ayurvedic Society, Jamnagar 1949 vol. II p. 557.

9. Kielhorn's edition has *śāstrapūrvake.*

10. The Bhāṣya has the words *yaḥ* and *śāstrapūrvakaṃ* in reverse order.

11. Mbh III p. 58 l. 14-15 (on P. 6. 1. 84 vt. 5), repeatedly quoted by Bhartṛhari in the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā.*

12. Bhartṛhari apparently takes *vedaśabda* to be a bahuvrīhi compound, as does Kaiyaṭa (NSP I p. 67) : *vedaḥ śabdo yasyārthasya sa vedaśabdaḥ.*

13. Mbh I p. 10 l. 23, quoted from TS 7. 1. 3. 1.

14. This means in view of section 12. 1 above that even though dharma results from a knowledge of correct words, adharma does not result from a knowledge of incorrect words.

15. The Bhāṣya reads *śabdajñāne* for *śabdajñānasya.*

16. Bhartṛhari's words are somewhat obscure, but the idea seems clear. Black serves as background for white ; one cannot avoid seeing the

black background if one wishes to see the white object. Similarly one cannot avoid knowing incorrect words in order to know correct words.

17. Untraced.

18. Untraced. The idea seems to be that not the sacrificer died who presumably kept his head down. The reconstitution of the text is however highly tentative.

19. The translation follows Eggeling, part II p. 197. This statement is Yājñavalkya's ironic reply to those who predict that he will die because he follows the wrong order in basting omentum and ghee.

20. This *śruti* must be the passage concerning Yarvāṇa and Tarvāṇa (Mbh I p. 11 1. 11–14), which is introduced with the words (1. 11) : *evaṃ hi śrūyate*.

21. This is closest to KātyŚS 20. 8. 16 : *avabhṛtheṣṭyante'psu magnasya piṅgalakhalativiklidhaśuklasya mūrdhani juhoti jumbakāya svāheti*. See further TB 3. 9. 15. 3, ŚB 13. 3. 6. 5, VārŚS 3. 4. 5. 17, MŚS 9. 2. 5. 25.

[13]

1. The finite verb *aśvaḥ* is the 2nd sing. aor. of *śvi*, derived with the help of P. 7. 4. 18 *śvayater aḥ*. This double use of *aśvaḥ* is again referred to in the *Vṛtti* on VP 1. 72 [71] (ed. Iyer p. 135) and in the *Yoga Bhāṣya* on sūtra 3. 17.

2. Cp. VP 2. 158 : *saṃkhyāpramāṇasaṃsthānanirapekṣaḥ pravartate / bindau ca samudāye ca vācakaḥ salilādiṣu //*.

3. *Aśnoti*, *padyati* and *mimīti* are to be considered as ending in *śtip* in accordance with P. 3. 3. 108 vt. 2.

4. Cp. Mbh I p. 247 1. 14–15 (on P. 1. 2. 64 vt. 59) : *vibhinnārtheṣu ca sāmānyāt siddhaṃ sarvam / aśnoter akṣaḥ / padyateḥ pādaḥ / mimīter māṣaḥ / tatra kriyāsāmānyāt siddham /*. *Akṣa* is derived from *aś* by UṇS 3. 65 *aśer devane* ; *pāda* from *pad* with *ghañ* by P. 3. 3. 121 *halaś ca*. *Akṣa*, *pāda* and *māṣa* are the standard examples of words with more than one meaning ; see Mbh I p. 220 1. 2 (on P. 1. 2. 45 vt. 9) : *ekaś ca śabdo bahvarthaḥ / tad yathā / akṣāḥ pādāḥ māṣā iti /*.

5. See Mbh I p. 1 1. 17 and 21, p. 2 1. 1, p. 3 1. 10–11, p. 4 1. 24.

6. Cp. Mbh I p. 399 1. 25 (on P. 2. 1. 57 vt. 2).

7. The Bhāṣya (except ms G) adds *ca*.

8. This line is not very clear. It may have to be understood, and has been emended, in the light of PMS 3. 1. 2 *śeṣaḥ parārthatvāt* " The auxiliary is an ' auxiliary ' because it serves the purposes of another " (tr. Ganganatha Jha).

9. *Utpatti, saṃskāra* and *pratipatti* seem to be the constituents of action in VP 3. 7. 128cd : *karmārthā ca kriyotpattisaṃskārapratipattibhiḥ.*

10. The suffix *aṇ* is added to *vyākaraṇa* in the sense *tatra bhavaḥ* (P. 4. 3. 53), thus creating *vaiyākaraṇa* ' present in *vyākaraṇa* '. If *vyākaraṇa* meant ' word ', every possible rule, including those of Mīmāṁsā etc. as Kaiyaṭa specifies, would be *vaiyākaraṇa.*

11. The Bhāṣya reads *proktādayaś ca taddhitā nopapadyante.*

12. This is Bhartṛhari's way of paraphrasing Patañjali's *sūtra* in *na cedānīm ācāryāḥ sūtrāṇi kṛtvā nivartayanti* (Mbh I p. 12 l. 9-10). Patañjali refers here to vārttikas, in Bhartṛhari's opinion.

13. These are the sūtras of Pāṇini. Note that these lines have been discussed by Ojihara (1978 : 222 f.).

14. The specific rule is vt. 13 *proktādayaś ca taddhitāḥ*, the specific amplification vt. 12b is *bhave.*

15. The reading *viparītavyāvṛttatvam* finds support in Nāgeśa's *Uddyota* (NSP I p. 71) : *evaṃ ca viparītavyāvṛttiḥ sadṛśasaṃgrahaś ca vyākṛtir iti bhāvaḥ.*

16. That is, it concerns only the exclusion, not what is brought to mind.

17. See above.

18. See above.

19. This seems to mean that then also words like *ap* and *akṣa* would be liable to *ekaśeṣa.*

20. Kielhorn's edition has *samudāyeṣu hi śabdāḥ pravṛttā avayaveṣv api vartante.*

21. This seems to mean that the word *vyākaraṇa* applies to the sūtras of its own accord.

22. Cp. Mbh I p. 324 l. 19-20 (on P. 1. 4. 23 vt. 8) : *adhiśrayaṇodakāsecanataṇḍulāvapanaidhopakarṣaṇādikriyāḥ kurvann eva devadattaḥ pacatīty ucyate.* See also Mbh II p. 28 l. 15-18 (on P. 3. 1. 22) and VP 3. 8. 9.

23. Or vice versa. The point is that it can be said that the root *i* has one vowel, even though it is not different from the latter.

24. What is probably meant is that *eti* can be the designation of the root *i* with all its derivatives, as well as of *eti* alone.

25. The grindstone is the body, yet can be said to have that body.

26. For a detailed discussion of the meaning of *anutantra*, see Bronkhorst, " Vārttika ", section 2. 2. This term occurs in VP 1. 23 and in the *Vṛtti* thereon.

27. This does away with alternative interpretation " [mere] sound is understood ". Note that according to Limaye (1974 : 36–37) this alternative interpretation is hinted at by Bhartṛhari in the sequel.

28. On this whole passage see CE III p. 127. The sūtra *nyaṅkoḥ pratiṣedhaḥ* appears to derive from Āpiśali ; see also Limaye, 1974 : 526. Āpiśali's sūtra prohibits *ai* before *y* when *nyaṅku* is followed by *añ*.

[14]

1. See P. 1. 3. 10 *yathāsaṃkhyam anudeśaḥ samānām.*

2. This word does not occur in the passage of the Bhāṣya under consideration, but is a paraphrase of *vṛttisamavāya* in the light of the identification of *vṛtti* and *pravṛtti.*

3. This explains the absence of *-artha-* in the compound *pravṛttisamavāya.* Cp. Mbh 1 p. 406 l. 5-7 (on P. 2. 1. 69) : *samānādhikaraṇādhikāre śākapārthivādīnām upasaṃkhyānam uttarapadalopaś ca* (vt. 8) ··· *śākabhojī pārthivaḥ śākapārthivaḥ.*

4. The ambiguous nature of the compound *vṛttiprayojanaḥ* seems to be referred to. It can be a tatpuruṣa compound with *prayojana = prayojaka*; see note 15 to section 10 above. Or it is a bahuvrīhi, meaning exactly the opposite.

5. Viz., at Mbh I p. 13 l. 11-12, which interposes *pratyāhāra* between *samavāya* and *vṛtti* : *vṛttisamavāyaś ca* ··· *pratyāhārārtham / pratyāhāro vṛttyarthaḥ /.*

6. Kielhorna's edition has *ime* for *maāy.*

7. The Bhāṣya reads *vṛttisamavāya-* for *samavāya-.*

8. Note that Kaiyaṭa is of an altogether different opinion (NSP I p. 74) : *ākārādīnāṃ* (or *ekārādīnāṃ*) *saṃvṛtatvaṃ doṣaḥ / na tv akārasya tasya saṃvṛtaguṇatvāt / tatra saṃdhyakṣareṣu vivṛtatameṣūccāryeṣu saṃvṛtatvaṃ doṣaḥ /.*

9. This is a paraphrase of Mbh I p. 14 l. 2-3 *evaṃ tarhy aṣṭādaśadhā bhinnāṃ nivṛttakalādikām avarṇasya pratyāpattiṃ vakṣyāmi.* The reference is of course to P. 8. 4. 68 *a a.*

10. It is not clear what is meant. The quotation in the Bhāṣya (*āmrāś ca siktāḥ pitaraś ca prīṇitā iti*; Mbh I p. 14 l. 13) cannot be traced (Limaye, 1974: 39). This is unfortunate, for the original context of this citation might have thrown light on Bhartṛhari's remark.

11. Cp. pādas b and c of the verse quoted by Śabara on PMS 11. 1. 1: *parārthe tv aprayojakaḥ / evam eva prasaṅgaḥ syāt.* See further Bronkhorst, " Tantra and Prasaṅga ".

12. Kielhorn's edition has *tathā vākyāny api dviṣṭhāni bhavanti.*

13. *Vṛtti* on VP 2. 399 deals with this same matter.

14. Cp. *Amarakoṣa* 3. 3. 253 (p. 629): *syāt prabandhe cirātīte nikaṭāgāmike purā.* The commentator Bhānuji Dīkṣita cites the Medinī: *purā purāṇe nikaṭṇe* ...

15. Cp. the *Kāśikā* on P. 2. 3. 29: *ārācchabdo dūrāntikārthe vartate*; *Amarakoṣa* 3. 2. 242 (p. 625): *ārād dūrasamīpayoḥ.*

16. Cp. VP 2. 473–75: *dviṣṭhāni yāni vākyāni teṣv apy ekatvadarśinām / anekaśakter ekasya svaśaktiḥ pravibhajyate // atyantabhinnayor vā syāt prayoge tantralakṣaṇaḥ / upāyas tatra saṃsargaḥ pratipattṛṣu bhidyate // bhedenādhigatau pūrvaṃ śabdau tulyaśrutī punaḥ / tantreṇa pratipattāraḥ prayoktrā pratipāditāḥ / /.*

17. Cp. Śabara on PMS 11. 1. 1 : *yat sakṛt kṛtaṃ bahūnām upakaroti tat tantram ity ucyate / yathā bahūnāṃ brāhmaṇānāṃ madhye kṛtaḥ pradīpaḥ /.* The same example in VP 378d : *na tantreṇa pradīpavat.*

18. This obscure sentence may have to be interpreted in the light of VP 2. 379 : *dṛśyādis tu kriyaikāpi tathābhūteṣu karmasu / āvṛttim antareṇāpi samudāyāśrayā bhavet /.*

19. obscure. *Karaṇa* has been translated 'expression' under the influence of the *Vṛtti* on VP 2. 401 (ed. Iyer p. 303) where the *karaṇa* of a *kriyā* is said to be *abhidhāna* or *śabda*. The sentence seems to concern examples like *akṣo bhajyatām akṣo dīvyatām*, to be discussed presently.

20. Cp. Mbh I p. 353 l. 9-10 (on P. 1. 4. 105–08 *vt.* 7): *akṣā bhajyantāṃ bhakṣyantāṃ dīvyantām.* Also see VP 2. 465–66, and the *Vṛtti* on these verses (460–61 in Iyer's edition, p. 320).

21. *Culump* does not occur in the Dhātupāṭha, but is mentioned in Mbh II p. 44 l. 18 (on P. 3. 1. 35 vt. 1).

22. The Bhāṣya explains : *prakṛtiṃ dṛṣṭvā pratyaya ūhitavyaḥ pratyayaṃ ca dṛṣṭvā prakṛtir ūhitavyā* (II p. 138 l. 20).

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